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Your discussion today is particularly appropriate. 
Shortly, NATO foreign miniﬆers will hold a Trans-
atlantic dinner on the margins of their meeting in 
Brussels.
An article in a prominent American professional 
journal in summer 2003 announced “the end of At-
lanticism.” An article in another publication in Oc-
tober 2007 speaks of “Horizons of the new Atlanti-
cism”. In both Prague and Washington a month or 
so ago, conferences were held to talk about the new 
Atlanticism in Central and Eaﬆern Europe.  
What has changed? I would argue, not much. Now 
the queﬆion for you and for all of us is, in the words
of NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheﬀer “Can
the transatlantic community deliver?” Transatlantic 
relations may have suﬀered “painful adjuﬆments,”
but that period should not be confused with a de-
cline in those relations.
We in the U.S. Embassy Bratislava are involved in 
this issue not as juﬆ an intereﬆed observer, but as an
actor. We are working to increase exchanges between 
US and Slovak universities; in particular, we are 
working with Matej Bel University’s new initiative 
to eﬆablish Slovakia’s ﬁrﬆ ever graduate program in 
defense and national security ﬆudies, by facilitating
contacts with such programs at U.S. universities for 
purposes of sharing expertise on curriculum devel-
opment and program “beﬆ practices”.
The premise of your workshop today is that there is 
a shortage of Atlanticiﬆs. Is it really an option NOT
to be a transatlanticiﬆ?
We really are on the same team on moﬆ issues. Of
course, there are exceptions, but identities have 
much more in common. We do some things quite 
LAWRENCE R. SILVERMAN
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Bratislava
Introduction
well together. The world needs U.S. and the EU 
to work together. Europe leads in Bosnia, in the 
Congo. Will the EU and the U.S. have to work 
together on Kosovo? If we are to avoid another 
crisis, yes. 
Look at the issues we face, and ask whether there re-
ally is an alternative to the U.S. and the EU working 
closely together. Look at energy eﬃciency, energy
diversiﬁcation, combating climate change. Look at
the Middle Eaﬆ. Role of Quartet and Tony Blair,
France’s role in hoﬆing pledging conference for as-
siﬆance to Paleﬆinians.
President Abbas and Prime Miniﬆer Olmert will
launch full-scale negotiations, including on ﬁnal
ﬆatus issues. Would that have been possible with-
out U.S. and European cooperation? Do the two 
sides need the role of the U.S. – and Gen. Jones – if 
they are to make progress in those talks? 
On the occasion of the recent conference in Annap-
olis, Secretary Rice ﬆated a ﬆark challenge for the
international community, one that we on both side 
of the Atlantic muﬆ meet: Inaction is not an option.
I am concerned that the next generation of young 
Paleﬆinians will no longer believe in the two-ﬆate
solution. .. and so we have to make the two-ﬆate so-
lution a reality for Israelis and Paleﬆinians.
Look at Iran: Shared perception that an Iran with 
nuclear weapons would be a very dangerous and 
unacceptable situation. Sanctions are one tool 
of a diplomatic approach.  We all want a diplo-
matic solution and are operating on that basis. 
Why does the world need the U.S.  and the EU 
operating in concert? Because the international 
community would be sending a very dangerous 
signal to proliferators or potential proliferators 
8  |  N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
that the community is incapable of carrying out 
eﬀective diplomacy. The appropriate venue is the
UN SC.
Unfortunately, the U.S. and the EU had to issue 
a very negative assessment of the Iranian govern-
ment position based on laﬆ weekend’s talks in
Paris. Mr. Solana called it a disappointment, and 
the French called it a disaﬆer. Moﬆ importantly,
the new Iranian negotiator, Mr. Jalili, bluntly told 
the group anything they had discussed and any 
progress they might have made with his predeces-
sor was null and void, as if it had never happened, 
he said. He blatantly contradicted Mr. El-Baradei’s 
assessment of Iranian cooperation by saying that 
the IAEA had gotten everything it requeﬆed from
Iran. Very diﬃcult to think of an alternative to ﬆiﬀ-
er sanctions at this point.
Look at Russia: EU and U.S.  are faced with a Rus-
sia with whom we want and need good relations, 
but whose actions – in domeﬆic and foreign policy
– compromise democracy in Russia, diﬆort energy
markets and create doubts about the reliability of 
supply, and complicate the solution of Europe’s 
laﬆ ”frozen conﬂicts.” We muﬆ not ﬆop emphasiz-
ing that NATO enlargement is not directed againﬆ
Russia.
We have to think of possible development of a re-
gional missile defense architecture that would inte-
grate U.S. and Russian defensive assets, including 
radars. This would enhance our ability to monitor 
emerging threats from the Middle Eaﬆ and could
also include the use of assets from NATO Allies. 
Secretaries Rice and Gates also proposed the idea 
of a phased operations approach. This idea, which 
is ﬆill under development, proposes that the con-
ﬆruction of the sites in Poland and the Czech Re-
public would be completed, while activation of 
the sites - turning the switch, so to speak - would 
be tied to speciﬁc threat indicators. Although the
U.S. and Russia would cooperate to monitor jointly 
the Iranian missile program, the U.S. would make 
decisions on how to make our European MD ele-
ments operational in response to how we see the 
threat evolve. The assertion that Washington and 
Moscow would have to agree jointly whether a suf-
ﬁcient threat exiﬆs from a third country (such as
Iran) prior to activating any U.S. European-based 
MD syﬆem is incorrect. There is no such agreement
or underﬆanding with Russia.
Look at Afghaniﬆan, where the U.S. and the EU are
absolutely essential to the training of the Afghan 
military and police to enable this country to shed 
the tyranny of the Taliban once and for all.
Being at Atlanticiﬆ is not simply one option to be
considered. It is an essential choice if the interna-
tional community is to be able to meet its moﬆ cru-
cial challenges. Would or could another perspective 
enable the world to deal with the global challenge 
of climate change? No.
Center for Transatlantic Relations in Washington 
juﬆ released annual ﬆudy of transatlantic economy:
Inveﬆment and capital ﬂows across Atlantic con-
tinue to bind us tightly together. EU inveﬆment in
U.S. was 29 billion euro in 2005, compared to com-
bined 8 billion for China and India. It rose further 
12 percent in 2006.  EU took 59% of U.S. direct in-
veﬆment outﬂows in 2006. Together, the U.S. and
Europe represent 60 percent of the world’s total 
GDP.
The ﬁrﬆ meeting of the Transatlantic Economic
Council took place less than a month, designed to 
ﬆreamline regulations that limit trade between the
EU and the US, to the beneﬁt of the living ﬆand-
ards of both Europeans and Americans.  To quote 
the head of the European delegation to the Council, 
Gunter Verheugen, “I am absolutely impressed that 
after so few months of preparation, we have been 
able to make more progress in one meeting than we 
could do with the previous method in years.” And 
it should get even better. 
Over the paﬆ few years, U.S. and EU cooperation
on energy security and climate change issues has 
deepened and improved. As one example, the U.S. 
and the EU have set up joint biofuels and energy 
eﬃciency working groups to address some of our
common goals. These working groups have held 
join meetings on resource assessments of biofuels 
and are looking at joint research on second gen-
eration biofuels. On energy eﬃciency, the EU has
adopted the U.S.’s Energy Star label for the moﬆ
energy eﬃcient oﬃce products - a voluntary labe-
ling scheme to explain to consumers the beneﬁts of
top-rated appliances in those categories.
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On September 19, 2007 the European Commission 
issued a two draft directives aimed at separating the 
supply/production of gas and electricity from trans-
mission networks for both internal EU and exter-
nal suppliers. These unbundling proposals, which 
are very controversial in several member ﬆates,
will take at leaﬆ two years to negotiate and imple-
ment since they need to be agreed by the European 
Council and Parliament and then transposed into 
national law.
Look at Kosovo, where we make up two-thirds of 
the Troika, and more importantly, all of KFOR 
(16,000 troops) – and, hopefully a future ESDP 
Mission. It is a transatlantic eﬀort to ensure that
Kosovo authorities live up to their responsibili-
ties to protect minority rights and property. We 
want a secure, ﬆable, democratic, multi-ethnic
Kosovo.
The U.S. and the EU co-sponsor UN resolutions 
on human rights. We ﬁght transnational crime to-
gether, block ﬁnancing of terrorism, and we have
taken a major ﬆep in aviation security for everyone
– Europeans, Americans, and every other national-
ity, through our agreement on the use of Passenger 
Name records. 
Let’s look at Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) – the U.S. and the EU cooperated 
in creating a very reasonable and ﬂexible initiative
to address the concerns that Russia has expressed. 
So far, the Russians do not seem to be in a mode 
to ﬁnd a conﬆructive solution. So, on the day that
Israelis and Paleﬆinians begin their peace negotia-
tions, Moscow may suspend it participation in the 
CFE Treaty. But it will not be for lack of eﬀort on
the part of the U.S. and the EU.
The United States and our Allies have responded 
clearly that we do not agree that those ﬆated con-
cerns, which relate primarily to NATO enlarge-
ment and its consequences, conﬆitute a suﬃcient
basis to suspend implementation of this major 
Treaty. We have held ﬁrmly on the issue of ﬂanks.
However, we are working to try to bridge what cur-
rently divides us. Russia’s threat to suspend imple-
mentation of the current CFE Treaty is a matter 
of serious concern to the United States and to our 
NATO Allies. We have said that publicly and we 
have certainly conveyed that message in our bilat-
eral meetings. 
I want to ﬆress that, in developing these ideas,
the United States and NATO Allies have worked 
hand-in-glove. We also have been consulting close-
ly with the Georgian and Moldovan governments. 
I personally traveled to Chisinau after the “2+2” 
meeting to consult with President Voronin and his 
government, and separately met with Georgian 
Foreign Miniﬆer Bezhuashvili to elicit his views as
well. Assiﬆant Secretary Fried was juﬆ in Tbilisi for
further consultations. A transparent, consultative 
process is a key to maintaining Allied unity and ef-
fectiveness. 
Indeed, we have been brainﬆorming with Allies,
and with Moldova and Georgia, to develop crea-
tive ideas to help us move forward. Georgian of-
ﬁcials have made clear that they consider CFE
and the Iﬆanbul commitments to have been re-
sponsible for the withdrawal of nearly all of Rus-
sia’s military bases and equipment from Georgian 
territory. They consider this a major success and 
they, like we, support the Treaty and the Adapted 
Treaty. 
More broadly, the U.S. and the EU should see cur-
rent problems in relations with Russia as a chal-
lenge to be faced jointly.  The U.S. and the EU 
need each other’s complementary eﬀorts to help
bring about a more conﬆructive Russia approach
to Iran, CFE, Korea, Kosovo and other areas. The 
U.S.  and the EU are working together to look 
at ways of reducing energy dependence on one 
source. We should jointly encourage Russia’s ac-
cession to the WTO.
How are U.S.-EU relations?  I think much better 
than they were in 2003, but, as ﬆudies like Trans-
atlantic Trends indicate, attitudes are not as posi-
tive as we would like them to be. That said, we now 
have a French American Caucus the U.S. Congress. 
That’s progress. In this case, public attitudes will 
lag behind those of policymakers, I believe.
There is a real need to build more educational link-
ages between both sides of the Atlantic. GMF fel-
lows is a great program, but it can reach only a lim-
ited number of people, albeit inﬂuential ones.  
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You are the paﬆ, current and future policymak-
ers or policy shapers. So whatever analysis of 
transatlantic relations you make today, remember 
the moﬆ important thing: shaping the European
- U.S.  relationship and U.S.-European policy in 
dealing with the world’s challenges, is not a spec-
tator sport. You are participants, and you have ob-
ligations and responsibilities – to educate yourself, 
educate others, and to make your voices heard at 
the higheﬆ levels.
Opening remarks to the workshop „Nurturing At-
lanticiﬆs in Central Eaﬆern Europe - a Neglected
Territory?“ held in Bratislava on December 6, 2007.
PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
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MARTIN BÚTORA AND OĽGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ1
Atlanticists, Transatlantic Agenda and U.S.-Slovakia 
Relationships in Contemporary Slovakia
INTRODUCTION 
As we were ﬁnalizing this ﬆudy, three events have
occurred.
Firﬆ, in March 2008, Slovak Interior Miniﬆer Rob-
ert Kaliňák and his American counterpart U.S. State 
Secretary for Homeland Security Michael Chertoﬀ
signed a Memorandum of Underﬆanding concern-
ing a visa-free travel regime between the two coun-
tries in Washington on Monday which outlines 
ﬆeps to put the country on track for visa-free travel
to the United States.2 
Secondly, in April 2008, The American Chamber of 
Commerce (AmCham) informed its members that 
as a recent illuﬆration of AmCham’s long-laﬆing
active engagement in consulting and commenting 
lawmaking covering business environment in Slo-
vakia, its comments has been incorporated into the 
draft of the Legislative Intent of the Law on Voca-
tional Education, an important piece of legislation 
in the transformation of education curricula to bet-
ter respond to the current labor market needs.3
Thirdly, in May 2008, The Center for North Amer-
ican Studies was launched at The University of 
Economics in Bratislava, in cooperation with the 
non-governmental Euro-Atlantic Center. The new 
inﬆitution will ﬆudy and disseminate knowledge
about the United States and Canada and organize 
ﬆudents and faculty exchanges. Also, commemo-
rating the 15th anniversary of its eﬆablishment, the
reinvigorated Slovak Atlantic Commission has an-
nounced an ambitious continuation of its activi-
ties. “We are a value-based organization,” says the 
SAC in its ﬆatement from June 2008. “We believe
in ﬆrong security community; we believe in trans-
atlantic partnership and its values; we believe in 
international cooperation.” A reﬂection of these
ambitions is the SAC’s involvement in the prepa-
ration of the 4th International Security Conference 
GLOBSEC 2009.
It would be obviously premature to make any op-
timiﬆic conclusions about a revival of mutual Slo-
vak-American relations only on these events. Nev-
ertheless, they can serve not only as a prelude to 
our discussion on current ﬆatus of Atlanticism in
Slovakia, but they also suggeﬆ the future ﬁelds and
terrains where the U. S. - Slovak cooperation and 
Atlanticiﬆ agenda can be nurtured and cultivated
– business, economy, education, security, young 
generation, people-to-people contacts.
The ﬆudy is divided into two parts. The ﬁrﬆ one
deals with hiﬆory and politics. Any analysis of Slo-
1  The ﬁrﬆ part of the text was authored by Martin Bútora; the second part was co-authored by Martin Bútora and Oľga
Gyárfášová.
2  Do Ameriky pôjdeme bez víz už v októbri [Visa-free travel to the USA will be introduced already in October 2008]. Hos-
podárske noviny, 4.6.2008.
3  “We are very proud of the fact that the Miniﬆry of Education has oﬃcially invited AmCham to join the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Law on Vocational Schools and thus to be one of the key subjects participating on actual drafting of the 
Law on Vocational Education and Training. In addition, AmCham Slovakia has collected case ﬆudies of successful busi-
ness-academic cooperation which were presented to our readers. (…) We hope that the modernized syﬆem of education
in Slovakia will more ﬂexibly reﬂect labor market needs; this will eventually lead to increased employment and a better
quality of life for Slovak citizens,” writes AmCham in its journal Connections in April 2008.
1 4  |  N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
vak-American relationships cannot avoid a refer-
ence to modern hiﬆory, to our legacies. As a new
chapter of this hiﬆory ﬆarted to be written after
the fall of communism, it is useful to oﬀer a peri-
odization of Slovak-American relationships after 
1989 which reﬂects diﬀerent phases in America’s
perception of Slovakia and vice versa. The next 
passage describes some more recent foreign policy 
tendencies in Slovakia (after the 2006 elections), 
which have materialized together with the current 
decrease of Atlanticism. Also, some additional fac-
tors inﬂuencing Atlanticism in Slovakia (the phe-
nomenon of “Europeanization” will be brieﬂy dis-
cussed).
The second part brings an overview of inﬆitutions
and actors active in developing Slovak-American 
relations and/or working on diﬀerent aspects of
transatlantic agenda.
PART ONE: FROM LEGACIES TO 
CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT
1. LEGACIES
Some of the legacies are similar to other Central-
Eaﬆern European ﬆates, others are diﬀerent.
Among the similarities, it is ﬁrﬆ and foremoﬆ mas-
sive and widespread emigration to America. For 
more than a century, the American dream presented 
an attractive promise of escaping the poverty and 
oppression at home. The second and third genera-
tions of immigrants have acquired the qualities that 
were lacking back in the “old countries”: a serene 
self-conﬁdence and a sharper sense of personal re-
sponsibility. Each face, each little house, tells the 
ﬆory of a personal ﬆruggle to make the American
dream of liberty, opportunity, equality, dignity, and 
self-government come true.
And even if this period has been ﬆudied also in the
paﬆ, the limited space for free research has not al-
lowed the broader public to fully embrace both the 
very subﬆance and the nuances of the Slovak immi-
gration to America. On the one hand, due to a cer-
tain “return” of topics and themes typical for the 
period of mass emigration (revival of capitalism, 
high unemployment in some areas of the country) 
as well as due to some new phenomenon (worries 
of brain drain), in the laﬆ decade there has been
invigorated intereﬆ in situations related to emi-
gration and immigration. Again and again, peo-
ple are re-discovering the high numbers of those 
who have left their homeland and the impact of it 
for life at home4. There is also shared underﬆand-
ing of the role which those migrants who returned 
have played in Slovak life at home, as “moderniz-
ers” in social and economic terms.5 The ﬆudents in
schools are taught about political activiﬆs among
the Slovak Americans (“americkí Slováci” in Slo-
vak) who were free to associate, who supported 
Slovak claims in the laﬆ decades of the Monarchy,
made common treaties with the Czechs (Cleveland 
and Pittsburg Treaty), and contributed to the crea-
tion of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. (They have played 
a more problematic role in the following decades, 
at the eve of WW II and later, especially in periods 
when their leadership ranks were penetrated by per-
sons connected with the war-time Slovak State in 
1939-1945.)
On the other hand, general public has not yet fully 
comprehended that the whole “emigration/immi-
gration agenda” in Slovak-American relations was 
not only about poor Slovaks seeking a better life 
for themselves and their families (and, at leaﬆ some
of them, continuing it after their return), but also 
about enriching the new American homeland by 
their contributions, helping to ﬆrengthen the soci-
etal fabric of American life, to build American econ-
4  In a recent reference to Zemplín region in Eaﬆern Slovakia, hiﬆorian Martin Molnár shows that practically each family
has had a relative who emigrated, and the original expatriates from the times of the Auﬆro-Hungarian Monarchy have
been followed and accompanied by other dozens of thousands leaving Czechoslovakia due to economic diﬃculties in 20-
ties and 30-ties or due to political reasons in 1938-39, in 1945, after 1948, and 1968. See Martin Molnár: Za vysťahovalectvom 
je zlá ekonomická a sociálna situácia. [Emigration is caused by bad economic and social situation] TASR, 19. mája, 2008.
5  “A particular social group emerged - which we already know well from literary sources - called ‘Amerikáni’,” says Molnár. 
“If they brought money with them, they bought land, built brick houses, their children went to diﬀerent schools, they
dressed diﬀerently etc. And that was good, because they brought from abroad experience and innovations, which could
only be beneﬁcial for this underdeveloped country.”  Molnár: Za vysťahovalectvom…
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omy, prosperity, liberty, and security, to encourage 
and broaden American imagination in art. In fact, 
it is only now, after almoﬆ two decades of poﬆ-com-
muniﬆ transformation, that Slovakia is gradually
revealing the richness of mutual ties in the paﬆ6 – so 
it was not by chance that the above-mentioned inau-
guration of the newly eﬆablished Center for North
American Studies at the University of Economics in 
Bratislava was greeted by a new ballet performance 
inspired by Andy Warhol (in fact, until recently, the 
Ruthenian or Carpatho-Rusyn patriots have been 
much more vociferously claiming their closeness to 
this avant-garde artiﬆ whose parents were born in
Medzilaborce in Eaﬆern Slovakia).
This lack of conﬁdence, so important for develop-
ing fruitful and equal partnerships, has been re-
ﬂected in the fact that Slovaks have not had great
political or cultural ﬁgures and/or great political
events that would capture American imagination 
– like Poles with Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimi-
erz Puławski, with Warsaw uprising, with Solidar-
ity and Lech Walesa; like Hungarians with Lajos 
Kossuth who has a buﬆ in the U.S. Congress, and
with Hungarian revolution in 1956; like Czechs 
with Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk whose monument 
was unveiled in Washington in 2003, with Václav 
Havel and freedom-ﬁghters. We have not had our
own Czesław Miłosz or Milan Kundera. While all 
those nations, together with the Baltics, have been 
perceived as the victims of oppression – the Slo-
vaks were remembered in American iconography as 
a part of this ﬆory, regretful, but heroic, only in so
far as we were a part of the former Czechoslovakia 
which has presented a warning teﬆimony of Weﬆ-
ern failures and defeats – Munich in 1938, the com-
muniﬆ coup d’etat in 1948, and Soviet occupation
in 1968. Once Slovakia was considered as a separate 
entity, it was, unfortunately, rather associated with 
the Holocauﬆ than with the tradition of anti-Nazi
Uprising againﬆ the Nazis in 1944.
Another legacy, which cannot be ignored, is that, 
unlike, for inﬆance, in Poland, America has not
been perceived as our prime ally ﬆanding againﬆ
“eternal enemies” (that is, in case of Poland, againﬆ
Prussia and Nazi Germany, as well as Czariﬆ and
Bolshevik Russia). Moreover, the relationships 
towards Russia and Russians were more positive 
than, for inﬆance, in Poland, in Hungary or in Bal-
tic ﬆates. Indeed, with the exception of Soviet in-
vasion in 1968 when Russian tanks have eventually 
removed a popular leader of Prague Spring Alex-
ander Dubček, an ethnic Slovak, from the scene, 
there has not been a tradition of mass anti-Russian 
feelings in Slovakia. On the contrary, Slovak Ro-
manticism in the 19th century and some of its lead-
ers saw the Slavic Russia as a possible savior from 
enforced Magyarization (and) Weﬆern liberalism.
(To put it metaphorically, in Bratislava, the capital 
of Slovakia, one cannot ﬁnd on the main City Hall
a ﬆatement like that by President Bush saying that
“anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy 
has also made an enemy of the United States of 
America”...)
However, in spite of those ambivalences, one can 
say that thanks to numerous personal and family 
ties, during the late 19th century and the ﬁrﬆ decades
of the 20th century, for average people the relation-
ships were by and large rather positive than nega-
tive and for many generations America was simply 
America – a promised land of opportunities.
This tradition has been broken by two regimes, 
Slovak wartime ﬆate, Hitler’s ally who in 1941 for-
mally declared “war” to the United States, and by 
communiﬆ regime. They eﬆablished a tradition of
political anti-Americanism, which has been resurg-
ing in 90-ties and later. Usually it has been a part of 
a broader political phenomenon, that of anti-Weﬆ-
ernism. In the ﬁeld of foreign policy it inclined to
the concept of Slovakia as a “bridge between Weﬆ
and Eaﬆ” or, worse, an isolationiﬆic-neutraliﬆ ver-
sion of Slovak foreign policy. But even in commu-
niﬆ era, some popular positive images of America
were widespread – like that of American culture, 
especially of music (from rock and roll and beat 
6  One of the illuﬆrations is the US Embassy-sponsored hiﬆoric photo exhibit, “Slovakia, Slovaks and Connections on 
Hiﬆoric Poﬆcards and Photographs,” opened in May 2008 which, according to an American diplomat Keith Hughes
“highlights the very deep and very personal relationship between Slovaks and Americans.” See Embassy Events, http://
slovakia.usembassy.gov/.
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to jazz and proteﬆ songs), ﬁlm, and literature; like
admiration of American landing on the Moon as 
a great technological achievement and an evidence 
of the U.S. superiority in comparison to the Soviet 
Union; like a country enabling its citizens to enjoy 
various life-ﬆyles; like a country of public ﬁgures
emanating spontaneous sympathy, from John Fit-
zgerald Kennedy to Martin Luther King.
2.  STAGES OF MUTUAL PERCEPTION 
AFTER 1989
Since 1989 to 2006, we have been witnessing at 
leaﬆ three phases of American political perception
of Slovakia and ﬁve ﬆages of Slovak perception of
America.
On the American side, during the ﬁrﬆ phase Slova-
kia has moved from a relatively unknown territory 
to a problematic territory with ambivalent chances 
to maﬆer its independence in a democratic and pro-
Weﬆern way. The ﬁrﬆ symptoms of nationalism in 
1990 and later have been critically portraying by 
Weﬆern media. After the defeat of liberal-conserva-
tive government in 1992 elections and soon after the 
dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia the national popu-
liﬆs led by Vladimír Mečiar and supported by Slo-
vak National Party took the helm, and the revived 
anti-American rhetoric has moved from the margin 
to the center. At the end of this phase, Slovakia was 
labeled as a “black hole” in political jargon and 
only a “partially free” country in Freedom House 
assessment.
The second phase has ﬆarted after the 1998 par-
liamentary elections with a sort of “discovery” of 
Slovakia’s potentials, followed by U.S. support for 
entry into OECD, NATO, and the EU and has been 
completed by relatively frequent high-level political 
contacts, including a ﬁrﬆ-ever visit of the U.S. Pres-
ident to Slovakia in 2005, and with a U.S. recogni-
tion of Slovak reform dynamism. In political and 
business circles, the relationships were perceived as 
very favorable and Slovakia was often mentioned as 
an example of a “successful catch-up” in the process 
of democratic transformation.
The third phase has ﬆarted after the 2006 parlia-
mentary elections in Slovakia. On the one hand, it 
reﬂects a decreased intensity of high-level political
contacts (which is paradoxically co-determined by 
Slovakia’s integration success and a certain “lack of 
agenda” in mutual cooperation), a certain U.S. em-
barrassment around political orientation and rhe-
torical ﬆatements of some representatives of the cur-
rent leading Slovak political eﬆablishment, as well
as disagreements on some political and security is-
sues (Kosovo, missile defense). On the other hand, 
continuing U.S. economic presence and business ties 
provide a solid soil for nurturing mutual ties.
On the Slovak side, at the very beginning, in the 
ﬁrﬆ phase, it was rather lack of knowledge, una-
wareness or even ignorance.
Very soon, however, during the second phase, 
America was discovered or “rediscovered”, by ac-
tors of civic society, by businessmen, and some poli-
ticians.
After turbulences in mid 90-ties, this was followed 
by the third phase full of with suspicion, resent-
ments, antipathy or even hoﬆility demonﬆrated by
political eﬆablishment under Mečiar, and by feel-
ings of sympathy and hope on the side of demo-
cratic opposition.
Then, after the defeat of Mečiar’s camp in 1998, 
came a relatively long-laﬆing fourth phase, which 
in its beﬆ part could be called “a love aﬀair”. Led by 
the new adminiﬆration of Mikuláš Dzurinda, Slova-
kia, a country without ﬆrong Weﬆern patrons and
sympathizers, all of the sudden has opted for and 
has acquired a sympathetic ally and partner. This 
has been a real U-turn in mutual relationships that 
resulted in multi-layer cooperation, in U.S. sup-
port of Slovakia’s integration eﬀorts, and in a full
Slovak support for the U.S. foreign policy, both in 
Clinton and Bush II era. The word “multi-layer” 
is not a phrase: there have been intensive political, 
military, and security relationships, there has been 
progress in economic links, there has been coopera-
tion in the ﬁeld of civil society, and there have been
many people to people contacts.
The ﬁfth phase has ﬆarted two years ago, when
elections in Slovakia won a party whose chairman 
has been a permanent critic of U.S. foreign policy, 
and since then, oﬃcial political relations did not
see much development. Robert Fico, the new Prime 
Miniﬆer, has repeatedly criticized not only sending
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a Slovak military unit to Iraq, but also the “exces-
sively pro-American” policy of the previous Dzurin-
da government. The new adminiﬆration promptly
negotiated with its U.S. and Iraqi counterparts, 
and the Slovak military contingent returned home 
at the end of February 2007. At the same time, there 
is continuity on the level of the Foreign Miniﬆry,
which keeps the relationships going with an appro-
priate diplomatic routine. While vivid links of the 
business sector with its American partners are ﬂour-
ishing, the capacities of current political opposition 
do not seem to be suﬃcient for further cultivation
of their relationships with U.S. partners, and civil 
society actors are rather concentrating the eﬀorts to
develop their “niches” within European Union.
This periodization suggeﬆs that perhaps with the
exception of Serbia, there has not been any other 
“new democracy” in the Central-Eaﬆern and South-
ern Europe which was led for quite a long period of 
time by an anti-American political representation. 
This could also to a certain extent explain the very 
opposite behavior of those Slovak political elites, 
which has successfully turned the country to the 
Weﬆ after the change in 1998 elections.
And it should be also reminded, that the current 
cabinet is made up not only of the victorious Smer-
Social Democracy, which might be reluctant to-
ward warmer relationships with the US because of 
its ideological background, but also of parties for 
whom relations with the US were a sensitive issue. 
In 1994-1998, the Movement for a Democratic Slo-
vakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar and the Slo-
vak National Party (SNS) chaired by Ján Slota were 
part of a government that led Slovakia into interna-
tional isolation and delayed the country’s entry to 
NATO and the EU. 
2.1. Foreign Policy Context
This brief description of phases of mutual relation-
ships and their perception should be also evaluated 
in the broader context of Slovakia’s foreign poli-
cy. Since the emergence of an independent Slovak 
Republic in 1993, the country’s foreign policy has 
gradually come to reﬆ on three fundamental pillars:
an European pillar (full integration into the Euro-
pean Union – EU), transatlantic pillar (developing 
transatlantic links through membership in NATO), 
and neighborly pillar (promoting good relations 
with neighboring countries).
Complementing the three main pillars were addi-
tional three accents related to the country’s bilateral 
and regional relations. The ﬁrﬆ was an emphasis
on Visegrad cooperation, which was of particular 
importance because political, practical, and sym-
bolic support of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic was inﬆrumental in the successful com-
pletion of Slovakia’s EU and NATO integration. 
As time went by, Slovakia also began to accentuate 
good relations with Ukraine, its largeﬆ neighbor,
revising the special “above-ﬆandard relationship”
with Russia that the Mečiar regime had foﬆered as
an alternative to Slovakia’s weﬆward integration.
The third accent concerned the Balkans, where the 
sharing of Slovakia’s own transition experiences 
helped promote democratization, economic devel-
opment, and prospects for EU integration.
Rounding out the three pillars and three accents, 
Slovak foreign policy gradually developed three 
speciﬁc features. The ﬁrﬆ was greater predictabil-
ity, reliability, and consiﬆency on the international
scene. A second feature was activism on various lev-
els. Slovakia was a ﬆaunch advocate of further EU
enlargement, not only for Bulgaria and Romania 
but also for Croatia and Serbia. Slovakia also began 
exporting the lessons of its economic and ﬆructural
reforms to the Balkan countries and Ukraine, espe-
cially the lessons learned in catching up with the in-
tegration process. Slovak diplomats earned respect 
from Montenegrin, Serbian, and EU oﬃcials for
their professional conduct in preparing the refer-
endum on independence in Montenegro. Slovakia 
was also elected a non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council, where it was keeping clear of 
direct involvement in complicated regional conﬂicts
on the Council’s agenda, and where the country has 
typically voted with its NATO and EU allies. The 
third feature has been cooperation between oﬃcial
diplomacy and civic diplomacy. Think tanks spe-
cializing in international relations emerged hand 
in hand with the birth of Slovakia’s independent 
foreign policy, actively inﬂuenced policy-making
and became involved in the ﬆruggle over the pro-
Weﬆern orientation practically from the outset.
Civil society organizations participated in public 
debates, and action-oriented NGOs engaged in 
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direct actions, launching projects to generate sup-
port for Slovakia’s NATO and EU memberships or 
to provide development and democracy assiﬆance
abroad.
All that has contributed to a respected position of 
the Slovak Republic on international scene. Though 
a small ﬆate, Slovakia has become a valuable partner
for its allies in the EU, for the U.S. as well as for the 
countries ﬆriving for democratic reforms. Through
its foreign policy activism, due to its reform dyna-
mism at home and because of its readiness to share 
its experiences with the others, Slovakia has been 
contributing to international security and ﬆability
also indirectly, emanating a sort of “soft power”, and 
by its successes presenting an attractive and accept-
able pattern for countries with similar problematic 
hiﬆorical burdens and legacies, an example showing
that a positive change is possible.
Already in 2002, Karen Henderson, a scholar well 
acquainted with Slovakia’s conditions could say 
that while “Slovakia really became visible to the 
outside world for the ﬁrﬆ time when it became an
independent ﬆate on 1 January 1993,” since then,
“it has become one of the moﬆ prosperous poﬆ-
communiﬆ ﬆates.”7 According to another foreign 
observer, while Slovakia was not so much a foreign 
policy player on a global scale, it has become in-
creasingly signiﬁcant on a regional level. In 2005, at
the time of Bush-Putin summit held in Bratislava, 
John Kubiniec, regional director for Central and 
Eaﬆern Europe at Freedom House in Warsaw, com-
mented: “Slovaks are great believers and support-
ers of the transitional democratic experience, not 
juﬆ its politicians but also its business people, civic 
leaders, NGOs and think tanks – even the media. 
If you look at Slovakia in that context, it’s a very 
important country.”8
In fact, thanks to the necessity to “catch-up” with 
other aspirants, foreign policy ﬆeps undertaken by
the Dzurinda cabinet have been coherent, and on 
vital goals, national consensus has been achieved. 
And this has brought results: membership in 
NATO, EU, and OECD, inﬂux of FDI, and enter-
ing Euro zone in 2009.
After 2006 elections a new phase has ﬆarted. While
some goals of the previous era have persiﬆed (en-
tering the Schengen area and the Euro-zone) and 
in several ﬁelds the continuity has been preserved
(cooperation within EU and NATO; involvement 
in Weﬆern Balkan; support of Ukraine’s integra-
tion aspirations), at the same time, some new ac-
cents have appeared.
As we suggeﬆed, in 1999-2006 period the transatlan-
tic pillar and the close relationship with the United 
States belonged to ﬁrm fundaments of Slovakia’s
foreign policy. The key security and defense ﬆrat-
egy documents approved by the government and 
parliament in 2005 deﬁned Slovakia’s orientation as
“Euro-Atlantic”. According to them, Slovakia sup-
ports NATO as the basis of the European security 
architecture, and welcomes a ﬆrengthened security
role for the EU only if it is compatible with commit-
ments towards NATO. Besides military and security 
cooperation, Slovakia, though a small country, had 
become a valued U.S. partner in recent years due to 
its clear pro-Weﬆern orientation, its courage in im-
plementing diﬃcult political and economic reforms
(i.e. new tax policy), its high economic growth, its 
willingness to share its transition experiences with 
neighboring ﬆates and the countries of Weﬆern
Balkan. All this was reﬂected in the high level of
relations between both countries, and in frequent 
meetings between the higheﬆ ﬆate oﬃcials.
7  Karen Henderson: The Escape from Invisibility. New York, Routledge 2002.
8  “Slovakia has demonﬆrated a remarkable turnaround in the laﬆ six or seven years in terms of building a democratic so-
ciety. As such, it is a ﬆabilizing presence in a region that is more or less in transition,” continues the article in The Slovak 
Spectator. “According to Kubiniec, Slovakia is an ally of the US and a vigorous proponent of democratic values; at the 
same time, it retains neutrality that is important to ﬆates that have not yet embraced democracy. What makes Slovakia
ﬆand out from its neighbors, according to Freedom House, is the country’s intereﬆ in ﬆaying engaged with the political
deﬆiny of the region. Slovakia has not so much attempted to insert itself but rather has attempted to play an important
role, working towards supporting transitions to democracy in other poﬆ-Communiﬆ ﬆates in a way that very few coun-
tries in the region have. In other words, Slovakia is more willing than its neighbors to export its experience to countries 
like Ukraine and the Balkans.” Julie Garrison Frederick: Regional mentor to its neighbors. Bush-Putin summit - Slovakia 
remains engaged in political deﬆiny of the region. The Slovak Spectator, 21. 2. 2005.
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The oﬃcial Slovak-American relations, which have
reached a pinnacle of intensity at the beginning of 
2006, have somewhat cooled oﬀ in 2007-2008. The
two countries continue to consult on routine busi-
ness and to cooperate in ﬁghting terrorism and
within the NATO framework. Slovakia’s miniﬆers
make visits to the United States, but in fact, the 
only perceptible Slovak diplomatic initiative with 
respect to the U.S. was participating in a joint eﬀort
with other new members of the EU to encourage 
the Bush adminiﬆration to liberalize its visa poli-
cies – which is not enough for full-ﬂedged allied re-
lations. More importantly, PM Fico has repeatedly 
criticized the U.S.-led eﬀorts to inﬆall anti-missile
shield in the Czech Republic and Poland and even 
has not hesitated to accept the language and argu-
ments of its moﬆ vocal critic, Russian President Pu-
tin. And it is not juﬆ the anti-missile syﬆem where
the Slovak Premier and some of the miniﬆers in his
cabinet or some of his partners in the current ruling 
coalition have been voicing opinions and positions 
similar to those pronounced by the Russians, ﬆart-
ing from Iraq to Kosovo. 
At the same time, after some turmoil, the U.S. part-
ners have appreciated Slovakia’s position regarding 
to commitments in Afghaniﬆan, including the re-
cent promise to increase the number of troops from 
current 69 to 280 by 2010.
2.2. The “Europeanization” Context
Besides some particular Slovak aspects, there are 
also other factors inﬂuencing Atlanticism in the
CEE ﬆates which are not very favorable for the cul-
tivation of Atlanticism.
As we already suggeﬆed, the ﬁrﬆ widespread phe-
nomenon is continuing Europeanization of life, 
which has become an encompassing reality. The ad-
miniﬆration has declared completing of the integra-
tion process, i.e. joining the Schengen area by the 
beginning of 2008 and adopting the single currency 
by the beginning of 2009 to be two of its immedi-
ate priorities. And after the European inﬆitutions
have approved the adoption of euro in Slovakia, 
both the public discourse as well as private atten-
tion is overwhelmingly devoted to diﬀerent aspects
of this process and American/Atlantic/Transatlan-
tic themes are sometimes limited to information on 
decreasing value of US dollar…9
Slovaks have repeatedly expressed highly positive 
ﬆance towards the EU, which is now supported by
the injections from EU ﬆructural funds helping
Slovakia’s economy to prosper, Slovakia’s infra-
ﬆructure to improve and Slovakia’s regions to re-
vive. Similarly to other new EU member ﬆates, in-
ﬂux of money from EU ﬆructural fund is immense,
and transformative eﬀects of the Union’s manna
are visible even in the moﬆ diﬆant villages in the
countryside.
It will take some time until the general public will 
ﬆart to pay more attention not only to materialiﬆic,
but also to other diﬆinctive features of “European
way of life” that are reﬂecting values and poﬆ-ma-
terialiﬆic attitudes shared with many Americans, in-
cluding issues like good governance, sensitiveness 
towards minorities, quality of democracy, respect 
to women and elderly etc. Paradoxically, this might 
become one of the channels through which at leaﬆ
a part of “Trans-Atlantic agenda” could be re-invig-
orated.
Secondly, the ongoing Europeanization matters 
especially for the young generations: their lives, 
their economic careers, their prospects, their every-
day reality will be more and more connected with 
the political, economic and cultural territory of Eu-
rope. Besides their own countries, their political so-
cialization will take place in the European Union 
– and thus, American inspirations, American ideas, 
and American projects that have been so relevant 
and formative for the “revolutionary generation” 
in 1989 and afterwards might become less signiﬁ-
cant.
Thirdly, there is an issue of the intensity of the con-
tacts. The sooner the visa will be abolished and 
9  Among the exceptions are events around upcoming presidential elections in the US. In fact, those media, journaliﬆs and
analyﬆs who pay attention to it, tend to believe that transatlantic links and US-EU cooperation might improve with the
new American president.
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a symmetric partnership will be inﬆalled, the bet-
ter. It does not mean the removal of visa is a pan-
acea and one cannot predict in how far this might 
inﬂuence the development of future relationships.
But the persiﬆence of the current ﬆatus is counter-
productive. We know from the surveys that only 
four percent of Slovaks have ever visited the U.S. 
(the higheﬆ number in the “old EU” is for the Brit-
ish – 46 percent, the loweﬆ for Portuguese – 11 per-
cent). Friendship and closeness is promoted and 
nurtured by frequent contacts and the current ﬆa-
tus is both embittering for the new EU and NATO 
member ﬆates and counterproductive for Ameri-
cans as well.
PART TWO: INSTITUTIONS AND 
ACTORS PROMOTING U.S. – SLOVAK 
R0ELATIONSHIPS AND TRANSATLANTIC 
AGENDA10
3.  EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION, 
U.S.-SLOVAKIA COOPERATION, AND 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
After the political change in 1998-1999, the key 
foreign policy and security goals of Slovakia were 
syﬆematically supported by public diplomacy. As
some of those goals, especially the NATO enlarge-
ment, have been also in accordance with the foreign 
policy agenda of then U.S. governments – both 
Clinton and Bush adminiﬆration – programs and
projects in this ﬁeld have been supported and/or
sponsored by both U.S.-based as well as Slovak in-
ﬆitutions and organizations, including think-tanks
and other NGOs.
3.1.  U.S.-Slovakia Action Commission  
 (U.S.-EU-Slovakia Action Commission)
In the time of its creation (Spring 2000), the U.S.-
Slovakia Action Commission (USSAC) was one 
of the crucial tools to advance a bilateral agenda be-
tween the two countries. After gaining U.S. support 
for Slovakia’s membership in the OECD, and after 
the beginning of negotiations on major inveﬆment
of US Steel in Slovakia, the USSAC was formed as 
another powerful inﬆrument of multilevel coopera-
tion between the U.S. and Slovakia.
The concept has proven very useful in bilateral re-
lations between the United States and Poland, but 
also in Romania (until 2000) and later in Bulgaria. 
In general, such commissions have been operating 
in the context of the countries‘queﬆ for full integra-
tion into the Euro-Atlantic ﬆructures; in Slovakia,
its goal was to assiﬆ the government in the reform
process, while providing an independent platform 
for an exchange of views on relevant topics and so-
lutions to relevant problems. The U.S.-Slovakia 
Action Commission (later renamed to US-EU-
Slovakia Action Commission) consiﬆed of three
working groups – Business Conditions, Banking & 
Capital Formation, and Security & Foreign Policy.
The USSAC was an initiative of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington D.C.; the Slovak Foreign Policy As-
sociation (SFPA) was CSIS’s counterpart organi-
zation in Slovakia. Under the leadership of George 
Handy, Director for International Commissions 
at CSIS, with the support by President Schuﬆer,
Prime Miniﬆer Dzurinda, the Commission was
launched in March 2000 as a non-governmental fo-
rum bringing together Slovak and American lead-
ers and experts to discuss areas of great concern in 
Slovakia’s continuing transformation. Slovak Em-
bassy in Washington was inﬆrumental in coordi-
nating these eﬀorts. Commission members includ-
ed business leaders, policy experts, and scholars. 
Government oﬃcials also participated, in order to
ﬆrengthen the private-public sector partnership,
but they were not commission members, so as to 
ensure that they judge the commission’s recom-
mendations objectively. The commission provided 
the participants with a unique atmosphere of can-
did exchange so that they can determine what pri-
orities and policy approaches should be chosen in 
Slovakia’s reform process (discussions focused on 
recommendations for taxation, law enforcement, 
transparency, intellectual property rights, meas-
ures of banking induﬆry that could contribute to
10  Michal Kiška, ﬆudent of the University of London, who has been an intern at the Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs in June 2007,
collected some background materials for this part of ﬆudy.
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a greater inﬂux of capital and inveﬆment in Slo-
vakia etc.). The formal opening of the U.S.-Slova-
kia Action Commission took place in Bratislava in 
November 2000, and was co-chaired by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski of CSIS and Eugen Jurzyca, Director of 
the economic think-tank INEKO. Later, former Re-
publican Senator William Roth, a legendary ﬁgure
in the process of NATO enlargement, became the 
U.S. Co-Chair of the Commission.
The security element was one of the moﬆ important
dimensions of USSAC’s activities. Under the chair-
manship of Janusz Bugajski, Director of the Eaﬆ
European Studies Program of CSIS, Theodore E. 
Russell, former U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia, and 
Alexander Duleba, Director of the SFPA, the Secu-
rity and Foreign Policy Working Group outlined 
a proposal to better coordinate the diﬀerent pro-
grams that bring Slovakia closer to joining NATO. 
It has also reviewed and approved a security “white 
paper” Slovakia’s Security and Foreign Policy Strategy that 
enumerated a detailed liﬆ of security concerns on
which Slovakia muﬆ focus over the next decade.11 
This policy paper outlined a ﬆrategic plan for Slo-
vakia’s security, emphasizing why Slovakia is now 
poised, politically, economically, and militarily, to 
become a member of NATO in the second round of 
enlargement scheduled.
The report received great attention due to its early 
release in Bratislava in May 2001 at a conference 
on NATO expansion where nine Central and Eaﬆ
European countries reaﬃrmed their intentions for
NATO membership. The government of Slovakia 
organized the conference and representatives of 
current NATO member countries attended it as 
well. Much of the discussion at the conference sur-
rounded Russia’s desire to “veto” the enlargement 
process. “The CSIS Policy paper became a signiﬁ-
cant part of the debate when the Russian Embassy 
in Bratislava refuted its contents, speciﬁcally a sec-
tion written about Russian organized criminality 
and eﬀorts to subvert the NATO expansion proc-
ess,” wrote the Washington Poﬆ.”The Russian em-
bassy placed letters at every desk at the conference 
repudiating the paper’s ﬆatements“.12
3.2.  U.S.-Slovak Security and Foreign Policy  
 Working Group
The program has continued and transformed itself 
into the U.S.-Slovak Security and Foreign Policy 
Working Group, a collaborative eﬀort of the Cent-
er for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
and Friends of Slovakia (FOS). The project con-
ducted within New European Democracies Project 
at the CSIS “examines the challenges facing the 
Slovak Republic as the country works within Euro-
pean political, economic, and security ﬆructures.
In working closely with Slovak government, NGO 
community, and policymakers, the project oﬀers
a forum for addressing important issues facing the 
country”.13
In 2007, the program focused on visa issues. On 
March 5, CSIS, Friends of Slovakia and American 
Friends of the Czech Republic sponsored a suc-
cessful Forum for Congressional ﬆaﬀ on “The Im-
pact of the New Visa Waiver Legislation on Central 
Europe”.14 The paneliﬆs discussed the ﬆatus of pro-
posed modernization and enlargement of the Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP) and commented on the im-
pact of expanding the VWP with particular refer-
ence to inclusion of US allies in Central Europe and 
11  U.S.-Slovakia Action Commission: Security and Foreign Policy Working Group. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, and Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovakia’s Security and Foreign Policy Strategy, 2001. www.csis.org/
ee.
12  The Washington Poﬆ, May 12, 2001. See also Steven Blank: Should NATO Invite the Baltic States? Perspective, Volume XII, 
No. 3, 2002, and Steven Blank: In Russia a Democracy and Does it Matter? World Aﬀairs, Volume 167, Number 3 / Winter 
2005.
13  http://www.csis.org/nedp/projects/
14  The panel included Paul Rosenzweig, Acting Assiﬆant Secretary for International Aﬀairs, Department of Homeland
Security, Mark Pekala, Deputy Assiﬆant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Aﬀairs, Department of State
and Michael Wyganowski, Executive Director, Center for European Policy Analysis. Janusz Bugajski, Director of the 
CSIS New European Democracies Project moderated the panel. The Forum was attended by a dozen Congressional 
ﬆaﬀers plus representatives from the Slovak, Czech, Hungarian and Polish Embassies.
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pointed out the negative foreign policy implications 
of failure to do so.15 The ﬁnal agreement between
the U.S. and Slovak governments on potential in-
clusion of Slovakia into the Visa Waiver Program 
(VWP) Memoranda of Underﬆanding (MOU),
signed in March 2008, was welcomed also a success 
of public diplomacy.16 In 2008, another area of com-
mon intereﬆ was energy security issue.17
CSIS continues to work on transatlantic agenda 
with special emphasis on new NATO member ﬆates
within the project America’s New Allies. According 
to its conclusions and recommendations, “to main-
tain dependable partners within the EU, the United 
States should focus greater attention on its new al-
lies in Central and Eaﬆern Europe (CEE), who will
be a guiding force in the continuing development 
of U.S.-EU relations and have generally exhibited 
a more pro-U.S. approach than many of their weﬆ-
ern European neighbors. (…) That being said, the 
United States muﬆ resiﬆ the temptation to focus
its diplomatic eﬀorts on bilateral agreements with
those European countries in closeﬆ alignment to it,
and inﬆead use these dependable and durable part-
ners among the CEE ﬆates to develop more predict-
able and productive relations with the EU for the 
sake of long-term ﬆability. To accomplish this ﬆra-
tegic objective, Washington needs to refocus the 
NATO alliance, ensure U.S.-EU complementarity, 
jointly pursue the expansion of democratic syﬆems,
reward its new allies, intensify economic and social 
interchanges, promote military rebasing, improve 
public diplomacy, defuse any current or latent con-
troversies, and more eﬀectively engage emerging al-
lies throughout Central and Eaﬆern Europe.”18
3.3. New Atlantic Initiative
According to its mission, the New Atlantic Initia-
tive (NAI) was an international nonpartisan organ-
ization dedicated to revitalizing and expanding the 
Atlantic community of democracies. The NAI was 
launched in June 1996 following the Congress of 
Prague, where more than 300 politicians, scholars, 
and inveﬆors discussed “the new agenda for trans-
atlantic relations.” Though moﬆ of the politicians
ﬆanding behind the NAI were conservatives, and
the organization was a project of American Enter-
prise Inﬆitute (AEI) in Washington, the attractive 
idea of Euro-Atlantic integration has brought to-
gether people with diﬀerent views (among the key
patrons were not only Margaret Thatcher, Henry 
Kissinger, and George Schultz, but also Václav 
Havel, Helmut Schmidt, and Leszek Balcerow-
icz). Its executive directors, Jeﬀrey Gedmin (1996-
2001) and Radek Sikorski (2002-2005), both resi-
dent scholars at the AEI, were known for their pro-
Atlantic attitudes and after leaving the NAI, they 
15  According to the FOS report from the Forum, the Central European participants considered the exiﬆing VWP as out-
dated: “U.S. relations with the countries of Central Europe liberated from Communism and now on a democratic path 
have been based on respect, gratitude and good will,” emphasized the participants. “The CE countries have therefore 
supported U.S. policies, including our eﬀorts in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan. However, U.S. assiﬆance is no longer provided
or needed and CE participation in Iraq has brought them problems rather than beneﬁts. As one of the paneliﬆs put it,
the U.S.-CE relationship has loﬆ its overarching raison d’etre. Central European citizens see Weﬆ European countries
that have not supported U.S. policies as ﬆrongly as they have in the VWP, while they have diﬃculty traveling to the U.S. 
This has caused considerable resentment. With travel and ﬆudy opportunities for Central Europeans now open within
the EU and travel to the U.S. problematic, the urge of Central Europeans to visit the U.S. is declining – said one of the 
participants. And even if the opening the VWP to the countries of Central Europe will not dramatically alter the current 
public view of the US, it will improve relations.” See http://www.friendsofslovakia.org/
16  Memoranda of Underﬆanding (MOU) was signed by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael
Chertoﬀ and Slovak Miniﬆer of the Interior Robert Kaliňák on March 17, 2008, together with Hungarian Ambassador
Ferenc Somogyi and Lithuanian Ambassador Audrius Bruzga, and after signing similar agreements with the Czech Re-
public, Eﬆonia and Latvia. “I applaud Slovakia, Hungary and Lithuania for their leadership on these enhanced security
measures, and I look forward to the day when their citizens can travel to the United States without a visa,” said Homeland 
Security Secretary Michael Chertoﬀ.”
17  On May 15, 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Friends of Slovakia (FOS), and American Friends of 
the Czech Republic (AFoCR) organized a roundtable entitled “Central European Energy Security Forum” with Douglas 
Hengel, Deputy Assiﬆant Secretary of Energy from the Department of State, Ambassador Václav Bartuška, Ambassador-
at-Large for Energy Security at the Czech Foreign Miniﬆry, Wojciech Ponikiewski, Director of the Department of Foreign
Economic Policy at the Polish Miniﬆry of Foreign Aﬀairs, and Slovak Ambassador to Washington, Raﬆislav Káčer.
18  Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki: Atlantic Bridges. America’s New European Allies. Washington, Rowman & Littleﬁeld/CSIS,
2006.
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continued to work in favor of a closer cooperation 
between the Atlantic partners (Jeﬀrey Gedmin later
became the director of Aspen Inﬆitute in Berlin and
from 2007, he serves as the President of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty; Radek Sikorski served later 
as the Polish Miniﬆer of Defense, and from 2007, he
is the Polish Miniﬆer of Foreign Aﬀairs).
The central objective of the NAI was “to ﬆrength-
en Atlantic cooperation in the poﬆ-cold war world
by bringing together Americans and Europeans 
to work toward common goals, including the re-
invigoration of Atlantic inﬆitutions of political co-
operation and consultation; the admission of Eu-
rope’s ﬂedgling democracies into the inﬆitutions
of Atlantic defense and European economic coop-
eration, notably NATO and the European Union; 
and the eﬆablishment of free trade between an en-
larged European Union and the North American 
Free Trade Area as a complement to ﬆrengthening
global free trade.”19 The NAI also sponsored con-
ferences, debates, and roundtable discussions in the 
U.S., Europe and elsewhere. (In 2005 the NAI was 
shut down and merged into the ”European Stud-
ies” program at American Enterprise Inﬆitute.)
For Slovakia, at that time a relatively less known per-
spective partner and ally, the NAI was inﬆrumental
in helping to organize in April 2000 an important 
gathering in Bratislava, attended by politicians and 
scholars, to discuss the prospects of Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration. U.S. and European leaders who gathered 
in the Slovak capital for the New Atlantic Initiative 
(NAI) conference “The Future of Euro-Atlantic In-
tegration: Chances and Obﬆacles” on April 28-30,
pledged to support further NATO enlargement by 
saying that “it will contribute to consolidating and 
solidifying democracy and a free-market economy in 
the former Soviet satellite ﬆates of Central and Eaﬆ-
ern Europe.”20 The co-organizers of the conference 
were the Bratislava-based Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs,
a public policy research think tank; the Bratislava Of-
ﬁce of the U.S.-based German Marshall Fund; the
Slovak Atlantic Commission; and the Slovak Miniﬆry
of Foreign Aﬀairs.21 In addition to the American par-
ticipants, the conference was attended by: the prime 
miniﬆers of Slovakia and Hungary; the foreign minis-
ters of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Eﬆonia, Slov-
enia, and Slovakia; the ﬆate secretaries of the foreign
aﬀairs miniﬆries of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania; the
Romanian defense miniﬆer; Central European am-
bassadors to the U.S. and NATO, members of parlia-
ments; as well as NGO representatives from Slovakia 
and other countries. At that period, it was not an exag-
geration when the Slovak journal Moﬆy concluded: “It 
was certainly the moﬆimportantNATO-relatedevent
to occur in Slovakia since its creation in 1993.”22
3.4. Friends of Slovakia
While Slovaks in America have not been short of 
fraternal beneﬁt societies, traditional cultural asso-
ciations, churches and religious groups, they have 
been missing an organization of modern type that 
would promote US-Slovakia relationships in areas 
which are crucial for broader-based cooperation be-
tween allies and nations sharing similar values of 
freedom, democracy and a market economy. This 
gap was successfully closed by eﬆablishing Friends 
of Slovakia (FOS), a non-proﬁt organization of vol-
unteers founded in 2001.23 Its mission is to ﬆrength-
en friendship and mutually beneﬁcial cooperation
19  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Atlantic_Initiative
20  “It was important for NATO members to have a plan, a process, and a ﬆrategy,” said Jeﬀrey Gedmin. “Central Europeans
are not shortsighted. If they see that NATO’s open door policy is only an empty slogan, they can get passive and disap-
pointed.”
21  Besides one of the NAI founder John O’Sullivan, several American scholars, senior fellows, and policy-makers attended 
the Bratislava conference. These included John Bolton, Karlyn Bowman, Joshua Muravchik, Michael Novak, and Ri-
chard Perle of the American Enterprise Inﬆitute; Ronald Asmus of the Council on Foreign Relations; Bruce Jackson
and Julie Finley of the U.S. Committee on NATO; Ambassadors Daniel Fried and William Taft; Jeﬀrey Simon of the
National Defense University; Walter Andrusyszyn of the U.S. Department of State; James Denton of Freedom House; 
Ian Brzezinski, a senior ﬆaﬀ member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Chris Rademaker, chief counsel
of the U.S. House International Relations Committee; Cameron Munter of the National Security Council; and Daniel 
Mariaschin of B’nai B’rith International. For some of them, it was the ﬁrﬆ-ever visit to Slovakia.
22  Moﬆy, 14, 2000.
23  http://www.friendsofslovakia.org.
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between the United States and Slovakia. Friends of 
Slovakia seek to promote this cooperation in eco-
nomic, business, political, security, cultural, edu-
cational and humanitarian ﬁelds and to improve
mutual underﬆanding between Slovak and Ameri-
can people. To achieve this purpose, Friends of Slo-
vakia has set following goals: to educate the U.S. 
public about Slovakia, its hiﬆory, its culture, and
its numerous ties to the United States; to enhance 
the relationship between Slovakia and the United 
States, including promotion of increased cultural 
and economic exchanges between the countries; 
and to promote underﬆanding and friendship be-
tween Americans and Slovaks.
According to Jan Surotchak, the then Chairman of 
the organization, “Friends of Slovakia was ﬆarted
with the idea that there is an increasing number of 
people all across the United States today who have 
ties to modern Slovakia, and who are willing and 
eager to commit time and resources to improve the 
relationship between the two countries. These are 
sometimes people who have Slovak roots, but there 
are many others who have no Slovak background, 
but have lived in Slovakia as Peace Corps volun-
teers, served as diplomats in Bratislava, came to 
Slovakia to open successful businesses, or work in 
the non-governmental sector. Friends set about to 
bring these people together to help improve rela-
tions between the countries in the areas of politics, 
business, and arts and culture.”24
There are three areas, on which Friends of Slovakia fo-
cus primarily. The ﬁrﬆ one is political ties. FOS seeks
to promote a greater underﬆanding of Slovakia and
its domeﬆic, foreign and security policies by Ameri-
ca’s decision-makers. Primary areas of activity include 
building networks and increasing Slovakia’s visibility 
in the United States through a series of Roundtables 
on major topics of intereﬆ.Thesecondarea iseconom-
ic ties: working with Slovak and American companies 
and entrepreneurs to explore and advance bilateral 
economic ties of trade and inveﬆment. The third area
is academic, cultural and social ties: enabling Slovaks 
and Americans to share with each other the diverse 
artiﬆic and cultural heritage of both countries. In this
area, Friends of Slovakia brings young Slovak lead-
ers to the United States through a summer Slovak 
Scholars program and promotes a variety of cultural 
exchanges, in cooperation with the Georgetown Uni-
versity, Washington DC.25 Traditional gala dinners or-
ganized annually in Bratislava bring together policy 
makers and public ﬁgures, people from business, cul-
ture and academia, diplomats and journaliﬆs.26
FOS is planning a travel program from the U.S. to 
Slovakia, which will ﬆart in 2008. Some of the FOS
delegations will be for professionals such as medi-
cal doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, etc., 
and others will be designed for people that want 
to travel to Slovakia, meet with some government 
oﬃcials, U.S. Embassy personnel and visit some of
the major cities in Slovakia. The U.S. Embassy in 
24  “Strong ties bind Slovaks living around the world.” Beata Balogová speaks with Jan Surotchak, FOS Chairman, The Slovak 
Spectator, Aug. 9, 2004.
25  “We’ve had an excellent group of committed colleagues from the very ﬆart,” says Surotchak. “Among them were Ameri-
ca’s ﬁrﬆ Ambassador to the Slovak Republic, Ted Russell; President of Tucker and Associates, William Tucker; Slovak
Honorary Consul in Weﬆern Pennsylvania, Joseph Senko, among others. Nothing, however, would have come together
for Friends without the leadership of former Slovak Ambassador to the US Martin Bútora, and we are happy to continue 
our relationship with his successor, Ambassador Raﬆislav Káčer. (…) We were extremely proud to support a long series
of activities surrounding the opening of the new Slovak embassy in Washington in the summer of 2001. In addition, we 
have a successful ongoing series of roundtable discussions in partnership with the well-known Washington think-tank 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We organised a large gala dinner to celebrate Slovakia’s membership 
in NATO and to award prominent Slovak and American leaders with Madeleine Albright in Bratislava in 2002, and col-
lected funds to help rebuild the damage of the ﬂoods in Slovakia in 2003.”
26  The recent one, held in Bratislava on December 10, 2007, was devoted to Slovakia’s economic progress. As at previous 
dinners, Friends of Slovakia presented awards to honorees in three areas. The 2007 Politics/Diplomacy Award went to 
Ján Kubiš, Miniﬆer of Foreign Aﬀairs; the Business/Economics Award was shared by Milan Filo and David Lohr. Mr.
Filo is chairman and CEO of Eco-Inveﬆ and chairman of the supervisory board of ﬁve other companies employing over
10,000 Slovak citizens and exporting products of an annual value in excess of $400 million euros. David Lohr is president 
of US Steel Košice, which, along with its subsidiaries, employs over 16,000 Slovaks and is one of the largeﬆ foreign inves-
tors in Slovakia. Dr. Branislav Lichardus, the ﬁrﬆ Slovak Ambassador to the U.S., received the Cultural Award for his
work in the ﬁeld of education. He is rector, School of Management, City University of Seattle, which enrolls some 1600
ﬆudents on campuses in Bratislava and Trenčín. Newly-arrived U.S. Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik and his wife, Anne
Marie, attended the dinner, together with former Slovak President Michal Kováč and other politicians and diplomats.
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Slovakia has agreed to work closely with FOS in 
putting the program together.
In Washington, Friends of Slovakia is cooperating 
with its partner, American Friends of the Czech Re-
public in organizing, together with Slovak and Czech 
Embassies, the annual Freedom Lecture at the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars.27 
3.5.  Euro-Atlantic Center and Slovak  
 Atlantic Commission
If Friends of Slovakia is an organization oriented at 
prominent representatives of political, economic, se-
curity, academic and culture elites, the Euro-Atlan-
tic Center (EAC) is an eﬃcient platform advocating
and promoting the Euro-Atlantic views and perspec-
tives among ﬆudents and young audiences. It was
founded in 1999 as a non-proﬁt NGO by ﬆudents
of Matej Bel University in Banská Byﬆrica (Central
Slovakia) with the aim of raising public awareness of 
international aﬀairs and security issues by foﬆering
qualiﬁed debate and research related to Slovakia’s
role within the Euro-Atlantic environment. “EAC 
boaﬆs a unique membership, which comprises ex-
clusively ﬆudents and young academics who have
come together to broaden their knowledge of inter-
national and security policy,” says the EAC in a bro-
chure describing its activities (www.eac.sk).
By organizing seminars, round tables, and presenta-
tions and by publishing articles and research ﬆud-
ies, the EAC ﬆrives to present the public a compre-
hensive picture of Slovakia’s ﬆanding in regional
and global developments. EAC contributes to the 
development of a network of individuals and inﬆi-
tutions concerned with Slovakia’s successful per-
formance on the international ﬆage. Among paﬆ
activities of EAC we can ﬁnd conferences such as
“Security Dialogue“, “European Days ‘99“, “Euro-
sec 2000 and 2001“, “Slovakia for Europe – Europe 
for Slovakia”, “The New Security Environment – 
Facing New Security Challenges”.
In the premises of the Faculty of Political Science 
and International Aﬀairs of Matej Bel University
(FPVaMV UMB) in Banská Byﬆrica, the Euro–
Atlantic Center organized a series of lectures and 
round tables under the title Foreign Policy Dia-
logues. The project aimed at “ﬆimulating a quali-
ﬁed dialogue on the current issues of international
politics and creating a venue for an open, yet criti-
cal discussion”.
Furthermore, the Euro-Atlantic Center has been a part 
of several educational programs, like “Quo Vadis: 
Europa-America?“, “Future and the Perspectives of 
NATO“, “Iﬆanbul Pan Atlantic Student Summit“,
“Slovak Teﬆimony,” “Slovakia to Ukraine: Building
Bridges to Future Generations,” “NATO and Security 
as a Necessary Part of the Slovak and Ukrainian Aca-
demic Studies” “Quo Vadis NATO?”.
In 2007 and 2008, the EAC was the Slovak partner of 
the Aliante project aimed at inciting young genera-
tion (high school/grammar school ﬆudents) “to be
actively intereﬆed in the NATO, the activities of the
Slovak Republic in the political and military ﬆruc-
tures of the Alliance and the tasks and mission of the 
Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.” By means of 
informal education it endeavors to increase the pop-
ularity of these topics, and “using a combination of 
theoretical knowledge and practical skills the Aliante 
conteﬆ makes ﬆudents acquainted with values un-
derpinning the North-Atlantic Alliance- democracy, 
partnership, dialogue and collective security.”28
27  Among the previous speakers were Madeleine Albright, Michael Novak, Adam Michnik, Václav Klaus, President of the 
Czech Republic, Ivan Mikloš, Slovak Deputy Prime Miniﬆer. In November 2007, it was Alexandr Vondra, Czech Deputy
Prime Miniﬆer and in November 2008 it will be Slovak Foreign Miniﬆer Ján Kubiš.
28  “Aliante has gathered ﬆudents across Europe and the United States to experience something truly exceptional and com-
pete for an unparalleled prize to visit places they could never visit on their own. The Aliante competition is centered on 
the promotion of a greater underﬆanding of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, security policy, and international
relations. In 2007, the Aliante competition winners had a unique chance to tour the United States and visit attractive 
places such as the largeﬆ naval base of the US Navy in Norfolk, Virginia, the Nebraska National Guard training center,
and one of the moﬆ modern and highly-secured bases of the US Air Force in Colorado Springs. In 2008, the winners will
have an opportunity to visit the northernmoﬆ NATO base that lies beyond the Arctic Circle. (…) As the Aliante family
has been rapidly growing, this year, exceptional ﬆudents from the Czech Republic, Eﬆonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and for the ﬁrﬆ time
also Finland and Georgia, will compete for the preﬆigious prize.” See http://www.project-aliante.org/us/
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The EAC has also has produced several publica-
tions (Global Terrorism; Slovakia for Europe – Europe for 
Slovakia; The New Security Environment – Facing New Se-
curity Challenges; GLOBSEC: The Role of the Transatlantic 
Partnership in the Global Security Environment). An illus-
trative example is the moﬆ recent books on Slo-
vakia’s position in transatlantic relations: after de-
signing nine possible scenarios of relationships be-
tween the U.S. and European Union, the authors 
elaborate on possible role of Slovakia, helping the 
reader to better underﬆand and think ﬆrategically
on security issues.29
The EAC closely cooperates with the Slovak At-
lantic Commission (SAC), eﬆablished in 1993.
The SAC, a member of the Atlantic Treaty Asso-
ciation, was revived and ﬆrengthened by young
leadership and vigor in 2004, and its current presi-
dent Robert Vass was previously the head of the 
EAC.30 They collaborated in organizing “National 
Security Table 1 and 2” and the international secu-
rity conferences GLOBSEC 2005, 2006, 2007 with 
topics devoted to global security environment, ter-
rorism, security situation in the Balkans. In No-
vember 2007, Slovak Atlantic Commission organ-
ized the GLOBSEC Express - Sending Message to 
the Balkans.31
In 2007, the EAC and the SAC organized an in-
ternational seminar Democracy Building in Iraq, 
which involved members of the Iraqi Parliament, 
representatives of the Atlantic Club in Iraq, and ﬆu-
dents from Iraq.
On April 2-4, 2008, the representatives of the 
Slovak Atlantic Commission participated at the 
Young Atlanticiﬆs Summit held in Buchareﬆ
during the laﬆ NATO Summit. On April 24, in
cooperation with the U.S. Embassy, the Slovak 
Atlantic Commission brought the leadership of 
Slovak policy think-tanks together with a top 
NATO oﬃcial via digital videoconference, as part
of its series of poﬆ-Buchareﬆ Summit brieﬁngs
– the ﬁrﬆ of its kind in Europe. Jamie Shea, Direc-
tor of Policy Planning in the Private Oﬃce of the
Secretary General, spoke enthusiaﬆically about
the successes of the summit to a group of Slovak 
policy experts.
Both organizations cooperate with Slovak Miniﬆry
of Foreign Aﬀairs and Miniﬆry of Defense, as well
as with main think tanks and NGOs working in the 
ﬁeld of transatlantic relations.
The Slovak Atlantic Commission is publishing the 
regular Euro-Atlantic Quarterly, supported also by the 
NATO; it serves as a communication website bring-
ing articles, analyses, information for a broadening 
audience (www.eaq.sk).
In October 2005, during the ﬁrﬆ GLOBSEC
international conference organized in Bratis-
lava by the EAC and the SAC, together with the 
NATO Public Diplomacy Division under the ti-
tle “The Role of the Transatlantic Partnership in 
the Global Security Environment”, Robert Vass, 
the newly elected head of the SAC, who at that 
time was ﬆill the chairman of the Euro-Atlantic
Center, was complaining that while there were 
several NGOs in Slovakia dealing with security 
issues, “making an excellent job”, their weakness 
was “that the target groups of these organizations 
29  Ivan Pešout, Ľubomír Tokár, Mário Nicolini: Pozícia Slovenska v transatlantických vzťahoch [The Position of Slovakia in Transatlantic 
Relations]. Bratislava, EAC and Miniﬆry of Defense 2008.
30  Another young leader, Mário Nicolini, the founder of the EAC, has later become the adviser to the Slovak Miniﬆer of
Defence.
31  The young leaders of the 12 countries of the Balkans and the wider region who have participated on a unique youth 
project GLOBSEC Express train “Sending message to the Balkans” from Bratislava to Zagreb on 26th – 27th November 
2007 have agreed that the gathering clearly shows the readiness of the young generation to take over responsibility for the 
common future of their region: “The young generation,” says the ﬆatement issued by the participants, “sees the Balkans
as a vital part of the Euro-Atlantic security – that is why it cannot be left behind. The idea of “Europe whole and free” 
cannot be fully realized without the Balkan region included. Possible enlargement of NATO and EU enlargement as 
a driver of internal reforms and changes in the Balkans will have a positive impact on the candidate countries, as well as 
the whole region; therefore, the young generation appeals to the oﬃcials of their countries to look ahead for their future,
leave the paﬆ behind and to ﬆep up to the challenges they have to face in their process of Euro-Atlantic integration.” We
call for the Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation of the whole Balkan region to promote the prosperity, peace and 
ﬆability of this region, emphasized the participants.
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and think-tanks rarely exceed the limited group 
of the security community. None of the NGOs re-
ally deeply touches the wide public, mainly there 
are small discussions groups, which do not really 
spread the ideas to the public, and the public ﬆays
unaware. During the PRENAME program these 
activities were coordinated and extensively sup-
ported to reach wide public, and the results were 
good. Without such a program it is really diﬃcult
to achieve those results. None of the NGO has an 
educational program, a program that would reach 
out far beyond the limits of the security commu-
nity and educate the public about the transatlan-
tic partnership, security policy. Here I see the very 
challenge… the task is to booﬆ the discussion, to
point on various queﬆions of the security and de-
fense policy, to provide suﬃcient comprehensive
information and to assure a permanent discussion 
on those topics”.32
After three years of work and at the occasion of 
its 15th anniversary, the Slovak Atlantic Commis-
sion is announcing an ambitious continuation of 
its activities. “We are a value-based organization,” 
says a ﬆatement of the SAC published in spring
2008. “We believe in ﬆrong security community;
we believe in transatlantic partnership and its val-
ues; we believe in international cooperation.” The 
position of the new president was oﬀered to Am-
bassador Raﬆislav Káčer who is now completing
his mission in Washington as the Slovak Ambassa-
dor to the U.S. In cooperation with the Miniﬆry of
Foreign Aﬀairs, the SAC is working on the prepa-
ration of the 4th International Security Conference 
GLOBSEC 2009.
3.6.  U.S. Think-Tanks, Academic and  
 Research Centers and Resource  
 Institutions
An attentive reader could easily observe how 
important in this agenda – Slovakia’s Euro-At-
lantic integration – were the involvement U.S. 
think-tanks, academic and research centers and 
resource inﬆitutions. Experts from places like
Center for International and Strategic Studies, 
American Enterprise Inﬆitute, Woodrow Wilson
Center, Council on Foreign Relations, RAND 
Corporation, Hoover Inﬆitutions, Hudson Inﬆi-
tute and others, scholars and teachers from Geor-
getown University, George Washington Univer-
sity, The Johns Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies, Harvard Uni-
versity, Princeton University, Yale University, 
Stanford University, Berkeley University, New 
York University, New School for Social Research 
and several others , have been inﬆrumental in
three regards. They have been working on com-
mon projects with their Slovak and Central-Eu-
ropean partners. They have been bringing CEE 
analyﬆs, politicians, young leaders, and civic ac-
tiviﬆs to the U.S., helping to increase the level of
public intereﬆ in transatlantic agenda in general,
and Central-Eaﬆern integration into the Weﬆern
political and security /ambit/zone/ in particular, 
supporting “internationaliﬆs” and “Atlanticiﬆs”
among the U.S. policymakers, inﬂuencing the un-
decided and challenging the opponents (like, for 
inﬆance, Michael Mandelbaum). On the other
side of Atlantic, they have been serving not only 
as a knowledge base for the proponents of Euro-
Atlantic integration, but some of them (like, for 
inﬆance, an almoﬆ legendary ﬁgure of Zbigniew
Brzezinski) as “eyes-openers” for highly posi-
tioned politicians.
While all of the previously mentioned inﬆitutions
are rather “generaliﬆs” than “specialiﬆs” (i.e. they
are dealing with a much broader groups of issues 
than juﬆ transatlantic cooperation), there has been
one among them with a special ﬆatus, namely The 
German Marshall Fund of the United States of 
America, with its branch operating in Bratislava. 
Oﬃcially, “GMF’s Bratislava oﬃce is its hub for 
activity in Central and Eaﬆern Europe. Founded
initially to work in the Visegrad countries (Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary), Roma-
nia, and Bulgaria, its scope has gradually expand-
ed further eaﬆ, into the former Soviet Republics
of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. The oﬃce (…)
hoﬆs and organizes conferences for leaders on de-
mocracy, security, and other regional issues, and 
32  Robert Vass: The role of  NGO´s  in the communication with public. http://www.globsec.sk/2005/page.php?doc=92
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works to support the democratic process in the 
region.”33
The special ﬆatus is caused by the GMF’s in-
volvement in transatlantic dialogue by “organiz-
ing seminal events that brought together politi-
cians, experts, and practitioners from US, Weﬆ-
erns Europe and Central and Eaﬆern Europe”.
One of them was a conference “A New Queﬆ for
Democracy” that took place the day before Presi-
dent George W. Bush met with his Russian coun-
terpart Vladimir Putin in the Slovak capital of 
Bratislava.34
The GMF also organizes the CEE component of 
the Marshall Memorial Fellowship program, which 
regularly brings to Slovakia groups of American 
leaders from various areas of public and private 
sphere that are meeting their partners in Slovakia, 
thus contributing to keeping the spirit of transat-
lantic dialogue.
Another important element in GMF activity is 
a cooperation on a well-known international pub-
lic opinion survey Transatlantic Trends (with the 
Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs, whose expert Oľga
Gyarfášová analyses and comments the ﬁndings in
Slovakia) and presentation of the results in Brati-
slava – an event closely watched by policy makers, 
media, and general public. This creates a unique 
opportunity to discuss the transatlantic issues in 
Slovak media.
Laﬆ but not leaﬆ, there is a personal factor that
matters. Pavol Demeš, the head of the oﬃce, is
not only former Slovak Miniﬆer of Internation-
al Relations and former foreign policy advisor 
to the President of the Slovak Republic, and an 
internationally recognized NGO leader who has 
been involved in peaceful democratic changes 
in Serbia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004, but also 
a Slovak civic activiﬆ, former leader of Slovakia’s
NGO community. Whereas several important 
Slovak NGOs and their protagoniﬆs have been
similarly involved both in democratic changes 
in Slovakia and later in providing democratic 
assiﬆance abroad, this has brought them all to-
gether into the common ﬁeld where transatlantic
agenda can be discussed and where, moreover, 
the values connected with the importance of At-
lanticism can be promoted, nurtured, and com-
municated.
4. EMBASSIES
4.1.  Slovak Embassy  
 in Washington
After the political change in Slovakia in the fall 
1998, the role of the Slovak Embassy in Wash-
ington was to gain the U.S. support for the for-
eign policy priorities of Slovakia (integration 
into the Weﬆern political, security and economic
ﬆructures – NATO, EU, and OECD). To achieve
these goals, the Embassy35 has been involved 
in a very intensive public diplomacy, including 
bringing to the U.S. (to the capital, as well as to 
other ﬆates and cities), not only the politicians,
but also leaders and protagoniﬆs from various
ﬁelds of Slovak society – mayors, judges, NGO
activiﬆs, artiﬆs, ﬆudents, researchers and scien-
tiﬆs, people from business and media, sports-
men and sportswomen etc. This has proved to 
be helpful in “transporting” the transatlantic 
agenda back home. While the key mission of 
the Embassy was, obviously, the coordination 
of various diplomatic and political activities, the 
uniqueness of the situation opened a space for 
a broad and colorful presentation of Slovak life, 
33  http://www.gmfus.org/about/oﬃce.cfm?city=bratislava
34  In association with the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs in Slovakia, the confer-
ence brought together a preﬆigious group of participants, including the speakers from Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia,
and other Eaﬆern European countries who were joined by Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment
for Democracy; Bruce Jackson, President of the Project on Transitional Democracies; and Jacques Rupnik, Director 
of Studies at the Center for International Research, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, France. On the 
next day, the leaders from Central and Eaﬆern Europe were received by President Bush before his public speech in
Bratislava.
35  The co-author of this ﬆudy, Martin Bútora, served as the Slovak Ambassador to the U.S. in 1999-2003.
N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E  |  29
Slovak culture and Slovak art.36 In the follow-
ing period, visits of representatives of businesses, 
ﬁrms and companies have continued and have
been supported by the opening of Slovak Com-
mercial & Touriﬆ Oﬃce of the Embassy of the
Slovak Republic in New York.
4.2. U.S. Embassy in Bratislava
As for the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Bratis-
lava, the level of events organized by the Embassy in 
all parts of Slovakia has increased in laﬆ 2-3 years, in
part because of a dynamic Ambassador (it was Am-
bassador Rodolphe “Skip” Vallee) and leadership 
team, in part because the number of Slovak organi-
zations requeﬆing events and joint activities contin-
ues to grow. The moﬆ frequent areas are transfor-
mational diplomacy, Roma integration, cultural and 
educational exchange, youth outreach, business and 
inveﬆment, alternative energy, environmental issues.
The Embassy works with all government and non-
government agencies: miniﬆries, national libraries
and museums, universities and secondary schools, 
many NGOs and cultural organizations. According 
their own appreciation, the moﬆ successful events
within laﬆ 2-3 years were “Ambassador’s trips to the
interior of Slovakia, including his hockey games with 
young people; Higher Education Initiative, includ-
ing Forum in June 2007; art exhibits hoﬆed at the
Embassy and covered by media; visit of Undersecre-
tary of State Karen Hughes in October 2007; Roma 
cultural events; Sept 11 commemorations; events re-
lated to transformational diplomacy in Afghaniﬆan,
Cuba, Iraq, Kazakhﬆan.” The Embassy also believes
that the image of US in the eyes of Slovak public 
would be improved “by the inﬆitution of the Visa
Waiver Program for Slovak citizens, something both 
governments are working on.”
In spring 2008, the Embassy was active in communi-
cating US foreign policy priorities through speech-
es of the new Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik. The 
Ambassador addressed audiences in Prešov, Banská 
Byﬆrica, and Bratislava. The theme of his speeches
adequately reﬂects the current level of U.S. - Slo-
vakia relationships. The Ambassador praised Slo-
vak economic development, emphasizing the role 
of U.S. companies in the economic growth.37 The 
36  The functioning of the Slovak Embassy was noticed among important players in Washington, both among the Democrats 
and Republicans. Bruce Jackson, who served as the President of the bi-partisan U.S. Committee on NATO (from 1995-
2002), a non-proﬁt organization that promoted NATO expansion and ﬆrengthening the U.S.- European relationships and
who was inﬆrumental in securing U.S. Senate ratiﬁcation of NATO expansion, emphasized the signiﬁcance of the Embassy
in Washington which “has powerfully and permanently inﬂuenced the direction of US and Euro-Atlantic policy,“ becoming
from the ﬁrﬆ days „the ethical and moral center of the Vilnius Group countries on this side of the Atlantic, in much the same
way that President Havel has always been the moral organizing force in Europe. On countless evenings, the campaign for 
NATO invitation and ratiﬁcation turned on the unfailingly wise and gracious counsel of the Ambassador” who “beyond
the great work he has done in gaining the truﬆ of American leadership and putting Slovakia on the map, together with his
wife has succeeded in putting Slovakia in people’s hearts.” According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security 
adviser to president Carter, a well-known political ﬆrategiﬆ and frequent commentator of foreign policy issues, “Ambas-
sadors from big countries impact on Washington life because their countries have power and Washington respects power. 
Smaller countries have a very diﬃcult time overcoming that handicap. But Slovakia was a remarkable exception because,
in fact, it had two ambassadors, each endowed with charm and intelligence. Martin and Zora Butora represented Slovakia 
in Washington at a time of truly hiﬆoric change in Slovakia’s position in the world. Each was an articulate, respected, and
personally engaging representative of a country that within years of gaining its independence became a member of the 
world’s moﬆ powerful alliance, the ally of the world’s superpower, and soon also a member of the European Union. (...) To
collaborate with them was not only productive but personally gratifying.” And Julie Finley, the current U.S. Ambassador 
to the OSCE, who was then the Chair of the Board of Directors of the Project on Transitional Democracies, an inﬂuential
organizer and eloquent voice in the then foreign-policy eﬆablishment, adds: “For the paﬆ four years, this capital has been
blessed” by the presence of Slovak diplomats and “working with them on the accession of Slovakia into NATO has been, 
deﬁnitely, one of the moﬆ pleasant experiences of my life.” See Slovak Embassy Newsletter, Spring 2003.
37  “Slovakia is an excellent example of the linkage between ﬆability, democracy and economic prosperity.  Its ﬆability and wide
ranging economic reforms have led to a large inﬂow of foreign direct inveﬆment and corresponding ﬆrong economic growth
– as high as 10.4 % laﬆ year.  Virtually every other country in the world would love to say that its projected growth this year may
“slow” to 7 percent.  Joining the Euro zone next January, another ﬆep forward, will beneﬁt both foreign and domeﬆic inves-
tors, and contribute further to Slovakia’s growth and the prosperity of its people. I’m pleased that U.S. companies have been 
a signiﬁcant factor in this growth.  They have been among the earlieﬆ and moﬆ successful inveﬆors, inveﬆing over 3.8 billion
dollars to date.  This inveﬆment has resulted in the employment of 46,000 Slovak citizens.  All in all, about 130 U.S. companies
have a presence in Slovakia today.  We look at the Slovak government as a partner in expanding business inveﬆment.” Vincent
Obsitnik: Policy Speech for SFPA Bratislava, June 11, 2008. http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/amb-speech.html
3 0  |  N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
main subject of his presentations was security chal-
lenges for Slovakia. He welcomed Slovak involve-
ment in Afghaniﬆan and the promise to increase
Slovakia’s troop numbers serving in Afghaniﬆan
from the current 69 to 280 by 2010. Ambassador 
Obsitnik also reminded the Slovak public of an 
important role of America in helping build the ca-
pacity of the Slovak armed forces both to protect 
this country and to enable its troops to conduct 
important peacekeeping missions abroad.38 He 
did not hesitate to add that beyond troop contri-
butions, nations, including Slovakia, should allow 
ISAF commanders to deploy troops in the moﬆ
eﬀective way possible.39
The U.S. Ambassador also touched the topics 
which both countries see from diﬀerent perspec-
tives, namely Kosovo and missile defense. After 
explaining the U.S. position on this issue and un-
derlining the U.S.-EU Summit declaration ﬆating
that the U.S. and EU will continue to support the 
ﬆability and security of Kosovo and its regional
integration, and will assiﬆ Kosovo in its econom-
ic and inﬆitutional development, he asked Slo-
vakia “to reach out to Serbia, encouraging them 
to adopt the path toward EU membership”. On 
missile defense, Ambassador Obsitnik thanked 
to Czech and Polish allies “for their commitment 
to implementing missile defense within a shared 
NATO security framework” and reminded that 
a positive contribution of a missile defense sys-
tem can be eﬀective for defending Europe was
acknowledged in NATO’s Buchareﬆ Summit
Declaration.
With the new Ambassador who was born in Slova-
kia and is ﬆill ﬂuent in the Slovak language, new
horizons were open for cultivating cultural and his-
toric ties between Slovaks and Americans. In one 
of his previous position, he served as a member 
of the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of 
America’s Heritage Abroad. He worked to bring 
international attention to the plight of the 17th 
and 18th century Greek Catholic wooden churches 
of Slovakia and, through his leadership, two of the 
moﬆ endangered churches have been reﬆored.40
Two events are emblematic for this new spirit. From 
February through June 2008, the Embassy-spon-
sored hiﬆoric photo exhibit, “Slovakia, Slovaks
and Connections on Hiﬆoric Poﬆcards and Pho-
tographs,” was touring ten Slovak cities.41 The his-
toric photo project is the result of an international 
collaborative project in conserving photographs 
at the Slovak National Library, funded by the Get-
ty Conservation Inﬆitute in Los Angeles, and is
traveling throughout Slovakia.42 One themes of the 
exhibit is the Slovak-U.S. connection over the years 
- introducing “pioneers” of Slovak life in the U.S., 
explaining the social and sports life of Slovaks in 
America, USA, the contribution of Slovak-Ameri-
cans to the beginning of Slovak cinematography 
and Slovak literature in the United States.” Open-
ing the exhibit in Vranov nad Topľou, Ambassador 
Obsitnik ﬆated that as a Slovak-American, he is
especially proud that Slovakia was chosen for this 
multi-year project: “It demonﬆrates the high repu-
tation of Slovak inﬆitutions in this ﬁeld,” he said.
He also added “the connections between Slovaks 
and Americans are very deep and very personal. As 
newcomers to the United States, Slovaks made con-
tributions to all aspects of American life: induﬆry,
the arts, sports, science, innovation and politics.”43 
Similar remarks to the crowds of library goers and 
media were expressed by other U.S. diplomats 
38  “My government has provided nearly 100 million dollars in aid, since Slovak independence, to help modernize and pro-
fessionalize the Slovak military.” Ibid.
39  According to him, forces should not be the subject of national “caveats,” or limitations, that in eﬀect tie the hands of the
commanders: “Unfortunately today there are 80 caveats on national contributions among those countries with forces in 
Afghaniﬆan, including Slovakia.  Those caveats, which reﬆrict military progress and success, should be lifted.” Ibid.
40  For his proﬁle, see an interview with him: Beata Balogová: Diplomat with Slovak roots returns with more than ideas. The 
Slovak Spectator, No. 27, 2008.
41  Košice, Prešov, Vranov nad Topľou, Martin, Banská Byﬆrica, Žilina, Trenčín, Piešťany, Nové Zámky, Bratislava.
42  Jana Liptáková: Ties celebrated through art. The Slovak Spectator, No. 27, 2008.
43  http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/hiﬆoric-us-slovak-photo-exhibit-opens-in-zilina-on-country-wide-tour-april8-2008.html
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who were present at the opening in various Slovak 
cities.44
Another reminiscence with an indirect political 
message was the display of the hiﬆoric document
of the original Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918 to 
Slovak public. At the Embassy-sponsored exhibit 
at Parliament on May 30, 2008, Speaker of Parlia-
ment Pavol Paška and Miniﬆer of Foreign Aﬀairs
Ján Kubiš spoke of the Agreement as the founda-
tion for cooperation between the U.S. and Slovakia 
that exiﬆs today in the security, education and eco-
nomic spheres. According to Ambassador Obsitnik, 
himself a Slovak-American, “The Pittsburgh Agree-
ment represented a major ﬆep on the long road to
independence for Slovakia and tangible proof of 
the support America has oﬀered and oﬀers to this
day to Slovakia and its people.”45. On June 9, the 
document was placed at the Slovak National Muse-
um in Bratislava. At the exhibit opening, Ambassa-
dor Obsitnik oﬃcially presented it to the Museum
in the name of the American people.46
The Embassy also continued to work in dissemina-
tion of information on American life. The Embassy 
and the University Library of Comenius University 
in Bratislava have jointly operated InfoUSA Center 
since February 2005, when Firﬆ Lady Laura Bush
formally inaugurated the center. In its nearly three 
years of exiﬆence, the center has proved to be not
only a home of learning, but also an eﬀective ven-
ue for the Slovak public to learn about American 
life and culture. Among the many programs hoﬆed
at the center have been book and poﬆer exhibits,
a series of American ﬁlms, speaker programs and
other events to promote a better underﬆanding of
the United States. A revised memorandum of un-
derﬆanding signed on January 22, 2008 continues
this fruitful cooperation for a further three years.47
An InfoUSA ﬆudy corner operates also at the Matej
Bel University in Banská Byﬆrica. Having a ﬆrong
commitment to enhancing cooperation and ex-
changes between U.S. and Slovak educational in-
ﬆitutions, the Embassy is looking forward to coop-
erating with the Center for North American Stud-
ies, eﬆablished on May 3, 2008, at the University of
Economics in Bratislava.
Since April 2008, the Information Resource Center 
at Embassy Bratislava has diﬆilled the beﬆ of the
Web on the 2008 U.S. elections into a newsletter 
called “Election Focus 2008” that has proven to 
be a hit with young political leaders in Slovakia. 
http://www.usainfo.sk/article.php?134
In accordance with its emphasis on U.S. - Slovak 
economic cooperation, the Embassy is involved in 
several programs oriented at the improvements in 
economy. One of the recent inputs was a partnership 
with U.S. Steel Košice and the American Chamber 
of Commerce to hold a conference on hiring long-
term unemployed in Prešov on May 20, 2008. A large 
percentage of unemployed workers are found in 
Roma communities in the Eaﬆ; American compa-
nies like Whirlpool and U.S. Steel have led the way 
with innovative hiring practices to coax these poten-
tial workers back into the workforce, allowing them 
44  Information Oﬃcer Keith Hughes who opened the exhibit in Nové Zámky said: “As an American diplomat whose job
is to increase exchanges between Slovaks and Americans, this exhibit is very special to me because it highlights the 
very deep and very personal relationship between Slovaks and Americans.” (http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/hiﬆoric-
us-slovak-photo-exhibit-opens-in-nove-zamky-on-country-wide-tour-may-19-2008.html) General Services Oﬃcer Antje
Weygandt who opened the exhibit in Trenčín noted: “It is no wonder that Americans who come to Slovakia feel quickly 
comfortable and at home here. Nearly every American who has lived in a big U.S. city has met a Slovak or Czech or other 
Central European person who was either a neighbor, became a good friend, or maybe even became a family member. The 
pictures and documents in this exhibit showcase the tremendous contributions Slovak immigrants have made to life in 
the U.S.” (http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/hiﬆoric-us-slovak-photo-exhibit-opens-in-trencin-on-country-wide-tour-april-
22-2008.html)
45  The Pittsburgh Agreement, signed on May 31, 1918 at a hotel in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, prepared the way 
for the creation of the ﬆate of Czechoslovakia. In October, 1918, the primary author of the agreement, Tomáš G. Masa-
ryk, declared the independence of Czechoslovakia on the ﬆeps of Independence Hall in Philadelphia.
46  http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/original-pittsburgh-agreement-of-1918-on-view-to-slovak-public-until-september-june-
9-2008.html.
47  http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/bratislava-university-library-and-embassy-continue-infousa-cooperation-january-22-
2008.html.
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to share in the beneﬁts of Slovakia’s growth. U.S.
Steel, Whirlpool and other companies showcased 
their beﬆ practices in ﬁnding workers to a gathered
audience of 130 business people, civic leaders and 
entrepreneurs who are also exploring ways to keep 
productivity up and labor coﬆs reasonable.48
The U.S. Embassy has been also inﬆrumental in
supporting various initiatives and activities aimed 
at improving transatlantic relationships or mutual 
ties between America and Slovakia, like Young Slo-
vak Professionals opening event, aimed at “forming 
a group and/or a discussion forum with an over-
arching goal to utilize experiences and skills ac-
quired abroad in and for Slovakia, to network and 
to obtain more ideas about how to beﬆ utilize skills
and experiences acquired abroad”. (The group was 
formed under the title “Slovensko Naše” (Slovakia 
of Ours) and continues its work.)49
Even if the limited ﬁnancial capacities do not al-
low the Embassy to run programs like America 
presents, Speakers Bureau (applied, for inﬆance,
in Poland), or to coordinate regular visits of Ameri-
can experts to Slovakia, the presented overview has 
shown that is it an important actor in cultivating 
Slovak-American relationships and issues of trans-
atlantic agenda.
5.  SLOVAK THINK-TANKS AND  
OTHER NGOS
An indispensable role in preserving transatlantic 
ties, nurturing “Atlanticiﬆ” agenda, developing
fruitful U.S. – Slovak collaboration, and taking 
inspiration from American experiences in dealing 
with public policy issues has been played by Slovak 
NGO (non-proﬁt, voluntary) community, in Slova-
kia called also “the third sector”. Here, the tradi-
tions of cooperation were eﬆablished in early 90-ties
and several of them are successfully continuing.50
There is wide range of topics and activities in public 
space and public arenas where we can trace a variety 
of “American lines of thinking” and “American ways 
of doing/acting” that have proved to be inspirational 
for the NGO community in Slovakia. Many think-
tanks and public policy research inﬆitutes, human
rights and advocacy organizations, watchdog groups 
and economic centers, environmental initiatives and 
foreign policy associations were able to ﬁnd ﬆimula-
tion in the U.S. realities, in America’s attempts, suc-
cesses and achievements, but also disappointments.
Democratic transformation and consensually 
agreed “rules of the game”; civic participation and 
self-government; autonomous judiciary and law 
enforcement; foreign policy choices and security 
alternatives; economic and social reforms; sensi-
tiveness towards minorities and their integration 
into the public life; independent media; individual 
freedom and global responsibility – to name juﬆ
a few – all those recurring themes vital for building 
a “good society” have been on the agenda of many 
inﬂuential Slovak NGOs.
According to Bulgarian analyﬆ Ivan Kraﬆev it was
the independent expert community, the think tanks 
48  Stuart J. Ishimaru, a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissioner, journeyed to Prešov at the Embassy’s invita-
tion to share the U.S. perspective on how a concerted eﬀort to hire minorities helped diversify the American labor force
and booﬆed productivity.
49  “Individuals and small NGOs can also make a diﬀerence,” say Ambassador Obsitnik. “A great example is the newly-
formed Slovensko Nase, which was ﬆarted laﬆ year by a group of Slovaks who have ﬆudied and/or worked in the U.S.
and have returned to Slovakia. Slovensko Nase seeks to share many of the positive business practices that the members 
picked up while in the U.S. To date they have held workshops to teach resume writing /job interviewing skills at several 
local universities and ﬆarted a mentoring program to bring together company executives to share their experiences with
top university ﬆudents.” Jana Shepperd-Žemlová: The Ambassadors speak: Deﬁning our bilateral ties. Connection, July/
Auguﬆ 2008.
50  An overview of key Slovak NGOs that could be considered as „formative actors“ in various ﬆages of democratic transfor-
mation is provided in Jozef Majchrák, Boris Strečanský and Martin Bútora: Keď ľahoﬆajnosť nie je odpoveď [When Indiﬀerence is
Not an Answer. Civic Associating in Slovakia after the Fall of Communism]. Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs 2004. As an exam-
ple of direct involvement of think-tanks in policy-making, including their expertise supporting pro-Atlantic orientation 
of Slovakia’s foreign policy, see an overview in: Martin Bútora: Pôsobenie think-tankov v slovenskej zahraničnej politike: genéza, 
výsledky, problémy [How Think-tanks Inﬂuenced Slovakia’s Foreign Policy: Origins, Outcomes, Problems]. Praha. Informační centrum 
Velvyslanectví USA 2005.
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and policy centers that took over the liberal reforms 
agenda in many Central and Eaﬆern European
countries when reformiﬆ political parties loﬆ elec-
tions and failed. Grigorij Mesežnikov shows that in 
Slovakia, where “population under the pressure of 
tough social circumﬆances gave political legitimacy
to anti-reformiﬆ, or in some cases, even anti-liberal
political forces,” the organized civil society helped 
to keep the reform agenda alive, “and pressured the 
ruling elites not to halt the transition completely.”51 
According to a foreign observer, “despite natural 
diﬀerences among Slovak NGOs, the overall third
sector community seems to have bypassed the reﬆ
of the region’s traditional obﬆacle – a lack of in-
volvement and participation of civic society in the 
decision-making process. This particular asset of 
well-developed, sophiﬆicated NGOs can be par-
tially attributed to the sharing of a common base of 
beliefs and due to the extensive network of coopera-
tion eﬆablished when the Slovak NGO community
came together to help topple the Mečiar govern-
ment in the “OK 98 Campaign” as well as to poﬆ-
Mečiar ruling leadership and “its determination to 
respect and advocate democratic principles”.52
In spite of the fact that during the laﬆ two years
think-tanks in Slovakia do play a less formative 
role, they are ﬆill vital resource for critical feedback
of current policy-making, source of information for 
media and general public and important forum for 
enlightened public debate.
5.1. Slovak Foreign Policy Association
According to its mission, the Slovak Foreign Policy 
Association (SFPA), founded in 1993 by Magda 
Vašáryová53, is an open discussion forum on interna-
tional aﬀairs and the Slovak foreign policy. Its over-
all goal is to enable open space for free exchange of 
opinions and ideas on the scope of foreign policy. 
While it is not linked to any political party or move-
ment, it has been actively supporting the integra-
tion of the Slovak Republic into the community of 
democratic countries and their political and securi-
ty ﬆructures. The Association has non-proﬁt ﬆatus
and has been very successful in spreading unbiased 
information among citizens of varied political af-
ﬁliations. In 1995, the Research Center SFPA (RC
SFPA) was founded as an integral part of the asso-
ciation. The Research Center has become the ﬁrﬆ
independent, non-governmental think tank in the 
Slovak Republic that has specialized exclusively on 
international relations research.
SFPA organizes Jours Fixe Program (informal dis-
cussions on the current foreign-political discourse), 
Modern Foreign Policy Program (lectures on cur-
rent foreign-political issues given by diﬆinguished
personalities from Slovakia and abroad). Since 
1999, the SFPA secondary school debating clubs 
(Junior debating clubs) have been run in several 
Slovak towns. National Convention on the EU, 
now a project run by Matej Bel University in Ban-
ská Byﬆrica, was originally an idea conceived and
a program founded by SFPA together with the Slo-
vak Miniﬆry of Foreign Aﬀairs and EuroInfo. SFPA
publishes journals Zahraničná politika, International Is-
sues and Slovak Policy Aﬀair, Studies on International Issues 
and The Year Book of Slovak Foreign Policy and with its ac-
tivities has considerably contributed to the forma-
tion of public debate on foreign policy issues. From 
the very beginning, it has been collaborating with 
U.S. think-tanks, and has been oﬀering a preﬆig-
ious forum for world leaders, both politicians and 
diplomats to speak out and discuss foreign policy 
and security aﬀairs.
51  Grigorij Mesežnikov: Role of Think Tanks in Economic Transition in Slovakia. In: Supporting Change – Proceedings. Prague, 
March 29–30, 2007. A Workshop for Central European NGOs Active in Democracy Assiﬆance and Promotion and Representatives of American and
European Partner Organizations. Organized by the U. S. Embassy in Prague, the Czech and Slovak Fulbright Commissions 
in cooperation with the Miniﬆry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Czech Republic. http://www.fulbright.cz/download/supporting-
change-day2.pdf
52  Sabina Crisen, Program Associate for Eaﬆ European Studies and former Fulbright Scholar to Romania: A Closer Look at the 
Slovak NGO Community. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?doc_id=18785&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_
id=7427&topic_id=1422
53  Magda Vašáryová served as the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Auﬆria (1990-1992), later became the Slovak Ambassador
to Poland (2000-2005), and in 2005, was appointed as the State Secretary at the Miniﬆry of Foreign Aﬀairs. Currently she
is the member of Slovak Parliament.
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5.2. Institute for Public Affairs 
Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs (IVO), is an independ-
ent public policy research inﬆitute founded in
1997.54 Its mission is to analyze social, political, 
economic, foreign policy, legal and cultural issues 
of public intereﬆ; to conduct research on public
policies and their consequences; to publish and 
disseminate widely the inﬆitute’s ﬁndings; to make
practical recommendations for improved govern-
ment policy; to ﬆudy, document and help to pro-
mote Slovakia’s transition to a free, democratic 
and open society; to ﬆimulate public debate on
important issues through lectures, seminars, work-
shops and roundtable discussions; and to promote 
the active involvement of informed citizens in 
public life. In addition to the projects focused on 
domeﬆic politics, public policies, and other issues
IVO has a rich record in assignments and activi-
ties focused on transatlantic relations and trans-
atlantic cooperation. Several projects have been 
supported by U.S.-based private foundations, in-
cluding the German Marshall Fund of the United 
States (GMF).
In its early years IVO conducted a research-action 
project “Slovakia after Madrid” which was a part 
of an international project “Illuminating the Grey 
Zone. Insecurity and Uncertainty in Eaﬆern Eu-
rope after NATO Enlargement”.55 In 1999 - 2000 
it was the project “Slovakia after the Washington 
Summit”, followed in 2001 by the project “EU En-
largement, NATO Enlargement”, and “The Future 
of Transatlantic Relations,” later on the project 
“Values and Identities in the Enlargement of the 
Transatlantic Community: Case of Slovakia,” and 
“The Future of the Enlarged NATO and Europe-
an Union as Seen by Political Actors.” All these 
projects have had ﬆrong dissemination dimension
which included publications, public events, semi-
nars, media out reach and others. IVO continued 
working on these topics also after Slovakia’s join-
ing EU and NATO and ﬆarted to be very active in
promoting democracy in other countries above all 
in Ukraine and Belarus.
When speaking about IVO’s role in transatlantic re-
lations promotion we have to mention participation 
on the GMF’s annual research project “Transatlan-
tic Trends.” Since 2004 Slovakia has been included 
into this cross-national comparative survey. Annual 
analysis, disseminations and presentations of the 
ﬁndings not only bring the transatlantic agenda to
the diﬀerent audiences in Slovakia, but make this
country more visible to the transatlantic commu-
nity worldwide as well.56 
Relevant contribution to the transatlantic proﬁle
of the Inﬆitute is the fact that its prominent ana-
lyﬆs – Grigorij Mesežnikov and Oľga Gyarfášová 
– have been Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows 
at the National Endowment of Democracy in 
Washington D.C. They collect a lot of knowledge 
and experience and made the Slovak public fa-
miliar with the role and importance of diﬀerent
inﬆitutions for critical thinking and democracy
development.57 
54  Both co-authors are involved in IVO. Martin Bútora was the founder and the ﬁrﬆ President of IVO and serves as its
Honorary President; Oľga Gyarfášová is the Program Director of IVO and a member of its Board of Directors.
55  See the critical overview and analysis of Slovakia’s failure to join NATO during the times of Mečiar rule - Martin Bútora 
and František Šebej (eds): Slovensko v šedej zone? Rozširovanie NATO, zlyhania a perspektívy Slovenska [Slovakia in the Grey Zone? NATO 
Enlargement, Slovakia’s Failures and Perspectives]. Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs 1998.
56  For more details see following ﬆudies and articles: Slovakia in the Transatlantic Context. Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs
2004; Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration - A Year After. Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs 2005; Oľga Gyárfášová: Prinesú
noví politickí lídri zlepšenie transatlantických vzťahov? [Will the new leaders bring improvement in transatlantic rela-
tions?], in: Domino efekt, 12.9.2007; Oľga Gyárfášová: Transatlantic Trends: What new democracies share, and don’t. blog.gmfus.
org; Zora Bútorová and Oľga Gyárfášová: Transatlantické trendy 2006: zotrvačnosť a zmena [Transatlantic Trends 2006: 
continuity and change], in: Zahraničná politika 2006/4; Oľga Gyárfášová: Slovenská geopolitická bezﬆaroﬆnosť [Slovak
Geopolitical Carelessness], in: Sme, 7.9.2007; Oľga Gyárfášová: Slovak’s views of the United States: Room for improve-
ment. Connection, July/Auguﬆ 2008.
57  Gyárfášová Oľga: Americké think tanky - zásobárne myšlienok, poradenﬆva a vplyvu [American think tanks – reservoirs
of ideas, consultancy and inﬂuence], in: Moﬆy, 17.6.2003. A book by Zora Bútorová, another key analyﬆ of IVO, called
Krehká sila [Fragile Strength], portraying women leaders in Slovakia, was also partially inspired by American experiences. 
The author compiled and edited her book during her (unpaid) ﬆudy ﬆay at the National Endowment for Democracy.
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5.3.  The Conservative Institute of Milan  
 Rastislav Štefánik
Founded in 1999, The M. R. Štefánik Conservative 
Inﬆitute (CI) wants to contribute to the creation 
of a conservative community and the cultivation 
of conservative opinions. According to the mission 
of this conservatively orientated think-tank, “the 
main goal of the Inﬆitute is to help create a social
atmosphere that will allow the perception and wide 
acceptance of conservative attitudes.” Contrary to 
some other think-tanks, “the activities of the CI are 
not oriented only towards one sphere of public life 
or society. The common denominator of the activi-
ties performed by the CI is their value deﬁnition i.e.
conservative view on society and a liberal approach 
to economy.”
Activities of CI are targeted at the economy, social 
policy, home and foreign policies, regional policy, 
civic society, battle againﬆ corruption and support
of culture and arts. The Inﬆitute organizes confer-
ences, seminars and debates clubs, analyses events 
in society and economy, issues thematic brochures 
and publications. Two laﬆ examples are a confer-
ence on value-based foreign policy, organized in 
June 2008, and a book Na obranu slobodného trhu [In 
defence of Free Market], published in 2007, which is a se-
ries of lectures “by respected pro-market personali-
ties” within the project “Conservative Economic 
Quarterly Lecture Series.”
A ﬆandard part of its agenda is relations between
Europe and America, relations between Slovakia 
and the U.S., the activities and performance of 
United States in international arena policy and the 
underlying values of U.S. involvement. Due to its 
eﬀorts, Slovak audience has got acquainted with at
leaﬆ some of the prominent ﬁgures of conservative
thinking of contemporary America. While moﬆ of
the authors and experts of the Inﬆitute are rather
skeptical or critical towards the deepening of the 
integration within the European Union, towards 
its obsolete model of welfare ﬆate, towards its bu-
reaucratic ﬆructures, its inability and/or unwilling-
ness to contribute to burden sharing of military ex-
penditures etc. – they are, in accordance with other 
conservative authorities in America and elsewhere, 
keen supporters of American concept of liberty, 
individual rights and free market. According their 
own words, “the CI bases its activities mainly on 
ideas conﬆituting the source of Anglo-American
conservatism. The principles of society arrange-
ment supported by the CI are in fact implemented 
more in the U.S., with the American emphasis on 
the individual freedom and responsibility than in 
the continental Europe, which has more paternalis-
tic and socialiﬆ tendencies.”
The CI has launched a project “American Liberty 
Scheme”. Within it, the CI supports the truﬆwor-
thy foreign policy of the Slovak Republic as well 
as the ﬆrategic partnership between Europe and
America. For the CI, “it is of vital importance to 
help eliminate false myths about the United States 
remaining in minds of the part of Slovak common 
public” (for an overview of these activities, please 
see a specialized website USAinfo.sk.
5.4.  Centre for European and North  
 Atlantic Affairs
Though the Centre for European and North 
Atlantic Aﬀairs (CENAA) was created only in 
January 2003 (in cooperation with Foundation of 
21ﬆ Century), it is now a well-eﬆablished NGO,
known in the Slovak as well as foreign security en-
vironment. Its aim was to enlarge the security com-
munity in Slovakia and to support the accession 
process of Slovakia into NATO and EU. The aim 
of CENAA was to become active within the activi-
ties and projects in the ﬁeld of foreign and security
policy in the laﬆ phase of pre-accession processes of
Slovakia and to upkeep those queﬆions topical also
after the accession into NATO and EU. After acces-
sion of Slovakia into the EU and NATO, CENAA is 
taking advantage of know-how from pre-accession 
processes into EU and NATO, especially in rela-
tion to the countries of Southeaﬆern Europe, sup-
porting the civil-military relations and professional 
independent platform in the CIS countries, taking 
part in the projects and activities within the EU and 
NATO, supporting the discussion about security 
issues in Slovakia, educating the broader public in 
the foreign and security and transatlantic issues.
The CENAA activities are divided into six pro-
grams: Transition, Transatlantic Relations and 
Europe, Strategic Regions, Security and Defense 
Policy, Panorama of Global Security Environment 
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and Summer School for Young Professionals. Each 
program covers a wide variety of research projects, 
training and education activities, conferences, 
workshops and publication activities with local and 
international partners involved. 
The Centre plays an active role in ﬆrategic discus-
sion in Slovakia and within the international secu-
rity community. The fourth edition of the Centre’s 
seminal work, The Panorama of Global Security Environ-
ment 2006-2007, was published at the end of Novem-
ber 2007. From October 30 to November 3, 2008, 
the Centre’s Executive Director Róbert Ondrejcsák 
together with Oľga Gyárfášová, Program Director 
of Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs and Ivo Samson, secu-
rity expert from the SFPA, teamed up on their joint-
project „Rising of public awareness in Ukraine: ex-
perience of Slovakia“.58
On April 4 and 5, 2008, CENAA organized The Sec-
ond Slovak Strategic Forum, titled “Frozen Con-
ﬂict or Strategic Partnership? Strategies and Mis-
sions of EU and NATO”, with experts from Slova-
kia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia and the United States. NATO Public Diplo-
macy Division and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
supported the Forum. Also, the Summer School for 
Young Professionals 2008 takes place on June 28 
through July 6, 2008, at the National Academy of 
Defense (NAD) in Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia and 
in Uzhorod, Ukraine.59 
5.5. Public Policy Institute
A dynamic newcomer in this community of think-
tanks and action-tanks is the Slovak branch of Pub-
lic Policy Inﬆitute, eﬆablished in 2006 in London
as an initiative of young people who ﬆudied or
worked in Anglo-Saxon countries. Under the title 
“The Central & Eaﬆern European Innovative Pub-
lic Policy Think Tank”, they want to contribute to 
suﬆainable development of Central Europe and to
deepen democratization by conducting analyses 
and independent research, authoring public policy 
conceptions and solutions, and oﬀering a platform
for public debates.60 In Slovakia, PPI concentrates 
on “initiatives” in the ﬁelds of university educa-
tion, culture, and foreign policy. It also serves as 
a democracy watchdog. Besides organizing lectures 
and discussions on foreign policy topics, the PPI 
also publishes a Foreign Policy Newsletter, informing 
about important articles and ﬆudies from America
and Europe. Public Policy Inﬆitute orients itself at
ﬆudents and young people (16-26 years old) whom
they see as a “potential for future growth of Slova-
kia and the whole region”.
5.6. American Inspirations in Other NGOs
On the conservative side, the advocacy of free-
dom, free market, private ownership, limited gov-
ernment, the ﬁght againﬆ “anti-Americanism” (as
well as criticism of “political correctness,” “positive 
discrimination,” “feminism,” “environmentalism,” 
“anti-globalism” etc) belong to ﬆandard agenda of
organizations like Práve Spektrum (Right Spec-
trum - www.prave-spektrum.sk) or Inﬆitute for
a Free Society (www.isloboda.sk), mainly oriented 
at ﬆudents and young people. A group of young
activiﬆs has also founded Konzervatívny klub Ron-
alda Reagana (Ronald Reagan Conservative Club) 
that avows itself to the legacy of former President 
Reagan, organizing seminars and discussion devot-
ed to his ideas and politics.
Another youth organization, Mladí Liberáli (Young 
Liberals – www.mladiliberali.sk) supports pro-mar-
ket ideas in economic issues and pro-liberal atti-
tudes in life-ﬆyle queﬆions.
U.S. experiences and practice, American ideas and 
leaders have been also a rich source of inspiration 
for NGOs confessing liberal values – for civic or-
ganizations aimed at democracy education, for hu-
58  Seminars and trainings for Ukrainian representatives have been held not only in Kyiv, but also in Odessa, Simferopol, 
and Dnipropetrovsk, cities with low support for Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. CENAA will prepare a joint pub-
lication in Ukrainian language about Slovak experiences from Euro-Atlantic integration and security sector reform.
59  Summer school is intended for maﬆer and doctoral level ﬆudents of political science and/or international relations who
are intereﬆed in the foreign and security policy issues. Around 25 ﬆudents will come from Central Europe, South Eaﬆern
Europe and Ukraine.
60  http://thinktank.publicpi.eu/
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man rights and anti-raciﬆs groups, women organi-
zations, watch-dog organizations and others.
5.7.  Economic Think-Tanks & Research  
 Centers, Economic Educational NGOs
“The biggeﬆ success of civil society in the economic
transitions,” writes Grigorij Mesežnikov, “was res-
cuing the agenda of socioeconomic reforms. The 
actors of this rescue operation were independent 
policy inﬆitutes, think tanks, and experts. After
the elections of 1992, pro-reform political forces 
were severely defeated by nationaliﬆ and populiﬆ
parties, on the wave of the population’s disagree-
ment with profound syﬆemic changes, especially
in the economy. The Slovak antireform forces were 
authoritarian and not liberal in the political sense, 
using non-democratic methods. They ouﬆed the
proponents of the reform course from the ﬆate ad-
miniﬆration, and it was civil society that oﬀered
these people safe harbor in think tanks and analyti-
cal centers.”
“Experts working in these organizations moni-
tored and analyzed, publicized their analytical out-
put and participated in the public debate on the 
overall ﬆate of economic transition,” continues
Mesežnikov. “Their role at the time was not simply 
to keep the reform alive; they were also the authors 
and advocates of economic reforms. Think tanks 
prepared the reform ﬆrategies in particular sectors
of the economy, and shaped the public debate on 
reforms, persuading the public that reform meas-
ures were necessary, generating additional support 
for them from the opinion-making community, and 
eliciting support among politicians for continuing 
economic transformation, which was a very im-
portant role. The second success of civil society in 
economic transition was their direct contribution 
to this process. When reformiﬆ political forces suc-
ceeded in returning to power, they invited people 
from think tanks, including economic ones, to be 
the implementers of reform ﬆrategies as ﬆate oﬃ-
cials.”
Indeed, continues Mesežnikov, “the whole ﬆory
of the Slovak “reform tiger”, the champion of eco-
nomic reforms in Central Europe, is a combination 
of the will of political elites to continue the reform 
process with the determination of civil society to 
generate reform ﬆrategies and reform practition-
ers, to educate the population about reforms, 
and to monitor the process of immediate reform 
implementation.”61
5.7.1.  M.E.S.A. 10 – Center for Economic and 
 Social Analyses
The main aim of M.E.S.A. 10 – a center for eco-
nomic and social analyses – is to support inde-
pendent market economy and principles such as 
free competition, equality of opportunities, inde-
pendent enterprises, inviolability of private prop-
erty, limited competencies of the ﬆate, openness of
economy and separation of economic and political 
powers.62
According to its mission, M.E.S.A. 10 considers the 
following points to be the essential prerequisites of 
successful economic transformation and healthy 
economic development: - eﬀective inﬆitutional or-
ganization of society based on respect and protec-
tion of values and principles ﬆated above; - creation
and rigorous exaction of rules of the game that pro-
tect these values and principles; - inﬂuence public
opinion with the aim to advocate these values in 
the society.
The hiﬆory of this think-tank reﬂects the hiﬆory of 
Slovakia’s economic and political reforms. It was 
founded in 1992 by well-known politicians (almoﬆ
all of them were economiﬆs) who belonged to ﬁrﬆ
Slovak and Czechoslovak reform governments after 
the fall of communism.63 In the years 1992 – 1998, 
M.E.S.A. 10 concentrated on defending the values 
61  Grigorij Mesežnikov: Role of Think Tanks in Economic Transition in Slovakia. http://www.ivo.sk/5147/sk/publiciﬆika/
role-of-think-tanks-in-economic-transition-in-slovakia
62  http://www.mesa10.sk
63  The founders were Pavol Hofman, Jozef Kučerák, František Šebej, Mikuláš Dzurinda, Ján Langoš, Anton Vavro, Ivan 
Mikloš, Gabriel Palacka, Pavol Kinšes, Anton Dančo.
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of market economy and inevitability of reforms of 
banking syﬆem, judiciary, public ﬁnances and pub-
lic adminiﬆration. It published organized public
discussions (it created Slovak Economic Forum, 
an informal association of several think-tanks, aca-
demic inﬆitutions, NGOs, and partners from me-
dia), published books and a monthly periodical 
Slovak Monthly Report, worked on alternative models 
of economic policies. It criticized the method of pri-
vatization through direct sales to owners that were 
designed beforehand by Mečiar government, which 
was not transparent and was extremely disadvanta-
geous for the ﬆate. Legal ﬆatus of the company was
changed in 1997, when M.E.S.A. 10 became a civic 
association.64 In the following period (1998 – 2006), 
several key actors of M.E.S.A. 10 left it and joined 
the government, working in areas of economy, pub-
lic ﬁnance and decentralization. One of the found-
ing members, Mikuláš Dzurinda, a dedicated At-
lanticiﬆ, became the Prime Miniﬆer of the Slovak
Republic for the period 1998-2006, and another 
founding member, Ivan Mikloš, became not only 
Deputy Prime Miniﬆer responsible for economic
reform, but also a well-known face of Slovakia’s 
economic successes in America and EU countries.
At the same time, the think-tank continued to prepare 
concept materials, employing new young analyﬆs
who created a core of the new team.65 In the period 
2006 – 2010, besides working on issues of knowledge 
economy, M.E.S.A. 10 incorporated in its agenda con-
sultation and implementation of Slovak reform expe-
riences in other EU ﬆates, transition countries and
future candidates for democratic changes.66
An illuﬆrative example of M.E.S.A. 10’s activity
abroad is projects in Ukraine. “Support of Building 
Local Democracy in Ukraine” was oriented at trans-
formation and democratization of society in Ukraine.67 
The project was based on Slovak experience but used 
also the experience of other transition countries, where 
it had been proved that ﬆrong and pragmatic self-gov-
ernment is not only a guarantee of democracy and im-
portant partner in the public adminiﬆration reform
but also signiﬁcant ﬆate representative when solving
economic problems. It was conducted with the as-
siﬆance of local self-government and Association of
Ukrainian Cities and Communities and in coopera-
tion with Research Triangle Inﬆitute, a major Ameri-
can research inﬆitute, “dedicated to improving the hu-
man condition by turning knowledge into practice”68. 
In 2008, M.E.S.A. 10 is realizing the project “Sup-
port of Competitiveness of Cross-border Regions in 
Ukraine under the Conditions of Market Economy”, 
conducted in cooperation with the Kyiv-based Inﬆi-
tute for Budgetary and Socio-Economic Research, 
and supported by oﬃcial Slovak Aid. Both inﬆitutes
have also launched a project titled “Support for Fis-
cal Decentralization in Ukraine through the Eaﬆ-Eaﬆ:
Partnership beyond Borders Program” funded by the 
International Renaissance Foundation.
In cooperation with Pontis Foundation in Bratisla-
va and Stockholm-based Chriﬆian Democratic In-
ternational Centre, M.E.S.A 10 also prepared a pol-
icy paper on Cuba, advocating domeﬆic dialogue
in Cuba and a new EU ﬆrategy towards Cuba.
5.7.2.  INEKO - Institute for Economic and  
 Social Reforms
A renowned economic think-tank, INEKO (Inﬆitute
for Economic and Social Reforms) was eﬆablished 
64  Viktor Nižňanský, later head of M.E.S.A. 10, was among the founding members of this civic association. In 2006, after 
completing his job as the government plenipotentiary for public adminiﬆration reform and ﬆate decentralization, he
returned to M.E.S.A. 10 and became its President.
65  Among them were Marek Jakoby, Peter Pažitný, Jana Červenáková, Oľga Reptová, Jaroslav Pilát, Karol Morvay and 
Martin Valentovič.
66  Milan Ježovica, former foreign policy adviser to Prime Miniﬆer Dzurinda, joined M.E.S.A. 10 in 2006, promoting “At-
lantic” topics in foreign policy thinking and acting of the think-tank.
67  Viktor Nižňanský – Richard Bodo: Local democracy in Ukraine. Summary of ﬁnding, theses and ideas to support local democracy in Ukraine. 
Bratislava, M.E.S.A. 10, Center for Economic and Social Analyses 2007. Local democracy in Ukraine: Summary of ﬁnd-
ings, theses and ideas to support local democracy in Ukraine. http://www.rti.org/publications.cfm?nav=369
68  “With projects in more than 40 countries and a ﬆaﬀ of more than 2,600, Research Triangle Inﬆitute oﬀers innovative
research and technical solutions to governments and businesses worldwide.” Its mission is “to improve the human condi-
tion by turning knowledge into practice.” http://www.rti.org/page.cfm?nav=6
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in 1999 “to support economic and social reforms 
which aim to remove barriers to the long-term positive 
development of the Slovak economy and society.”69 
“Wide-reaching changes brought about by induﬆrial
revolution, democratization, globalization and infor-
matization have hit our region in the laﬆfewdecades,”
writes INEKO in its mission ﬆatement. “Our socie-
ty is unable to cope in this world with the rules and 
values valid for thousands of years any more – yet it 
should not ignore them either. For inﬆance, there was
no need to take care of the elderly through the ﬁrﬆ or
second pillars of the pension syﬆem a thousand years
ago. The seniors’ relatives provided the care reliably 
inﬆead. No doubt that the relatives’ role is important
today as well, yet it needs to be combined with the 
new schemes that would take in account changing 
conditions such as rising migration, and that would 
be able to take a good care of an increasing number 
of people who are not tied to small communities any-
more. Hence the main mission of INEKO: to search 
for an optimal speed and scale of an “upgrade” of so-
ciety’s operating syﬆem, its ethics code.”
One of the moﬆ creative and widely appreciated
initiatives of the Inﬆitute is “HESO (Evaluation of
Economic and Social Measures) Project”, which 
creates a platform, where independent economiﬆs,
analyﬆs, journaliﬆs, academics, people from busi-
ness community, representatives of trade unions, 
employers´ associations and NGOs express their 
opinions on quality and importance of proposed 
and passed economic and social measures of leg-
islature, executive power, as well as on decisions 
of public inﬆitutions on a quarterly basis.70 The 
project was created with the aim “to push forward 
the economic and social transformation, to inﬂu-
ence public awareness and to increase public ac-
ceptance of measures and policies, that speed up 
transformation toward a democratic, transparent 
political syﬆem buttressed by civil society and com-
petitive market economy and lead to life quality im-
provements from a long-term perspective.”
Similar to other Slovak think-tanks and NGOs, 
INEKO operates also abroad. The project called 
“Transfer of Slovak Economic Reform Know-How 
to Ukraine” aimed at contributing to faﬆer eco-
nomic growth and poverty reduction of Ukraine 
through improved economic reform policy-mak-
ing. In cooperation with the Kyiv-based The Inter-
national Centre for Policy Studies, the experiences 
of Slovakia and other V4 countries in providing 
experts’ policy feedback to both public and to de-
cision-makers were used.71 The goal of the project 
“Creating Reform Coalition from Business, NGO 
and Media Leaders in Serbia” was to improve the 
eﬃciency of Serbian labor market and quality of
its business environment as key elements for rais-
ing the country’s economic growth and reducing its 
poverty. By eﬆablishing a reform alliance consiﬆing
of business leaders, think-tank experts and journal-
iﬆs who will monitor and comment on labor mar-
ket and business climate reforms on a regular basis, 
a more eﬀective push on government can be cre-
ated to change legislation towards a more economic 
growth- and employment-friendly environment.72 
The ﬁndings and ideas of Eugen Jurzyca, the di-
rector of INEKO (an alumni of a scholarship ﬆay
at Georgetown University, who was also active in 
opening of U.S.-Slovakia Action Commission), and 
of his team, are frequently quoted in media and help 
to cultivate economic thinking in Slovakia.73
5.7.3.  Hayek Foundation 
Hayek Foundation is an independent, non-politi-
cal and non-proﬁt organization founded in 1991 in
Bratislava by a group of Slovak economiﬆs. The
mission of the foundation is to oﬀer practical in-
novative proposals of the market solutions to the 
economic and social problems, disseminate and 
promote ideas of the classic liberalism in the Slo-
vak Republic, be a platform for academic discus-
sions among scholars as well as broader public and 
69  http://www.ineko.sk/about/ineko-inﬆitute-for-economic-and-social-reforms
70  http://www.ineko.sk/articles/heso-project
71  http://www.ineko.sk/articles/transfer-of-slovak-economic-reform-know-how-to-ukraine
72  http://www.ineko.sk/articles/project-serbia
73  http://www.ineko.sk/media/medialne-vyﬆupy
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develop basic liberal ideas and values in the Slovak 
Republic. Fundamental liberal values, which the 
foundation endeavors to promote are free choice 
of every individual and his/her responsibility, mar-
ket economy, minimalization of ﬆate interventions,
cutting down the taxes and the right of every indi-
vidual for life, liberty and property. In 2004 Hayek 
Foundation was awarded in the USA by preﬆigious
Templeton Freedom Award for Inﬆitute Excellence
in Promoting Liberty. 
5.7.4.  Slovak Governance Institute
According to its webpage, Slovak Governance In-
ﬆitute (SGI), a non-proﬁt, non-partisan civic asso-
ciation, was spun oﬀ from INEKO in October 2001
to create an NGO with a clear focus on good gov-
ernance and public policy. SGI’s mission is “to initi-
ate and promote the search for solutions to improve 
the process of making and implementing decisions 
on the allocation of public resources to meet the 
society’s needs to ensure good, accessible, transpar-
ent and eﬀective public services for the citizens of
the Slovak Republic.” Their projects are oriented at 
better governance in public sector and education; 
they also focused on issues like corruption, trans-
parency in public sector or e-government.74
5.7.5.  INESS – Institute of Economic and  
 Social Studies
A relatively new actor on the think-tank scene, 
INESS – Inﬆitute of Economic and Social Stud-
ies, has ﬆarted its activities in Bratislava on Janu-
ary 1ﬆ, 2006. The think tank monitors the function-
ing and ﬁnancing of the public sector, valuates the
eﬀects of the legislative changes on the economy
and society and comments on current economic 
and social issues: “Our goal is to broaden public 
awareness of the principles of functioning of mar-
ket mechanisms, the eﬀects of ﬆate interventions
and their impact on the society and everyday life,” 
says INESS in its mission ﬆatement. “The priority
areas of include taxation and contributions to the 
ﬆate budget, public healthcare syﬆem, monetary
policy, issues related to the membership in the EU, 
government regulation, and property rights.”
INESS sees as one of its moﬆ signiﬁcant product
an “Analysis of the Social Syﬆem in Slovakia” and
“Proposals for Solving the Major Drawbacks.” 
The think-tank issues a monthly newsletter Market 
Finesse. INESS is also a member of Stockholm Net-
work (the leading pan-European think-tank and 
market-oriented network).
Besides its regular analyses, ﬆudies, presentations
at conferences, educational activities, frequent 
comments on current economic and social issues 
in media, INESS has gained popularity due to its 
project “Price of the State.”75 The goal of the project 
launched in December 2006 is “to improve the ac-
cess to information on public ﬁnance, especially its
size and proportions, for ﬆudents, journaliﬆs and
general public in a sphere of public ﬁnance.” Ac-
cording to INESS, the information on revenues 
and expenditures of general government are dis-
persed, unclear and published at diﬀerent locations
throughout the Internet. The output of the project 
is a new internet portal76, which gathers the accurate 
and actual information on particular components 
of public ﬁnance: “Interactive functionality of the
web page assiﬆ users in learning about the size and
various uses of general government resources and 
track its changes in time. The ﬆructure of public
expenditures are visualized in the form of poﬆer
„Vesmír verejných výdavkov“ (A Universe of Public 
Expenditures)” INESS has diﬆributed the poﬆer
to high schools and universities together with an 
inﬆruction CD ROM. “The main purpose of the
portal is to inform, not to provide political evalua-
tion,” they say. Educated and better-informed ﬆu-
dents and general public are considered to be nec-
essary assumptions of future development of able 
and active society.
While INESS is emphasizing its independence and 
non-partisanship, it openly declares it closeness to 
74  http://www.governance.sk/index.php?id=436
75  http://www.iness.sk/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=7
76  www.cenaﬆatu.sk
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American experience, namely to Congressman Ron 
Paul. The former Presidential candidate visited 
INESS in 2007, ﬁnding there a group of scholars
sympathetic to his reluctance to government spend-
ing. In its analyses, INESS scholars frequently 
quote U.S. literature, especially that of libertarian 
way of thinking, and they proudly refer to Ameri-
can inspiration in their ﬆudies of social syﬆem, of
the price of the ﬆate as well as their research on
“healthy proﬁts” in health care.77
5.7.6.  Health Policy Institute
Eﬆablished in 2005, as a response “to the backdrop
of growing medical care coﬆs driven by high expec-
tations of citizens, ageing of the population, chang-
ing ﬆructure of illnesses and technological advanc-
es,” the mission of this young dynamic inﬆitution,
well-known in Slovakia, but also frequently invited 
to advice the policymakers in other Central Euro-
pean countries, is to promote values which support 
ﬁnancially suﬆainable health syﬆems responding
ﬂexibly to the needs of the population, achieving
a higher eﬃciency in the provision of health servic-
es, as well as to promote client-oriented approach to 
the insured and patients” (www.hpi.sk). While the 
analyﬆs of the HPI value the principle of solidarity,
they also underﬆand health as an individual asset
and support health policies, which motivate citi-
zens to improve their own health. They support the 
higheﬆ possible decentralization of decision-mak-
ing and all market mechanisms in the health sector 
that are more eﬃcient than ﬆate intervention.
Many of those ideas and principles are reﬂected in
their monthly Newsletter on Health Policy.
5.7.7.  Junior Achievement Slovensko  
 – Mládež pre budúcnosť
A nonproﬁt educational organization, a partner of
Junior Achievement Worldwide, and a member of 
Junior Achievement - Young Enterprise Europe, 
teaches enterprise, entrepreneurship, and “eco-
nomic literacy”, focusing on the role of business in 
the economy and the relevance of education in the 
workplace. The Junior Achievement has its roots in 
America (it was eﬆablished there in 1919) and after
the fall of communism, it was also active in Slova-
kia, with the help of famous entrepreneur Tomáš 
Baťa who originally worked in Czechoslovakia, 
and who later became honorary president of JAW. 
In the academic year 2007/2008, 16 thousands of 
Slovak ﬆudents are involved in the program and
in June 2008, the overall number of alumni has 
reached 155 thousands (http://www.jasr.sk/show-
doc.do?docid=103)
5.7.8.  The Michael Bosak Society
The Michael Bosák Society came into exiﬆence in
1999 at the 130th Anniversary of his birth (http://
www.bosak.sk/en/index.html). Michael Bosák left 
Slovakia at the end of the 19th century for Americas 
to seek happiness and opportunity. Through his ef-
forts, skill and business acumen he was successful 
beyond measure and became a well-known celebri-
ty in Slovak hiﬆory. During World War I, he organ-
ized collections to help Slovakia. He was also one 
of the signatories of famous Pittsburgh Agreement 
preceding the creation of Czecho-Slovakia. He 
served as the President of the Firﬆ National Bank
and his signature was used on a ten-dollar bank 
note. During his life he built banks, schools and 
churches, leaving behind a legacy of laﬆing values
for future generations.
The Society has published books and organized ex-
hibitions devoted to life of this unusual personality. It 
has also created a Memorial Room of Michael Bosák 
in the school in his native village, which was conﬆruct-
ed with his ﬁnancial support in 1925. Its current main
activity is the organization of a yearly competition for 
secondary business and economics ﬆudents in Slova-
kia for the Michael Bosák Prize. The moﬆ recent one
was announced on February 2008.
X X X
It should be added – though this is not a subject of 
our ﬆudy – that the activities of many eﬃcient and
well-known NGOs in the arena of democracy, civil 
society, and good governance have been supported 
77  Juraj Karpiš – Radovan Ďurana – Richard Ďurana: Zdravý zisk [Healthy Proﬁt]. Bratislava, INESS 2007.
by American public and private actors, from US-
AID program to National Endowment for Democ-
racy, International Republican Inﬆitute, National
Democratic Inﬆitute, Freedom House, Open So-
ciety Inﬆitute to Truﬆ for Civil Society in Central
and Eaﬆern Europe (some of the schemes they have
developed are ﬆill running).
X X X
And even if think-tanks and related inﬆitutions
have lower signiﬁcance in shaping public policies
as it was during the previous decade, when they 
were among the key “agents of change,“ serving as 
catalyﬆs for ideas and actions, designers and pro-
moters of transition policies – they are ﬆill fulﬁlling
their role, described so eloquently by many authors 
and summarized by Jiří Schneider78, ﬆarting from
agenda setting to providing feedback and policy 
evaluation, serving as a source of information for 
media and general public, exercising conceptual 
thinking, creating of multidisciplinary network of 
experts, oﬀering policy recommendations, helping
to articulate public intereﬆ and to contributing to
the quality of public debate. They ﬆill “provide an
organizational link and communication bridge be-
tween their diﬀerent audiences”.
Having said that, one has also to notice serious prob-
lems of suﬆainability of this part of the non-proﬁt
sector in Slovakia connected with. Boris Strečanský, 
who recently co-authored a research on the NGOs’ 
inﬂuence on decision-making processes in Visegrad
countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia), speaks of “two diﬀerent interpretations of
the 1989-2008 period regarding the role of NGOs. 
The ﬁrﬆ scheme ﬆates that “thanks to the support of 
Weﬆern countries, especially American private foun-
dations (but also U.S. and EU public sources), it was 
possible to plant and husband a seed of civic partici-
pation and social capital in Slovakia, a process that 
NGOs contributed to as well.” However, there is also 
a second interpretation ﬆating “that this seed did not
– despite the support it received – leaved a deeper im-
print on the collective memory of Slovak citizens.” 
Inﬆead, it was subﬆituted by another model, based
on Slovak traditions, hiﬆory, and culture, which is
conservative, respects authority and which is similar 
to Weﬆern Europe, emphasizing “social economy
over the association of citizens”. The EU member-
ship indirectly ﬆrengthens this model, the ﬆate in-
ﬆead of developing a “culture of dialogue” requires
ﬆricter regulation and control over the activities of
the NGOs which are facing a dilemma “whether to 
keep the activiﬆ ethos of civil society or to accept the
gradual Europeanization of the NGOs” in the situ-
ation when the ﬁnancial environment is weak and
unﬆable and there is lack of independent funding.
Besides other challenges, the Slovak NGOs will 
have to ﬁnd out how to live with “the gradual de-
crease” of the ‘American’ civil society model in favor 
of the Europeanization of the third sector (linkage 
with the ﬆate and public sources)” and how to cope
with “the gradual disappearance of the ‘US’ variety 
of civic engagement in the public domain”. 79
6.  EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS, RESEARCH 
& ACADEMIC EXCHANGES
6.1. The Fulbright Program
The Fulbright Program, one of the world’s largeﬆ
and moﬆ diversiﬁed educational exchange pro-
grams, currently operates in more than 140 coun-
tries, including 51 countries with bi-national Ful-
bright Commissions. The J. W. Fulbright Commis-
sion for Educational Exchange in the Slovak Re-
public is “an autonomous, non-proﬁt, non-partisan,
bi-national inﬆitution” consiﬆing of eight members
appointed by the U.S. Ambassador to Slovak Re-
public and the Slovak Miniﬆer of Education, who
are the Honorary Chairmen of the Board. Both gov-
ernments, with the U.S. government contributing 
about 75 percent of the budget and the Slovak Gov-
78  Jiří Schneider: Think-tanks in Visegrad Countries. From Policy research to Advocacy. Budapeﬆ, Center for Policy Studies, Central
European University 2002. http://www.policy.hu/schneider/FRP.html
79  “This seed is present within the collective experience of Slovak society. In times of need, when democracy was threatened 
and ﬆandards of civility and tolerance were trampled, it was activated. Compared with neighboring countries, it is clearly
imprinted on the Slovak experience. „We and They.” NGOs Inﬂuence on Decision-making Processes in the Visegrad Group Countries. Ed-
ited by Tom Nicholson. Tokyo, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation 2008.
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ernment contributing about 25 percent, jointly fund 
the Fulbright Program. Since 1994 the Fulbright 
Program in the Slovak Republic enabled over 220 
Slovaks (34 in the period 2003-2006) to ﬆudy, teach
or conduct research in the United States and nearly 
200 U.S. ﬆudents, scholars, and professionals (25
in the period 2003-2006) have been awarded Ful-
bright grants to the Slovak Republic in a variety of 
academic ﬁelds. According to vaﬆ majority of the
alumni, the Fulbright experience is of great value, 
for some of theme it is a “life experience”.
In 2001, the Slovak Fulbright Alumni Association 
(SFAA) was created with the objective to network 
and translate the individual Fulbright experience 
into a long-term inﬆitutional impact. In March 
2007, it has participated at the “Support of Trans-
formational Diplomacy Workshop”, a joint event 
of the Czech and Slovak Fulbright Commissions in 
co/operation with the Czech Miniﬆry of Foreign
Aﬀairs brought together Czech and Slovak active
NGO’s, Fulbright Alumni and Representatives of 
both American and European Partner Organiza-
tions to discuss the transformational diplomacy and 
its impact on countries in Eaﬆern Europe. How-
ever, the Slovak Fulbright Alumni Association has 
not organized its own events and the activities and 
results of Fulbright Alumni Initiatives Awards Pro-
gram are not very visible in Slovakia.
6.2.  The Slovak Academic Information  
 Agency (SAIA)
The Slovak Academic Information Agency is a non-
governmental, not-for-proﬁt organization which,
since its eﬆablishment in 1990, has been imple-
menting programs and providing services aimed at 
enhancement of civil society, and assiﬆing in inter-
nationalization of education and research in Slova-
kia. From 2006 SAIA began to implement two new 
programs approved by the Government of the Slo-
vak Republic. These are the National Scholarship 
Program of the Slovak Republic and M. R. Štefánik 
Fellowship. Consequently, SAIA currently operates 
eight major programs, but none of them is focusing 
on the USA. For Europe, the number of scholar-
ship recipients provided on the basis of bi-lateral 
agreements in education and oﬀers from individual
countries were quite high (542 in 2004, 467 in 2005. 
In comparison, SAIA has made recommendations 
for the American Fund Czechoslovak Relief, which 
each year awards citizens of Czech and Slovak Re-
publics with complementary grants in the amount 
of 2000 USD for university ﬆudy in the USA. In
both 2004 and 2005 nine ﬆudents were awarded on
the basis of SAIA´s recommendations.
Unfortunately, Slovakia does not have major or signiﬁcantpri-
vate foundations, which would enable ﬆudents, and/or experts’
exchange, like for inﬆance, Kosciuszko Foundation in Poland.
In 2007 SAIA carried out project “Educational re-
search cooperation between the Slovak Republic 
and the USA in the years 2000-2006“. The result of 
the project revealed that during that period 18 out 
of 33 higher education inﬆitutions cooperated with
the U.S. inﬆitutions; there were no details about the
nature and results of this cooperation.
X X X
Our own research has shown that in Slovakia’s school curricu-
la, the presence of Atlantic and/or America-related 
topics is underrepresented. While the textbooks for 
high schools bring some basic information about 
American democracy, rule of law, economic pros-
perity, as well as about the importance of the US 
role in creating Czechoslovakia, the US role in the 
WW II and in the Cold War – the amount of infor-
mation is insuﬃcient and does nor help the ﬆudents
and teachers in reﬂecting upon important events.
The exceptions are some bi-lingual elementary and 
high schools, which have developed, sophiﬆicated
program on the US realities.
On university level, we were not able to ﬁnd any
courses of American Studies that would go beyond 
the topics of American literature. 
There are positive exceptions like scholarship 
schemes for fellows oﬀered by the German Mar-
shal Fund or Eisenhower Fellowship, like programs 
provided by private inﬆitutions of higher education
(City University in Bratislava or Inﬆitute for Lib-
eral Studies BISLA) or small program called An-
nual Slovak Seminars on the Free Society, launched 
by a philosopher Michael Novak and organized to-
gether with the Ladislav Hanus Society.
Publishing houses like Kalligram, magazines like 
Kritika a kontext (philosophy, cultural ﬆudies) jour-
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nal like economic weekly Trend or a political-cultur-
al weekly Týždeň (a part of it is devoted to foreign 
policy80) are a valuable source helping the ﬆudents
to better orient themselves in American thinking.
But in general, the numbers of ﬆudents, programs,
and projects are very low, and as for books, an illus-
trative example speaks volumes about the fact how 
widespread are even “classics” – Tocqueville’s semi-
nal work Democracy in America was translated into Slo-
vak only in 2006... It should be, however, added, that 
this disadvantage is to certain extent compensated 
by numerous Czech translations which Slovak ﬆu-
dents, teachers and intellectuals can easily read.
7. BUSINESS REPRESENTATION
7.1.  American Chamber of Commerce -  
 AmCham
A very important role in nurturing Slovak-Ameri-
can relationships and cooperating in the transatlan-
tic economic area is played by business actors, ﬁrﬆ
and foremoﬆ by a very active American Chamber
of Commerce (AmCham) in Slovakia. AmCham 
was founded in 1993 in Bratislava as an independ-
ent and self-supporting organization, entirely de-
pendent on contributions from its members. Cur-
rently, its membership has reached more than 300 
international and Slovak companies, including 
many of the largeﬆ and important ﬁrms in Slova-
kia. Of this amount, approximately 40 % are Ameri-
can companies, about 40 % are Slovak companies 
and about 20 % are other nationalities. The U.S. is 
one of the top ten inveﬆors in Slovakia; there are
more than 120 U.S. companies eﬆablished on Slo-
vak market and their number can ﬆill grow. The
U.S. export to Slovakia grew by 25 percent in 2007 
to $680 million.81
AmCham organizes numerous regularly scheduled 
events throughout the year, including monthly 
Business Cocktails, Business Breakfaﬆs and Round-
table Luncheons, which provide great opportunity 
to obtain new contacts. Through their publications 
such as Connection magazine, the Membership Direc-
tory, Membership Beneﬁts and Opportunities, Slo-
vak Brochure, Annual Report, and the web site they 
provide information for their members. Through 
their committees, Task Forces and other advocacy 
eﬀorts, AmCham members can approach the gov-
ernment or other appropriate authorities to sup-
port the development of the business environment 
in Slovakia.82 “AmCham became a respected part-
ner of the Slovak Government and other important 
political, business and non-governmental players in 
Slovakia,” says Oľga Algayerová, State Secretary of 
the Miniﬆry of Foreign Aﬀairs. “The positive inﬂu-
ence of AmCham Slovakia on the business environ-
ment in the country is growing.”83 
80  František Šebej, its foreign policy editor, was not only an analyﬆ connected with think-tank community, but he also served
as the chair of Foreign Relations Committee of House of People of Federal Parliament in Czechoslovakia 1990-1992 and 
the head of European Aﬀairs Committee in the Slovak Parliament in 1998-2002.
81  The recent survey of the U.S. Embassy of U.S. ﬁrms operating in Slovakia showed that U.S. companies have inveﬆed
more than $3.8 billion in the country and employ almoﬆ 50,000 Slovak citizens. “This is ﬁve times more than the oft-
quoted oﬃcial government ﬆatiﬆics,” says U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia Vincent Obsitnik, “which put the U.S. as only
the 10th largeﬆ inveﬆor in Slovakia, primarily because the Statiﬆical Oﬃce determines a company’s origin based on where
it is regiﬆered, which is often a third country.” I don’t think anyone would doubt that Coca-Cola is a U.S. company, he
adds. See Jana Shepperd-Žemlová: The Ambassadors speak…, Connection, July/Auguﬆ 2008.
82  “AmCham has always been very supportive of all the government’s eﬀorts to progress towards a knowledge-based soci-
ety,” says Jake Slegers, the executive director of the AmCham in Slovakia. “Therefore, we eﬆablished our Committee on
Business-Academic Cooperation, which brings together company experts, CEOs, university representatives, ﬆudents
and NGOs, with the aim of creating better links between business and academia. This committee has already commented 
on the Act on Educations and Training and has actively participated in the Working Group, including preparing the 
draft Law on Vocational Education and the Act on Financial Education. We hope that by building “bridges” between the 
business sphere and the education syﬆem, and by assiﬆing the education syﬆem to better reﬂect the needs of the labor
market, AmCham is contributing to progress towards a knowledge-based economy in Slovakia.” Beata Balogová: They 
will return back. The Slovak Spectator, No. 27, 2008.
83  According to the State Secretary, “the transatlantic economic area is, and for a long time ahead will remain, the moﬆ
important business and inveﬆment relationship in world’s economy and a forefront of globalization. Slovakia is proud
to be a part of it and very much appreciates the role of the American Chamber of Commerce in the process of building 
ﬆrong economic ties after the fall of the Iron Curtain.“ Connections, May 2008.
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AmCham is a visible and inﬂuential advocate of
pro-business and pro-market climate in Slovakia.84 
According to a survey presented at the AmCham 
General Assembly in April 2008, “vaﬆ majority of
member are satisﬁed with AmCham’s performance
and think its activities are helpful in gaining con-
tacts, networking and lobbying“.85
Among its moﬆ supportive members are compa-
nies like U. S. Steel Košice, Radison SAS Carlton 
Hotel, Phillip Morris Slovakia, KPMG, Oracle, Ac-
centure, Ernﬆ & Young, and DELL. The ﬆory of
the U.S. Steel is an emblematic one: hundred years 
ago, in the ﬁrﬆ years of the company, there were
Slovak workers helping to ﬆart a proﬁtable future
of the ﬁrm; in November 2000, the ownership of the
complete metallurgical operation of the Eaﬆ Slova-
kian Steelworks was successfully transferred to the 
U. S. Steel Group, a unit of the United States Steel 
Corporation. It represents a successful partner-
ship of Slovak technical skills and knowledge with 
ﬆrong American plant management and market-
oriented business experience. “U. S. Steel Košice 
recognizes and accepts its role as a responsible com-
munity partner and is a leading contributor to the 
economic, environmental, and social development 
of Košice and Eaﬆern Slovakia. The Company sup-
ports community projects in healthcare, education, 
charity, sport and culture” (http://www.usske.sk/
corpinfo/corpi-e.htm)
7.2.  Slovak American Enterprise Fund  
 – SAEF
SAEF was eﬆablished in 1991 as a nonproﬁt venture
capital fund and private equity under the Support 
for Eaﬆern European Democracy Act of 1989 in or-
der to support the transition of the Czech and Slo-
vak Republics to a global free-market economy. It 
is funded by U. S. taxpayers through appropriation 
by the U. S. Congress. SAEF is inveﬆing its ﬁnan-
cial sources into small and medium sized enterpris-
es in Slovakia. The Fund provides mid-term ﬁnanc-
ing capital for private companies, which present 
a complete and sound business plan. Their prod-
ucts help to ﬁnance activities related to: expansion
and development, management buy-outs/buy-ins, 
mergers and acquisitions. The mission of the Slovak 
American Enterprise Fund is to act as a catalyﬆ for
suﬆainable economic growth among small and me-
dium sized enterprises in Slovakia. Their objective 
is to achieve superior capital returns for their inves-
tors by taking an active approach in building the 
success of the portfolio companies. Furthermore, 
SEAF oﬀers for its portfolio companies access to busi-
ness knowledge, ﬆrategic partners, network of business contacts,
new market opportunities and new talents to companies (www.
SAEF.sk).
Through September 2006, SAEF inveﬆed approxi-
mately $49m in total. Since choosing Slovakia as 
its target market, SAEF has developed invaluable 
knowledge about the small and medium sized busi-
ness sector in the country, which has aﬀected its cur-
rent inveﬆment model. SAEF has contributed to
Slovakia’s success in developing a vibrant market 
economy and a ﬆrong sprit of entrepreneurship.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS
In an article published in July 2005, Ronald Asmus 
and Alexandr Vondra, two scholars and govern-
ment oﬃcials personally involved on both sides of
the Atlantic in the debate and policy decisions over 
these issues of Atlanticism, argued that thanks to 
a speciﬁc set of hiﬆorical experiences the countries
Central and Eaﬆern Europe believe “that their na-
tional intereﬆs in Europe are better preserved via
active American engagement that balances the in-
ﬂuence of other major European powers”.86
84  “AmCham has been active in assessing legislation passed by the government,” continues Jake Slegers. “AmCham tends 
to advocate for less legislation with the aim of reducing the adminiﬆrative burden on businesses and making the exiﬆing
legislation as simple as possible. There is a signiﬁcant amount of unproductive, unnecessary and even harmful barriers
in place in the present syﬆem. We advocate removal of unnecessary adminiﬆrative barriers to allow businesses to operate
as productively and fairly as possible.“ The Slovak Spectator, No. 27, 2008.
85  Connections, May 2008.
86  Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra: The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eaﬆern Europe. Cambridge Review of 
International Aﬀairs, Vol 18, Number 2, July 2005.
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The authors wrote their piece as a response to 
a queﬆion raised by Timothy Garton Ash at
a conference of Euro-Atlantic intellectuals on 
the margins of the Prague 2002: “Do we believe,” 
asked T. G. Ash, “that the countries of Central 
and Eaﬆern Europe, having juﬆ received invita-
tions to join the Alliance and so proud of their 
pro-American orientation, would ﬆill be Atlanti-
ciﬆ in ten years’ time? Or would they rather suc-
cumb to the wave of radical chic anti-American 
Euro-Gaulliﬆ sentiments on the rise in the weﬆ-
ern half of the continent?”
Their argumentation deserves a longer quotation. 
Their thesis was “that the Atlanticism of Central 
and Eaﬆern Europe is rooted in hiﬆory, national
ﬆrategic intereﬆs and genuine and recent real-
world experience.”87 In the years of communiﬆ
dominance, “America was overwhelmingly seen as 
the region’s beﬆ hope and the only Weﬆern coun-
try willing and able to counter Moscow and ﬆand
up for eventual freedom and independence”.88 
There are also other factors which make America 
attractive: it is seen as a model and example for the 
CEE countries, which have undergone their own 
experience of oppression by totalitarian regimes: 
“After decades of living in ﬆate-managed and over-
regulated societies, the Central and Eaﬆern Euro-
peans have considerable admiration for American-
ﬆyle individualism and capitalism. Whereas Ameri-
can-ﬆyle capitalism is rejected in Weﬆ European
intellectual salons, in capitals from Tallinn to Bra-
tislava you ﬁnd governments experimenting with
policies involving lower taxes, ﬂat rates, etc.— ideas
that have been developed in the United States (and 
the UK) yet largely ignored or rejected in Weﬆern
Europe.”
But, say the authors, even if “there are real and re-
inforcing factors that have made Central and Eaﬆ-
ern Europeans ﬆaunch Atlanticiﬆs,” it would be
a miﬆake “to assume this is permanent. Neither
Washington, nor the political elites in the region 
can take it for granted. Hiﬆorical memories fade,
87  “If there is one largely positive hiﬆorical experience the region has in common, it has been with the United States. In the
eyes of moﬆ Central and Eaﬆ Europeans, the United States is the one major Weﬆern power that has never conﬆituted
a threat to any of them. On the contrary, it is a country that was central in the creation of many of these ﬆates (…) The
independence and very exiﬆence of Central and Eaﬆern Europe as we know it today, was largely created out of the ruins
of the Auﬆro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, and is attributable to American power, diplomacy and the
idealism of President Woodrow Wilson.” Ibid.
88  “If you ask Central and Eaﬆ Europeans, they will point to two American presidents, each of them very diﬀerent, whose
ﬆrategies and impact were critical to the eventual victory of freedom ﬁghters behind the Iron Curtain. The ﬁrﬆ is Jimmy
Carter and his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who in the late 1970s made human rights and democracy 
a core part of American ﬆrategy. While derided in many capitals of Weﬆern Europe at the time, this new American policy
was warmly welcomed by dissidents in Central and Eaﬆern Europe, who used it to help lay the foundation for Charter
77, Solidarity and other dissident movements throughout the region. (…) The second American president Central and 
Eaﬆern Europeans will point to as having played a key role in helping them obtain their freedom is Ronald Reagan.
Reagan was of course despised even more than Carter in Weﬆern Europe in the 1980s. But in retrospect it is clear that
his military build-up and his clear rhetoric about the Soviet ‘evil empire’ helped to precipitate the ﬁnal Soviet retreat
under Gorbachev. (…) Thus, after 1989, Czechs, Polish, Hungarian and Slovak elites emerged on the European scene as 
generally pro-American. They considered the U.S. contribution to the end of the Cold War as well as to the liberation 
of captive nations as the moﬆ decisive among all other international factors. (…) The inclinations of many democratic
leaders of poﬆ-communiﬆ regimes in Central and Eaﬆern Europe to look to the United States were further reinforced
by the experience these countries had in the 1990s with NATO and the EU While a major theme of the revolutions that 
swept away communiﬆ rule in 1989 was a ‘return to Europe’, many Central and Eaﬆern Europeans soon discovered
that many Weﬆ Europeans held ambivalent feelings at beﬆ about opening the doors to welcome them into European
and transatlantic inﬆitutions. (…) This disillusionment with the initial reaction of Weﬆern Europe was one factor that
led Central and Eaﬆ European leaders as pilgrims to Washington. There they soon discovered that one of their biggeﬆ
champions was the United States. (…) There was also a ﬆrong lobby among both Democrats and Republicans who
from the outset saw the inclusion of these countries into the core inﬆitutions of the Weﬆ as the natural next ﬆep in the
consolidation of freedom and peace on the continent—and who quickly became champions of the issue. One need only 
compare Mitterrand’s skepticism towards the idea with the openness of President Bill Clinton or of leading Republican 
ﬁgures such as Richard Lugar or John McCain. Once again, the leaders of Central and Eaﬆern Europe saw that it was
the United States that was willing to bring its power to bear to champion their cause, ﬆand up to Russian pressure and
overcome the reticence of their Weﬆern European neighbors. This reaﬃrmed their faith in the United States as a benign
superpower that was willing to champion their values and intereﬆs. Thanks to American leadership, they were able to
transcend the dilemma of living in a geopolitical no-man’s-land between Germany and Russia and obtain the same level 
of security taken for granted in much of Weﬆern Europe.” Ibid.
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gratitude is a waﬆing asset in international aﬀairs,
and elites turn over and retire.” According to them, 
Atlanticism in Central and Eaﬆern Europe is not
a blank cheque; its future will depend both on 
American behavior and on future shape of the EU 
and on domeﬆic leadership that “will be central in
shaping the future orientation of the region. Cen-
tral and Eaﬆern Europe have been fortunate to
have a set of bold and brave leaders—ranging from 
former dissidents like Václav Havel to reform com-
muniﬆs turned social democrats like Aleksander
Kwaśniewski —who since the fall of communism 
have ﬆeered their countries toward and eventual-
ly into the Weﬆ againﬆ the odds.” Today, both of
them retired, and “it is time for the next generation 
of younger Central and Eaﬆern European leaders
to ﬆep forward and answer these queﬆions. Yet, this
time they will—unlike their predecessors—have the 
advantage of doing so sitting as full and equal mem-
bers of the EU and NATO. The future of Atlanti-
cism in the region will also depend on their ability 
to interpret the lessons of the paﬆ and to respond
to the challenges that lie ahead. “But we believe,” 
conclude Asmus and Vondra, “that ten years from 
now they will ﬆill be making the right choices.”
However, very soon after Asmus and Vondra out-
lined favorable prospects for the future of Atlanti-
cism in Central and Eaﬆern Europe, several new
developments have challenged their arguments. 
The CEE countries have experienced a wave of 
populism, sometime even a return of “the old wine 
of illiberal democracy in the new bottle of political 
populism”.89 The liberal consensus of the transi-
tion period—market economy, pro-Weﬆern orien-
tation in foreign aﬀairs, pro-Atlantic attitudes—is
no longer in a dominant position. While there are 
many explanations for this phenomenon (“poﬆ-ac-
cession hangovers,” “a second wave of disenchant-
ment,” “reform fatigue,” “responses to real and 
perceived corruption,” “narrowly focused tech-
nocratic reformers”), it has taken place in times 
when the role of the U.S. almoﬆ everywhere in the
world, and certainly in Europe, was diminished, 
the U.S. preﬆige has declined, and the American
political and social model is much less attractive 
(and for the younger generation, also less known) 
than it was in the 90-ties.
In general, the pro-American attitude of the ﬁrﬆ
non-communiﬆ governments of the CEE countries
is no more the case. According to Charles Gatti, the 
period during which “when American diplomats 
made a requeﬆ to a Central or Eaﬆern European
government in the 1990s, they did not have to ask 
twice,” is over (see his teﬆimony for the House For-
eign Aﬀairs Committee, presented two years after
Asmus’s and Vondra’s article, on July 25, 2007.90 In 
the CEE countries, the popular feelings towards 
America are among the coldeﬆ in decades.
As for Slovakia’s position among these countries, 
the data assembled by Pew Global Attitudes Survey 
(June 2007), by Transatlantic Trends survey spon-
sored by the German Marshall Fund (September 
2007), as well as by other surveys (both Eurobarom-
eter and polls conducted by Slovak agencies) show 
that while Slovaks are quite friendly towards Ameri-
cans, they are not so enthusiaﬆic about diﬀerent
aspects of America’s life, moﬆly occupying the low-
eﬆ level among the CEE countries included in the
Pew as well as in the GMF sample (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia) – let 
it be the relationship towards the US as the ﬆate,
US leadership in international politics, American 
ideas about democracy, or US-led eﬀort to ﬁght ter-
rorism.
While Romanians are probably the ﬆrongeﬆ Atlan-
ticiﬆs, Slovaks seem to have the weakeﬆ “Atlanti-
ciﬆ identity”, and occasional rhetoric of some pop-
uliﬆ politicians does not create an atmosphere in
which positive attitudes would ﬂourish. (Intereﬆ-
89  On this topic, see Martin Bútora – Oľga Gyárfášová – Grigorij Mesežnikov – Thomas W. Skladony (Eds.): Democracy and 
Populism in Central Europe: The Visegrad Elections and Their Aftermath. Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs 2007; Václav Nekvapil
and Maria Staszkiewicz (Eds.): Populism in Central Europe. Prague, Association for International Aﬀairs 2007, and
Oľga Gyárfášová – Grigorij Mesežnikov – Daniel Smilov: Populiﬆ Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eaﬆern Europe. 
Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs 2008.
90 Charles Gatti: Backsliding in Central and Eaﬆern Europe. Teﬆimony prepared for The Honorable Tom Lantos, Chairman, and the House Foreign
Aﬀairs Committee. Washington, DC. July 25, 2007.
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ingly enough, favorable attitudes toward the U.S. 
increased in 2005 when President Bush delivered 
the ﬁrﬆ-ever visit of a U.S. president to Slovakia.)
Another issue is the reluctance of government oﬃ-
cials to discuss NATO-related issues or commonly 
shared values in their public ﬆatements, which may
explain why Slovak citizens seem somewhat to be 
losing intereﬆ in the Alliance.
At the same time, as we already suggeﬆed, Slovaks
have repeatedly expressed very positive ﬆance to-
wards the EU, which is now supported by the injec-
tions from EU ﬆructural funds helping Slovakia’s
economy to prosper, Slovakia’s infraﬆructure to
improve and Slovakia’s regions to revive.
This is not to say that regardless from public reser-
vations on America’s leading role in international 
politics91, the democratic policymakers in Slovakia 
are not aware of the unique position of the U.S. in 
contributing both to solving long-term challenges, 
and coping with imminent crisis (like, for inﬆance,
a threat of deadly conﬂict between India and Pa-
kiﬆan some time ago). From non-proliferation of
WMD to ﬁghting fanatical Islamism; from support-
ing free market to enabling more nations and indi-
viduals to positively participate on globalization; 
from promoting liberty and democracy to ﬆanding
againﬆ tyrannical regimes worldwide; from balanc-
ing againﬆ rising China to resiﬆing resurgent impe-
rialiﬆ inclinations of Russia – the U.S. presence is
indispensable.
For Slovak democrats, U.S. assiﬆance in catching-
up with our integration aspirations, in particular 
the entry into NATO has been highly appreciated. 
For Slovak civic activiﬆs, U.S. input in develop-
ment of civil society in Slovakia, is a part of their 
proud ﬆory. Their American colleagues often in-
spired Slovak reformers in think tanks. For Slovak 
economy, the U.S. inveﬆments, including the ﬆra-
tegic one, like the U.S. Steel in Eaﬆern Slovakia, are
an inseparable part of Slovakia’s economic miracle. 
And it is not only about money, it is also about re-
sponsible corporate behavior, about ﬁghting cor-
ruption, and helping to integrate excluded groups 
of populations, like Roma, by providing them job 
opportunities.
Both the military and diplomatic eﬆablishment, in-
cluding their higheﬆ echelons, is not anti-American:
on the contrary, they are looking for pragmatic co-
operation. But they do not seem to have a suﬃcient
modus operandi to work on productive partnership 
ties and projects. And while there is a ﬆrong base for
mutual relationships in the economic sphere, at the 
same time, Slovakia has currently an etatiﬆ, ﬆatiﬆ-
oriented ruling coalition, including a member that 
is, from a political angle, openly anti-American.
X X X
It is not clear what will follow – the ﬆrength of the
mutual ties, the relevance of transatlantic agenda, 
and the eﬃciency of transatlantic inﬆitutions, like
NATO, will be teﬆed in upcoming months and
years. Not only because of the change in America 
(presidential elections), but also because of possi-
ble turbulences in crisis or problematic areas: Kos-
ovo, Middle Eaﬆ, Bosnia, Georgia, frozen conﬂicts,
Russia, Iran). Partnership is always teﬆed and con-
ﬁrmed – or not – in action.
91 For details, see the chapter on public opinion in Slovakia.
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INTRODUCTION 
Anti-American attitudes have spread throughout 
Europe in recent years, especially after the ﬆart of
the war in Iraq. In these circumﬆances, Jeﬀrey Gold-
farb’s call for an intelligent form of anti-Americanism 
is particularly timely1. This “intelligent form” allows 
people to see the internal diversity of America and to 
diﬆinguish the concrete policies of various govern-
ments in the US, a country with a long democratic 
tradition and internal mechanisms for dealing with 
its own imperfections. Intelligent anti-American-
ism is the opposite of the form of anti-Americanism 
that Norman Podhoretz compared to anti-Semitism. 
Podhoretz argued that this latter type of anti-Ameri-
canism is an irrational ideology that hopes the US 
fails and hates everything American2. 
This type of anti-Americanism is uncommon in Po-
land or other poﬆ-communiﬆ countries in Central
and Eaﬆern Europe. In Poland, pro-American at-
titudes resulted from a number of hiﬆorical proc-
esses and policies both before and after 19893. Dur-
ing the poﬆ-Communiﬆ transformation period, 
ANNA HOROLETS
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the US served as the antithesis of Communism in 
terms of economic well-being, political freedom 
and military security, unlike Europe, which was 
perceived more as a spiritual and civilization point 
of reference4. After its accession to the European 
Union in May 2004, however, Poland became more 
involved in European politics and economy. The 
overall pro-American attitude in Poland5 has not 
changed much, but it is no longer as widespread6 
and it has ﬆarted to change qualitatively as well un-
der the inﬂuence of closer relations with the EU.
Openly anti-American attitudes are ﬆill limited in
Poland and are moﬆly “imported” for ideological or
political reasons (e.g. by the extreme left). As Ivan 
Kraﬆev has suggeﬆed, in some Central and Eaﬆ-
ern European countries, a ﬆrange attitude towards
America has emerged among the political elites that 
can be called anti-anti-Americanism.7 This ﬆance is
opposed to “unintelligent” anti-Americanism and 
attempts to secure a ﬆable place for the US in the
new political identity of these countries. 
Undoubtedly, there are various forms of anti-Amer-
icanism as well as pro-Americanism. This essay at-
1  Goldfarb, Jeﬀrey: “How to Be an Intelligent Anti-American”, in: Logos, no. 1 (1) Winter 2002, pp. 14-27.
2  GW 14-15.10.2006: “Only the War Counts” (interview with Norman Podhoretz); compare with: Europa 03.02.2007, “Does 
America Rule the World?” (discussion between Norman Podhoretz, Ryszard Legutko and Radosław Sikorski).
3  See for example Michałek, Krzysztof: “The Queﬆ for the New Kolchida – The Origins of Pro-Americanism in Poland
in the Years 1918 to 1989”, in: Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena, Jacek Kucharczyk and Piotr M. Kaczyński (eds.), Bridges Across 
the Atlantic? The Attitudes of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks Toward the United States. Inﬆitute of Public Aﬀairs, Warsaw, 2005, pp. 15-33;
Kuźniar, Roman and Andrzej Szeptycki, “The Role of the United States in the Foreign Policy of the Third Republic 
of Poland,” in: Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena, Jacek Kucharczyk and Piotr M. Kaczyński (eds.). Ibidem., pp.115-151.  For 
a similar view see Europa 10.08.2005: “Looking for Pro-Americanism”, Anne Applebaum.
4  Compare: Horolets, Anna. Obrazy Europy w polskim dyskursie publicznym [Representations of Europe in Polish Public Discourse], Univer-
sitas, Kraków, 2006.
5  This attitude is not the outcome of some “objective”, detailed knowledge of the country, but rather of “the myth of the 
USA as a ‘country of freedom’”: Wenzel Michał and Krzysztof Zagórski, “The Choice of the Poles – American vs. Euro-
pean Social Models”, in: Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena, Jacek Kucharczyk and Piotr M. Kaczyński (eds.). Op.cit., p. 83.
6  Compared to January 2006, in January 2007 positive opinions about the US had fallen from 62% to 34% while negative 
opinions had increased from 15% to 24% (CBOS, BS/10/2007, January 2007).
7  “The End of the Age of Freedom: The Failure of Global Interventionism”, by Ivan Kraﬆev, Europa 07.06.2006.
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tempts to eﬆablish which attitudes to the US pre-
vailed in Polish public debate between September 
2005 and July 2007. The following queﬆions arise
from the main line of inquiry: Which topics moﬆ ef-
fectively attracted public opinion to the US and its 
role for Poland? Did these topics produce cohesive 
or divided attitudes to the US?  What were the lines 
of division in Polish public discourse concerning 
the US (were they political, ideological, or did they 
depend on the issues being assessed)?
I. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
To clarify the role of public discourse in society, sev-
eral theoretical and methodological points muﬆ be
made. Public discourse is a form of inﬆitutional-
ized communication regarding issues of general in-
tereﬆ and concern that are recognized by the public
as important and legitimate, i.e. as deserving its at-
tention and/or involvement. In academic debates, 
this deﬁnition is contentious, because it implies the
exiﬆence of a single general public within a ﬆate. In
this essay, however, the obvious diﬀerences among
publics (e.g. working class, upper or middle class 
publics) will not be addressed.
Public discourse includes ﬁrﬆ and foremoﬆ the dis-
course of symbolic elites and power elites8. The latter 
produce events and processes that require explanation 
in the form of parliamentary debates, speeches by the 
president, prime miniﬆer and other leading political
ﬁgures, as well as interviews given to the press; all of
these conﬆitute public discourse. The symbolic elites
include intellectuals, professionals, leaders of non-
governmental organizations, as well as media celebri-
ties. The media are increasingly powerful and able to 
mould public discourse and spin political news and 
positions so they can be accessed and noticed by the 
general public. Pierre Bourdieu was critical of the role 
of the media in shaping public discourse: 
“Journalism, which ﬁlters, acquires and interprets
all public speeches according to its moﬆ typical
logic – “for” or “againﬆ”, “everything or nothing”
– attempts to force everyone to make an idiotic 
choice...”9.  
This media logic of opposing sides and arguments 
tends to create a shallow image of the world, as in 
the case of pro- and anti-American attitudes. 
Public discourse is thus produced by the legisla-
tive and executive branches, party politics, and the 
media, all of which are connected through mutual 
quotation and reference10. However, as Norman 
Fairclough argued, “a single text is insigniﬁcant:
the impact of the media is cumulative, and operates 
through the repetition of particular ways of handling 
causality and agency, particular ways of position-
ing the reader, and so forth”11. This means that we 
should consider only the repetitive features of public 
discourse and only those topics and lines of division 
that transcend the various discourse genres.
This essay draws a general map of topics that occu-
pied public discourse on the US in Poland, and as-
sesses the relative importance of the various issues. 
12 The issues and debates are analyzed to identify 
the lines of divisions in attitudes towards the US. 
Particular attention is paid to those arguments that 
can produce a negative image of the US in Poland. 
The topics of public discourse that shape attitudes 
to the US are grouped into four broad categories. 
8  For a more detailed deﬁnition of public discourse, see: Czyżewski, Marek: Wprowadzenie [“Introduction”], in: Czyżewski,
Marek, Sergiusz Kowalski and Andrzej Piotrowski. Rytualny chaos. Studium dyskursu publicznego [Ritual Chaos: The Study of Public 
Discourse], Aurelius, Kraków, 1997, pp. 6-37. For a discussion of the limitations of the term “public discourse” as well as 
the Habermasian “public sphere”, see: Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
and London, 1994.
9  Le Monde Diplomatique Polska, April 2006, “On a European Social Movement”, by Pierre Bourdieu. For a more detailed 
presentation of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the journaliﬆic ﬁeld see also: Benson, R. and E. Neveu (eds.). Bourdieu and the 
Journaliﬆic Field. Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, MA, 2005.
10  Wodak, Ruth: “The Discourse – Hiﬆorical Approach”, in: Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer (ed.), Methods in Critical Dis-
course Analysis, Sage, London, 2001, pp. 63-94.
11  Fairclough, Norman, Language and Power, Longman, New York, 1989, p. 54.
12 The following newspapers were selected for this analysis. Two dailies, Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza, were analyzed 
in a syﬆematic manner. Materials from the following newspapers and magazines were also used selectively to map the
variety of opinions from far right to far left, from non-religious to ﬆrongly religious: Dziennik with its weekly Europa sup-
plement; Trybuna; and Nasz Dziennik. See the Annex for the liﬆ of abbreviations and information on the political leanings
and circulation of each newspaper. 
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Firﬆ, attitudes to the US as a player in international
politics and as an ally of Poland are analyzed. This 
is the moﬆ salient category. Second, attitudes to
the US as a model for democratic and free market 
changes after 1989 are considered. Third, images 
of the US as a country with which Polish people 
have ﬁrﬆ-hand contacts are ﬆudied. Laﬆ, represen-
tations of American culture are analyzed.
II.  DOMAINS OF POLISH PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE ON THE US
II. 1.  The US as an international player  
 and an ally of Poland 
The US often appears in Polish media discourse as 
a country that takes an active part in world politics 
(e.g. in Iraq, Kosovo, Syria, Lebanon etc.). It is rep-
resented in the press as a global player that inﬂu-
ences many regions and without whom virtually no 
global problem can be solved. The miniﬆer of for-
eign aﬀairs in the Kaczyński cabinet, Anna Fotyga,
ﬆated in her report to the Polish parliament on the
ﬆate of international relations: “In terms of bilat-
eral relations I would like to ﬆart with the United
States, the guarantor of the global order”13. The US 
is also portrayed as Poland’s ally. In his inaugural 
address to the parliament on November 10, 2005, 
Prime Miniﬆer Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz ﬆated
that Poland should build its economic well-being 
on belonging to EU ﬆructures, while in matters of
national security, Poland’s membership in NATO 
and its cooperation with the US is crucial14. The 
“division of labor” between the US and the EU 
presented in this exposé shows how emphases are 
placed in public debate. In the majority of public 
discussions, the role of the US is ﬆrongly linked to
the issue of security, thus – along with NATO – the 
United States is represented as a guarantor of mili-
tary security and ﬆability in Poland, especially vis-à-
vis Russia. Transatlantic cooperation is viewed not 
only through the framework of Poland’s member-
ship in NATO, but also through direct cooperation 
with the US on military development and security. 
Yet this vision is not shared by all the symbolic elites, 
and increasingly one hears voices that are either mod-
erately skeptical or openly critical of close cooperation 
with the US at the expense of developing eﬀective UE
ﬆructures to deal with security and international af-
fairs. Some queﬆion the underlying assumption that
the US is a reliable ally, while others doubt that Po-
land’s national intereﬆs are identical with those of the
US, and argue that the two should be diﬆinguished
even while preserving partner relationships. In order 
to accurately present opinions that diﬀer fromthepro-
American mainﬆream of Poland’s political and sym-
bolic elites, these opinions muﬆ be placed in the con-
text of arguments about particular issues, and their 
potential for inﬂuencing public opinion muﬆ be as-
sessed. During the laﬆ two years these contexts have
included the wars in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan, the war on
terror, and the Missile Defense inﬆallation, to name a
few. They will be presented in more detail below.
II. 1. 1.  The War in Iraq
During the paﬆ two years, the intervention in
Iraq has remained high on the public agenda and 
therefore has aﬀected public opinion on relations
between Poland and the United States. Three con-
secutive Polish governments and two Polish presi-
dents were in favor of supporting the US in the in-
tervention in Iraq. In the middle of 2007, the eighth 
rotation of Polish troops (900 people) was ﬆationed
in Iraq as a part of the Multinational Force15. The 
UN mandate for the Multinational Force was ex-
tended to the end of 2007 at the requeﬆ of the Iraqi
government16. Yet, among Poland’s political and 
symbolic elites, attitudes to the Polish presence in 
Iraq are not unanimous. 
13  41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007. The image of the US as a leading global player appears in articles on current inter-
national politics that are devoted to such issues as Israel’s attack on Lebanon (e.g. Rz 14.07.2006 “Almoﬆ All of Europe
Filled with Indignation”, Rz 15.07.2006 “The Specter of Regional War”); the threat of war with Iran (e.g. Rz 28.12.2005 
“Will the USA Attack Iran?”, Rz 14.01.2006 “Together Againﬆ Iran”); the production of nuclear weapon by North Ko-
rea (Rz 16.05.2006 “The Atomic Game with Kim”), the independence of Kosovo (Rz 30.04.2007 “USA: Kosovo Has to 
Become Independent”) and so on.
14  Przegląd Rządowy [Government Review], no. 11 (173), November 2005, Oﬃce of the Prime Miniﬆer, Warsaw, p. 23.
15  Miniﬆry of Defense Information Bulletin, http://www.do.wp.mil.pl/ﬆrona.php?idﬆrona=16, accessed 09.07.2007.
16  Resolution of the UN Security Council no. 1723, November 28, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs//2006/sc8879.doc.
htm, accessed 09.08.2007.
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The debate over the withdrawal of Polish troops 
from Iraq in the Polish parliament in December 
200517, as well as its continuation in the Parliamen-
tary International Aﬀairs Committee 18, can provide 
some insights into the lines of division on the is-
sue. The ﬆandpoint of the ruling PiS party was well
summarized by a press commentator:
“In the case of the new elite, this alliance is the ex-
pression of deeper ﬆrategic thinking and an ideo-
logical liking for the American model of doing in-
ternational politics. The thinking goes back to the 
Cold War and a belief in the truﬆworthiness and
ﬆrength of America as an ally. It is supported by
a certain suspicion and disbelief in the ﬆrength of
Europe and its ability to provide security for itself 
– and thus for Poland – independently.”19 
The LPR, Self-Defense, and PSL parties took pride 
in having been againﬆ the intervention in Iraq from
its ﬆart in 2003. The LPR put forward diverse argu-
ments including the unjuﬆ and immoral nature of
the war (referring to Chriﬆian ethics), the number
of civilian victims among the Iraqis, losses of Polish 
soldiers, the lack of economic and other beneﬁts for
Poland (e.g. contracts for Polish companies, the ab-
olition of the American visa requirement for Poles) 
as well as the danger that Poland would become 
a target of terroriﬆ attacks. This argument was re-
peated in the draft resolution on the withdrawal of 
Polish troops from Iraq20. 
Self-Defense representative Mateusz Piskorski em-
phasized the disregard for international law and 
violations of human rights by the US as the reasons 
why his party opposed Poland’s participation in the 
mission. He also noted the possibility that the neo-
conservative sympathies of Radosław Sikorski, the 
miniﬆer of defense, had inﬂuenced the decision to
prolong the mission. In the draft resolution on the 
withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq, Self-Defense 
put forward yet another argument againﬆ the mis-
sion: 
“The mission undermines the heroic paﬆ of Po-
land, which was often occupied and resiﬆed occu-
pation, because now [Poland] becomes an occupier 
itself21.”
While the position of Self-Defense on Iraq later un-
derwent some modiﬁcations for political reasons
(the party received an oﬀer to join the coalition
government), the party never assessed the war in a 
positive way.22 
Independent MP Zygmut Wrzodak (formerly 
LPR) was openly anti-American, claiming that the 
war in Iraq was a plot by Israel which – with the 
help of the US – aimed to achieve supremacy in the 
Middle Eaﬆ, while on the American side the war
had been dreamed up by neo-conservative Zioniﬆs
as well as corporations seeking access to cheap oil23. 
The latter argument is not typical of Poland’s politi-
cal elites, even those that moﬆ ardently oppose the
war. However, this exotic view is worth mention-
ing since similar arguments appear in the far-right 
press, which has some inﬂuence on public opinion
(Nasz Dziennik and Radio Maryja)24. 
PO representatives ﬆated that their party had sup-
ported Poland’s participation in the intervention 
in 2003, but that they currently opposed prolong-
ing the mission because the economic beneﬁts that
had been part of the “deal” with the Americans had 
not materialized. This argument about the lack of 
17  Shorthand record of the 6th Sitting of the Sejm, 29. 12.2005.
18  For inﬆance, the shorthand records of KSZA Sittings no. 5, 27 and 42, in Bulletins of the Parliamentary Commissions no. 160 
(16.12.2005); no. 451 (20.03.2006) and no. 859 (12.07.2006) respectively.
19  GW 29.12.2005 “It’s Good that we Stay in Iraq”, Antoni Podolski.
20  Bogusław Sobczak (LPR): Sejm of the Republic of Poland, V term, print nr 370.
21  Sejm of the Republic of Poland, V term, print nr 369.
22  Compare: GW 07.01.2006 “Will Lepper Trade Iraq for a Share in Government?” (Andrzej Lepper is the leader of Self-
Defense.) The journaliﬆ quoted an anonymous Self-Defense member who ﬆated that the party desired cooperation with
both Eaﬆ and Weﬆ, and who claimed that the issue of Iraq was no longer crucial.
23  Zygmunt Wrzodak (independent), in: Shorthand Record of the 6th Sitting of the Sejm, 29.12.2005, p. 229.
24  Various sources eﬆimate the liﬆeners of the far-right Radio Maryja at up to four million people, which makes it an inﬂu-
ential media outlet. However, voting behavior research has shown that liﬆening to this ﬆation does not directly inﬂu-
ence people’s political behavior, e.g. voting for the LPR or PiS. For details see:  Polish General Election Study 2005, at: 
http://www.isppan.waw.pl/pgsw/index2.html, 23.07.2007.
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political and economic beneﬁts has recurred in the
speeches of PO members in the Sejm and in the 
press25.
The SLD promoted the immediate withdrawal of 
Polish troops, even though it had been the SLD’s 
decision as a ruling party to send Polish troops to 
Iraq in 2003. SLD members argued that the mission 
could be considered accomplished as of the end of 
2005 because democratic elections had been held 
in Iraq. The SLD also pointed out that – as the pre-
vious ruling party – they had prepared provisions 
that made the withdrawal of Polish troops from 
Iraq feasible26. Intereﬆingly, vague comparisons
between the Soviet Union’s paﬆ interventions and
the US intervention in Iraq appeared in the SLD’s 
rhetoric: 
“I am asking ... what has convinced the government 
of Law and Juﬆice to continue the ﬆabilization mis-
sion for another year? What are the motives behind 
this decision? Are they based only on the requeﬆ
from the government of the United States? [...] 
What has to happen [for the government] to real-
ize that Iraqi people can manage without brotherly 
help?” [emphasis added – A.H.]27. 
This theme appeared occasionally in parliamentary 
debates: “Let’s not liberate others as we ourselves 
used to be liberated; let’s not serve Americans with-
out receiving anything in exchange”28. It also ap-
peared in a speech by Mateusz Piskorski from Self-
Defense:
“This invasion of ours, and our presence in Iraq, 
is often presented by [the leader of PiS Jarosław] 
Kaczyński as our war, and as an opportunity for 
Polish troops to get training. In the old days, in 
1938 (sic!) and in 1968, we also sent Polish troops 
for training, as it was then deﬁned, to Czecho-
slovakia, so maybe it would be more appropri-
ate [to send them there now] than to send them 
to Iraq. Of course, this ﬆatement is ironical and
sarcaﬆic.”29 
Although not widely held, this view represents a 
surprising shift in perceptions of the US in Polish 
public discourse, and one that could hurt the image 
of the US, since “brotherly” help for other coun-
tries has very negative connotations arising from 
the Communiﬆ period.
Moﬆ MPs who took part in the debate in December
2005 expressed anti-war sentiments (representatives 
of the LPR, PSL and Self-Defense) or at leaﬆ pos-
tulated the need to withdraw Polish troops from 
Iraq (PO, SLD). Even MPs from the ruling party 
(PiS) asked government representatives for more 
evidence that the mission was beneﬁting Poland30. 
The decision made by the government and support-
ed by the president was to prolong the mission. The 
same scenario – only with less attention in the Sejm 
– was repeated a year later31. 
The public perception of the war in Iraq is 
negative32. Although anti-war proteﬆs in Poland
attract far fewer people than in “Old” Europe or in 
25  Jarosław Wałęsa (PO): “For national-political reasons, the present ruling elite wishes to demonﬆrate that Poland counts
in global politics and that cooperation with the US brings measurable beneﬁts. This, however, is misleading and out of
line with the real achievements.” In: Shorthand Record of the 10th Sitting of the Sejm, 15.02.2006, p. 36; Bronisław Komorowski 
(PO): “Our presence in Iraq is being prolonged beyond the real needs and our commitments. We have exceeded our re-
sponsibilities in Iraq by 300%”, in: Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007, p. 376. Compare: GW 16.10.2006 
“Time for Debate on Europe” Bronisław Komorowski (PO): “... the government does not have a vision for ... shaping 
more pragmatic relations with the US.” [emphasis added – A.H.]
26  Zbyszek Zaborowski (SLD): “In March 2005 the government of Marek Belka made a decision to terminate the mission 
in January 2006”, in: Shorthand Record of the 6th Sitting of the Sejm, 29.12.2005, p. 224.
27  Zbyszek Zaborowski (SLD): Shorthand Record of the 6th Sitting of the Sejm, 29.12.2005, p. 224.
28  The opinion of this MP is not representative of the ﬆandpoint of her party: Stanisława Anna Okularczyk (PO): Shorthand 
Record of the 44th Sitting of the Sejm, 27.06.2007, p. 122.
29  Mateusz Piskorski (Self-Defense): Shorthand Record of the 6th Sitting of the Sejm, 29.12.2005, p.227.
30  Jędrzej Jędrych (PiS) requeﬆs explanations of the consequences of an immediate withdrawal of the International Forces
from Iraq; the beneﬁts the Polish Army receives from taking part in the mission; speciﬁcs about the area in which Polish
troops are ﬆationed, etc. In: Shorthand Record of the 6th Sitting of the Sejm, 29.12.2005, p. 226. 
31  Presently, a similar decision from one year later (December 22, 2006) forms the legal basis for the presence of Polish 
troops in Iraq, http://www.do.wp.mil.pl/ﬆrona.php?idﬆrona=16, accessed 09.08.2007.
32  IAR 27.06.2007 “Poles do not Want Troops in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan”. The methods of conducting warfare in Iraq were
criticized by 52% of respondents in January 2007 (CBOS, BS/10/2007, January 2007). 
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the US itself, they take place regularly. These anti-
war proteﬆs are initiated and organized by non-
governmental organizations and take the form of 
a social movement. For inﬆance, several anti-war
demonﬆrations were organized and promoted by
left-wing parties and non-governmental organi-
zations (e.g. the Greens 2004, Polish Labor Party, 
New Left and others) as well as left-leaning media 
that deﬁne themselves as “new left”, such as Krytyka 
Polityczna33. Since these parties are not in parliament, 
the circulation of information via the Internet by 
NGOs and the work of journaliﬆs are more notice-
able to general public. However, these movements 
do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence oﬃcial party politics.
The divisions on Iraq among the political elites do 
not have clear ideological bases but inﬆead are dic-
tated by a mixture of ideology and pragmatism. 
Debates among politicians are echoed and elabo-
rated on by discussions in the media. In general, 
the leading opinion newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza 
(GW), Dziennik (Dz) and Rzeczpospolita (Rz) accept 
the presence of the US in Iraq as a lesser evil. Their 
ﬆrategic reasoning is intertwined with political con-
siderations:
“The Polish government could not have made a dif-
ferent decision than leaving our troops in Iraq for 
another year. A withdrawal would have been inter-
preted by the US as well as by Europe, which op-
poses the war, as giving in to the populism and anti-
Weﬆern attitudes of Self-Defense and LPR.”34 
Positive arguments rely on the premise that the mis-
sion ensures further cooperation as well as military 
and security support for Poland from its Ameri-
can partner. Other positive arguments include the 
economic beneﬁts as well as the booﬆ to Poland’s
bargaining position in negotiations with the US. 
Among the three papers, Gazeta Wybocza is the moﬆ
reserved in its evaluation of the results and pros-
pects of the intervention and the presence of the 
US and its allies in Iraq. Among the criticism that 
appears in all three newspapers, the following argu-
ments can be diﬆinguished: the lack of visible posi-
tive results for the Iraqi population; the ruin of the 
country; the high ratio of civilian casualties; and the 
failure to build a democracy in Iraq. The prolifera-
tion of terrorism in the world as an outcome of the 
Iraq war is also highlighted:
“The 9/11 attack had a surprisingly small inﬂu-
ence on the mobilization of Islamic fanatics. Their 
number as well as the number of attacks ﬆarted
growing only after the ﬆart of the war in Iraq.” 35
The lack of noticeable economic and political ben-
eﬁts for Poland in the laﬆ three years is also men-
tioned. Criticism in Gazeta Wyborcza however is ad-
dressed not so much to the US as to the Polish rul-
ing elites, who are attacked for their servility to the 
US and their clumsy diplomacy.36 In this case, the 
negative impact of the Iraqi war on the US image is 
eclipsed by domeﬆic political arguments. In other
words, it is not the US that is blamed for the fail-
ures in Iraq, but the Polish government. A diﬀer-
ent perspective is presented in the left-wing paper 
Trybuna (T), which accuses the US of dragging Po-
land into war with falsehoods: “We participated in 
the invasion of Iraq because the US lied about its 
reasons.”37
The moﬆ elaborate critique of the war in Iraq can
be found in the far-right Nasz Dziennik (ND). The 
anti-Americanism of the newspaper identiﬁes the
US with rich, neo-conservatives (who allegedly fol-
low Trotsky’s ideology of permanent war), Jews 
(Zioniﬆs) who are intereﬆed in building a hegem-
onic ﬆate of Israel, and atheiﬆs (the paﬆ of some of 
neo-conservatives in leftiﬆ movements in the 1960s
and 1970s is virtually equated with Communiﬆ
terrorism38 in Europe in the 1970s). 
33  In an editorial titled “Stop the War!” in Krytyka Polityczna 01.10.2005, the exact date, time and route of the anti-war dem-
onﬆration was described (The demonﬆration, “Withdraw the Troops From Iraq Now! Money for the Starving – Not for
War!” took place on October 6, 2005, three days before the presidential elections). See also http://www.isw.republika.
pl/; http://www.irak.pl/, accessed 29.07.2007.
34  GW 29.12.2005 “It’s Good that we Stay in Iraq”, Antoni Podolski.
35  GW 28.02.2007 “Iraq Feeds Terrorism”, Paweł Szczerkowski.
36  GW 29.12.2005 “It’s Good that we Stay in Iraq”, Antoni Podolski.
37  T 24.11.2005 [Subtitle:] Anti-Missiles: Poland in US Military Chariot [Title:] “We Will be a Target.”
38  Communiﬆ terrorism includes the terroriﬆ acts of groups such as the Italian Red Brigades.
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“The invasion of Afghaniﬆan was a prelude to
the attack on Iraq, which was not supposed to 
end in Baghdad. Teheran was to be the next tar-
get for conqueﬆ on the road to victory in the glo-
bal war ‘on terror’. [...] The US wanted to build 
a power base which could not be challenged by 
anybody on earth, and to subdue the world to one 
government...”39
According to the ND, poor people, Iraq civilians 
and even Islamic terroriﬆs (who are deﬁned as
“pushed to such draﬆic measures by poverty”) are
considered to be on the positive side, i.e. opposed 
to America. However, Islam is also criticized for 
persecuting Chriﬆians.40
The event that galvanized Polish public opinion on 
the Iraq war was the trial and execution of Saddam 
Hussein.41 The former Iraqi dictator was not liked 
by the Polish media, but his execution, followed by 
the scandal of the smuggled recording of the ex-
ecution, polarized opinions on how perpetrators 
of crimes againﬆ humanity should be punished in
democratic societies. The execution was criticized 
by some journaliﬆs and experts as an act of bar-
barism that undermined democracy’s claim to be 
superior to dictatorship42. Others criticized it for 
being a tactical miﬆake.43 On the other hand, the 
main newspapers evaluated the event positively as 
the rightful end for a cruel dictator and an act of 
juﬆice.44
Two aspects of the anti-war argument are particu-
larly likely to generate a more US-skeptical public 
opinion: a) the argument presenting the US as the 
perpetrator of an unjuﬆ war and the violator of
another country’s sovereignty, which is a highly 
signiﬁcant issue in Poland; b) the argument that
the war in Iraq juﬆ about oil. The latter claim
could produce an image of the US as a suprana-
tional corporation that ruthlessly pursues its own 
intereﬆs. In addition, the prospect of being alien-
ated within Europe due to close ties with the US 
in the intervention in Iraq has contributed to a 
more reserved attitude to the US in Polish pub-
lic discourse. However, this caution is less notice-
able following the laﬆ elections in Germany and
France that led to warmer relations between “Old” 
Europe and the US. 
II.1.2.  The NATO mission in Afghanistan
Parallel to the war in Iraq, the intervention in Af-
ghaniﬆan also aﬀects views of the US in Polish
public discourse, even though the mission has 
been NATO-led since 200745. The Polish presence 
increased considerably in 2007 from previous 
years (1,000 Polish troops are present in Afghani-
ﬆan at the moment). The role of these troops has
changed from observers to a more active force 
prepared to confront the Taliban army46. Espe-
cially recently, when some Polish soldiers report-
edly refused to obey the orders of the American 
39  ND 27.04.2007 “Absurd Drama of an Empire”, Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski.
40  See for example: ND 22.01.2007, “Islamo-Fascism or Energy-Fascism?”, Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski; ND 3-4.02.2007 “Trag-
edy for Some, Intereﬆ for Others”, Waldemar Mszweski.
41  20% of respondents said the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein and other aspects of the war in Iraq were the moﬆ
signiﬁcant event of 2006 (CBOS, BS/13/2007, January 2007, by Michał Wenzel).
42  GW 02.01.2007 “Executing Saddam is Barbarism”, Marek Antoni Nowicki (Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights); Rz 
06.01.2007 “Killing Saddam”, Dariusz Rosiak. 
43  Rz 02.01.2007 “Now He Will Become a Martyr”, interview with Bahijat Suliman (The Association of Iraqis in Poland): 
“This execution is the next episode in the cruel American soap opera of murder and oppression againﬆ the Iraqi peo-
ple”.
44  GW 27.12.2006 “Saddam Has to Die”; GW 03.01.2007 “Saddam the Martyr versus Saddam the Monﬆer”, Paweł Szc-
zerkowski; Rz 02.01.2007 “This Despot Deserved Death”, interview with Hatif Janabi: “Many people [in Iraq] were 
happy [after Saddam’s execution]. Saddam deserved such a death.”
45  NATO took command in Afghaniﬆan at the end of 2006. This is now the largeﬆ NATO-led operation of the International
Security Assiﬆance Force (ISAF).
46  Press debate after the ﬁrﬆ information appeared regarding the change in the character of the mission: Rz 21.29.2006
“Poles will Fight With the Taliban”; Rz 15.09.2006 “Diﬃcult Mission of the Poles”; Rz 29.09.2006 “NATO will Control
the Whole of Afghaniﬆan”; Compare: Polish Radio, “Sygnały Dnia” 16.09.2006 “Afghaniﬆan is a Dangerous Mission”,
General Stanisław Koziej, former deputy miniﬆer of defense, warned that the mission will be ineﬀective because the
ﬁghters are scattered and will attack from cover. Press discourse on the implementation of the new mission: Dz 14.06.2007
“Firﬆ Day of Real War for Poles”; GW 22.07.2007 “Poles Have to Persuade [the allies] to Change Their Strategy in Af-
ghaniﬆan”, by General Stanisław Koziej.
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command47, issues were raised in the press con-
cerning the nature of the partnership between the 
US and Poland. According to some sources, the 
soldiers refused to use non-armored Hummers, 
and this was their ‘mutiny’48, while signs have ap-
peared that the return of several Polish soldiers 
to Poland was due to psychological problems49. 
In our search for arguments that could hurt the 
American image in Polish discourse, the miﬆreat-
ment of Poles by Americans – at the level of both 
diplomacy and ordinary soldiering – deserves par-
ticular attention, because it creates an image of 
the US as a disloyal partner. Although not wide-
spread, the theme of disloyalty or unequal part-
nership was repeated in other contexts as well. In 
parliamentary debates on Polish foreign policy, 
the main claim repeated by opposition represent-
atives was that Poland’s cooperation with NATO 
and the US is one-sided. The technical assiﬆance
that the US oﬀered was dismissed as insuﬃcient
by Mateusz Piskorski (Self-Defense). Janusz Do-
brosz (LPR) called the relationship of the Polish 
government to the US as “ﬂattery on demand”,
and claimed that Poland was getting nothing out 
of its engagement in Afghaniﬆan50. Intereﬆingly,
both parties at the time were a part of the coali-
tion government. Tadeusz Iwiński (SLD) claimed 
that in light of the dissolution of the Army In-
formation Service (WSI), counter-intelligence 
would be hard to come by in Afghaniﬆan. This ar-
gument was repeated by Jarosław Wałęsa (PO)51. 
Representatives of the PO were also concerned 
with the poor equipment and lack of preparation 
of the soldiers and the mission in general52. Rep-
resentatives of the ruling PiS party emphasized 
the civilization mission of the NATO troops, and 
noted the negative consequences of any reﬆora-
tion of Taliban rule in the country such as the 
eradication of schools and the maltreatment of 
women.53 Government oﬃcials also tried to re-
fute the claim about a lack of reciprocity from the 
US54, but they were repeatedly blamed for inept 
diplomacy on this issue by the opposition and 
the press.55 
The main press concerns about the mission of the 
Polish troops in Afghaniﬆan are the purpose of the
mission and its chances of success (i.e. eﬆablishing
a democratic ﬆate and a functioning economy in Af-
ghaniﬆan). Disagreements among the NATO allies
triggered additional queﬆions about the possible
impact of the mission in Afghaniﬆan.56 The press 
also closely followed the negative consequences of 
the presence of NATO troops in Afghaniﬆan such
as civilian deaths, and was critical of them57. Ter-
roriﬆ attacks by the Taliban, such as the kidnap-
ping of the Korean team of doctors and nurses, 
sparked increasing anxiety about the feasibility of 
the mission58. Importantly, the press raised issues 
concerning relations between the Polish contingent 
and their American partners in Afghaniﬆan. Gazeta 
Wyborcza was critical of the absence of Polish gener-
als among the mission’s command ﬆructures59, and 
was also bitter about the fact that Polish soldiers 
47  Compare: Dz 22.06.2007 “A Mutiny by Polish Soldiers in Afghaniﬆan?”.
48  Dz 22.06.2007 “Mutiny of Polish Soldiers in Afghaniﬆan?”, compare: Radio ZET 10.08.2007: “Americans Lent us Hum-
mers that are Worse Equipped, and Thus Broke the Bilateral Agreement”.
49  Dz 24.06.2007 “Soldiers in Afghaniﬆan had Nervous Breakdown”.
50  Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007, pp. 387, 390.
51  Shorthand Record of the 27th Sitting of the Sejm, 26.10.2006, pp. 138, 140.
52  Bogdan Zdrojewski (PO), Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007, p. 407.
53  Radosław Sikorski (miniﬆer of defense), Shorthand Record of the 27th Sitting of the Sejm, 26.10.2006.
54  Radosław Sikorski (miniﬆer of defense), Ibidem.; Anna Fotyga (miniﬆer of foreign aﬀairs), Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting
of the Sejm, 11.05.2007.
55  Bronisław Komorowski (PO), Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007, p.380.
56  Rz 14.09.2005 “Quarrel Over Afghaniﬆan”; Rz 08.07.2005 “Too Little of Alliance in Afghaniﬆan”; compare: GW
23.10.2006 “Afghan Taliban Bet on Suicide Bombers” – the terroriﬆ methods employed by the Taliban are seen as a sign
that the NATO mission is not successful, but on the contrary that it is causing more violence and suﬀering among the
civilian population.
57  Rz 05.03.2007 “USA Troops Killed Several Civilians”; GW 19.06.2007 “Afghan Children Died in NATO Bombardment”.
58  GW 23.07.2007 “Taliban Kidnapped and Threaten to Kill Korean Missionaries”; Rz 26.07.2007 “Taliban Kill Hoﬆages”;
GW 28.07.2007 “Afghaniﬆan: The Drama of the Koreans”.
59  GW 19.06.2007 “Polish Soldiers in Afghaniﬆan do not Have Their Generals in NATO Staﬀ”.
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and especially high-ranking oﬃcers wore American
insignias of rank60. These issues are worth mention-
ing because they echoed the general criticism of the 
uneven relationship between Poland and the US, 
criticism that could reduce public truﬆ in the US.
However, criticism of the inequality in such con-
texts is not automatically transformed into a nega-
tive image of the US as such. 
II.1.3.  The threat of terrorism
The war on terror declared by George W. Bush, 
which in ideological terms juﬆiﬁes and provides a 
rationale for the interventions in Afghaniﬆan and
Iraq, conﬆitutes a permanent topic in Polish public
discourse, although critical opinions of the “war on 
terror” are also presented.61 The theme of terrorism 
appears more often in the international than in the 
national context, such as when tragic events such as 
the bomb attacks in Madrid or London are moni-
tored, or when Al-Kaida terroriﬆs are captured62. 
Terrorism is also often mentioned in the context of 
the Iraq and Afghaniﬆan wars.63 The issue of Islam-
ic fundamentalism has also entered Polish public 
discourse, together with discussions of world ter-
rorism. Poland was recognized as a target for po-
tential terroriﬆ attacks. Some measures were taken
by consecutive governments to ensure inﬆitutional
backing for preventing terrorism. Apart from spe-
cial anti-terroriﬆ training and intelligence, ﬁnanc-
ing for combating terrorism was also suggeﬆed.64 
Disagreements among politicians as to whether 
these eﬀorts were suﬃcient and/or eﬀective run 
mainly along political lines (i.e. the opposition 
blames the government for insuﬃcient eﬀorts or 
ineﬀective solutions). However, opinions that the
“war on terror” is leading to too much interference 
in the lives of individuals are rarely heard. 
The war on terror became a topic of public dis-
course in the national context on several occasions. 
Allegations againﬆ the US regarding secret CIA
prisons for terroriﬆs in Europe, through which sus-
pects where “processed” and brought to Guantan-
amo prison, launched a series of debates on the ex-
iﬆence of secret prisons in Poland as well as on the
desirable scope of cooperation with the US in the 
sphere of anti-terroriﬆ actions.65 Poland was named 
as one of the countries that hoﬆed secret prisons,
so this issue leapt to the top of the media agenda. 
International and Polish NGOs and movements 
criticized these prisons moﬆly over the Internet.66 
In the print media, the issue was treated with more 
reserve and disbelief. The ruling elites were blamed 
for not oﬀering all the information they possessed
to the public. The ethical repercussions of the pris-
ons as well as the potential impact of such prac-
tices on Polish security were sometimes discussed, 
but these discussions rarely led to a heated press 
debate.67 By and large, mainﬆream newspapers – al-
though critical of actions that undermined protec-
tion for human rights and calling for the country’s 
60  GW 28.06.2007 “Polish Soldiers in Afghaniﬆan Wear American Insignia of Rank”.
61  GW 04.04.2007 “Terrorized by the War on Terror” by Zbigniew Brzeziński: “The Notion of a ‘War on Terror’ has Caused 
Greater Wounds to the US Than 9/11”; GW 07.10.2006 “And Who is the Terroriﬆ Here?”, interview with Noam Chom-
sky.
62  Dz 07.07.2006 “London Remembers the Attacks”; Dz 30.06.2007 “Bombs Were Meant to Kill Hundreds of People in 
London”; Dz 01.07.2007 “Arreﬆs of Terroriﬆs in Great Britain”; GW 19.07.2007 “Al-Kaida Aims at the US and Great
Britain” 
63  GW 05.02.2007 “Bloody Weekend in Iraq”; Rz 15.06.2007 “Iraq: Terroriﬆs Killed 14 Soldiers”; GW 23.10.2006 “Afghan
Taliban Bet on Suicide Bombers”; Rz 23.07.2007 “Taliban Threaten to Kill Foreigners”.
64  Janusz Kaczmarek (miniﬆer of interior and public adminiﬆration), in: Shorthand Record of the 45th Sitting of the Sejm, 
05.07.2007.
65  Reactions to information in the European media about secret prisons in Poland: T 06.12.2005 “The Myﬆery of CIA
Flights”; GW 07.12.2005 “Kwaśniewski: There Were no CIA Prisons in Poland”; T 12.12.2005 “Flying Gulag of the CIA”; 
GW 14.12.2005 “Report of CIA Prisons: ‘Suspicions More Credible’”; Reactions to the conﬁrmation by George W. Bush
that secret prisons exiﬆed in Europe: GW 07.09.2006 “World Press on Secret CIA Prisons”; GW 19.09.2006 “As an Ally
- Lawlessness” by Dawid Warszawski; GW 08.09.2006 “Bush Revealed CIA Prisons to Win Congressional Elections?”; 
after a report by Dick Marty was published: GW 9-10.06.2007 “We Got a Knock for CIA”.
66  Amneﬆy International Poland: http://amneﬆy.org.pl/dzialaj/kampanie/ﬆop-torturom-w-wojnie-z-terroryzmem.html, 
accessed 26.07.2007
67  GW 22.09.2005 “Non-Election Security” by Antoni Podolski: the threats posed by terrorism are real and we have to learn 
to take them seriously.
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sovereignty to be protected – viewed the American 
war on terrorism as sensible and unavoidable:
“Today, a world embittered by the arrogance of 
Washington may not fully realize how much it 
needs an America that is militarily and economically 
ﬆrong. The queﬆion that remains to be answered is
how to use American military and economic power 
and cultural inﬂuence to dry up the swamps that give
birth to and support terror in today’s world.”68
II.1.4.  Missile Defense debate
The inﬆallation of the US Missile Defense (MD)
shield in Poland and the Czech Republic69 occu-
pied a signiﬁcant place in the national agenda. Its
cooperation with the US makes the latter an ally of 
Poland and a guarantor of its security, yet increas-
ingly this security guarantee requires an involve-
ment in global confrontational politics, which is 
increasingly unpredictable and dangerous70.
In the Missile Defense debate, the intereﬆs of the
US and Poland were again juxtaposed, but in a 
more articulate manner than before. The governing 
PiS party favored the project because the party had 
backed plans to have a US military base on Polish 
territory in the paﬆ, and considered this a more
solid guarantee of Polish international security. Yet 
another argument in favor of the Missile Defense 
syﬆem claimed that it would contribute to Polish
and European security in a world of increasingly 
unpredictable threats from “rogue ﬆates”. The pro-
ponents of the shield emphasized that it would have 
only a defensive character.
However, opposition parties as well as the two gov-
ernment allies of the PiS were againﬆ the shield.
The arguments they put forward were the following: 
the SLD was againﬆ the shield because its inﬆalla-
tion on Polish territory would increase the risk of a 
preventive attack on Poland71. Moreover, the SLD 
was critical of the way the negotiations with the US 
had been handled, saying there was too little reci-
procity, and that the public and the parliament had 
not been suﬃciently informed. These views were
largely supported by the non-parliamentary left 
and the center-left opposition (e.g. the SdPl, UP 
and PD).72 The PO was moﬆ critical of the inequal-
ity in the partnership between the US and Poland: 
“On the issue of the shield, the Polish government 
was treated by the US like some kind of Bantuﬆan
[...] the draft of the answer was sent along with the 
requeﬆ [by the Americans – A.H.]”.73  PSL leader 
Waldemar Pawlak argued that the government’s 
ﬆrategy of basing security exclusively on cooper-
ation with the US was unacceptable. He blamed 
the US for practicing an aggressive international 
policy. He also cited Roman Kuźniar as a “victim” 
of the shield debate, saying he had been suspended 
from his poﬆ as director of the Polish Inﬆitute of
International Relations (PISM) in 2007 allegedly 
for criticizing the Missile Defense project. As a pri-
vate citizen, Roman Kuźniar said during the GW 
debate:
“Let’s not be in a hurry to make decisions about the 
shield. There is no threat at the moment; there are 
no conditions that could force us to make a decision 
now. Especially given that we have an untruﬆwor-
thy American government, and on the Polish side 
68  GW 01-02. 07.2006 “Imperialiﬆs from Hollywood”, Andrzej Lubowski.
69  This issue appeared repeatedly on the agenda throughout the period (e.g. Rz 17.11.2007 “A Shield for Poland”; Rz 2006 
“Anti-Missile Shield Has to Pay Oﬀ for Us”) and reached a particularly prominent place in the spring and summer of
2007 (Rz 15.05.2007 “Rice: This Isn’t a Cold War”, Rz 09.06.2007 “American Shield Closer”; GW 11.06.2007 “Shield 
– Egotism of the Americans”, interview with Viktor Litowkin).
70  By the same token, the inﬆallation of the missiles on the border with Poland is viewed in the context of the F-16 contract; see
e.g. Rz 31.05.2006 “Byelorussian Answer to the F-16”. The moﬆ modern Russian missiles are right on the Polish border.
71  Zbigniew Zaborowski (SLD), in: Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007, p. 408.
72  The congruence of opinions can be judged from the records of the debate on the MD in which four left-wing parties 
participated (SLD, SdPl, UP and PD), and which was organized at the SdPl headquarters on 18.02.2007; Compare: GW 
05.06.2007 “Specter of the Left”: “The SLD rejects the building of the shield on the territory of Poland (‘the building of 
the shield is a threat to our country and could lead to a new arms race’) despite the fact that the Miller and Belka govern-
ments pursued a pro-American policy even at the expense of worsening relations with European countries”.
73  Bronisław Komorowski (PO), in: Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007, p. 380. Komorowski also attacked the 
government due to the fact that during his visit to Moscow, the American president told the Russians that they would have an 
opportunity to visit the base on Polish territory. Komorowski claimed that this was an unacceptably unilateral way of handling 
the partnership with Poland, and blamed it on the servility and lack of professionalism of the present government.
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– I am sorry to say – the leaﬆ competent foreign and
security policy team since 1989.”74
Self-Defense, one of the three parties forming the 
coalition government, was not particularly enthusi-
aﬆic about the plans to inﬆall the MD syﬆem in Po-
land. While avoiding sharp criticism, its members 
called for a referendum on the issue.75 The repre-
sentative of another government coalition party, Ja-
nusz Dobrosz (LPR), confessed that the party was 
divided on the issue of the shield. Judging from the 
content of Nasz Dziennik (see below), the opponents 
of the project anticipated a potential attack on Po-
land as well as limitations on Polish sovereignty if 
a foreign base was built on Polish territory. The na-
tional intereﬆs of the two countries were presented
by LPR politicians as in conﬂict, with the US por-
trayed as a country which does not care for anyone 
else’s intereﬆs but its own.
On the issue of the Missile Defense inﬆallation in
Poland, newspapers such as Gazeta Wyborcza, Dzien-
nik and (to a lesser extent) Rzeczpospolita were more 
skeptical, and presented more cautious opinions 
than they did on the mission in Iraq or Afghaniﬆan.
The government’s ﬆrategy in negotiations with the
Americans, as well as the extent to which they in-
formed the public, was sharply criticized. For in-
ﬆance, the ﬆatement of the Polish president after
his meeting with George W. Bush - “The shield is 
going to be inﬆalled because in itself it is good for
Poland” – was criticized for undermining negotia-
tions and inviting threats to Poland without even 
asking for additional protection. The president was 
also blamed for his servility towards the US.76 By 
the same token, journaliﬆs and politicians could
not refrain from criticism when the prime miniﬆer
visited the US in 2006: 
“Several hours before her meeting with the Polish 
prime miniﬆer, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, without asking her gueﬆ, cancelled the press
conference they had been supposed to hold togeth-
er. Similarly, it was not clear until the laﬆ moment
whether George W. Bush would allow himself to 
be photographed with Jarosław Kaczynski. In the 
end, the president gave ﬁve minutes to the head of
the Polish government”77. 
Former Miniﬆer of Defense Radosław Sikorski,
well known for his pro-Americanism, argued in 
the press that some of the actions of the US were 
againﬆ Poland’s national intereﬆs:
“I would warn Americans not to undereﬆimate how
much the Polish perception of the US has changed. 
In the paﬆ, when decision-time arrived, Polish poli-
ticians said: on security issues, America can be truﬆ-
ed. But after Iraq and the performance of the US 
Secretary of State [Colin Powell, who in a speech at 
the UN warned of the threat to world peace posed 
by Saddam Hussein], we will watch Washington’s 
proposals more carefully.”78
Another often-quoted expert is General Stanisław 
Koziej, who supported the MD inﬆallation in Po-
land, but also argued that additional security guar-
antees were needed, such as the Patriot Air Defense 
Syﬆem.79 Yet, it muﬆ be emphasized that even Gaze-
ta Wyborcza, which is perhaps moﬆ skeptical of the
three main newspapers about the MD inﬆallations
in Poland, criticizes US international politics less 
than it does the national ruling elites who negotiate 
with the Americans.
Trybuna (the newspaper moﬆ closely connected
to the SLD) is far more critical of the anti-missile 
shield than are left-wing party representatives: 
74  GW 03.03.2007 “Why do we Need the Anti-Missile Shield?”, debate with Radosław Sikorski, Roman Kuźniar, Bronisław 
Komorowski. Compare: GW 02.03.2007 “Does Poland Need a Shield?”, by Paweł Wroński.
75  Mateusz Piskorski (Self-Defense), in: Shorthand Record of the 41ﬆ Sitting of the Sejm, 11.05.2007.
76  Rz 8.06.2007 “Kaczyński and Bush: Underﬆanding Without Words”, by Sławomir Sierakowski: Kaczyński is called
a “vassal” of Bush; GW 11.06.2007 “Hel and Other Elements”, by Tomasz Lis [the play of words in Polish title “Hel i inne 
peirwiaﬆki” is based on the double meaning of the word pierwiaﬆek, which means “element” and thus collocates well with 
Hel (the geographical name, but also in Polish a word for the gas helium); the second meaning is “square root”, and thus 
refers to the debate about the method of counting voices in the UE decision-making processes at the time – A.H.].
77  Rz 23.09.2006 “Alliance without Partnership”, by Jędrzej Bielecki.
78  GW 03.03.2007 “Gazeta Debate: What do we Need the Shield For?”; compare: Europa 30.06.2007 “Polish Security: Do we 
Need a Missile Shield?”, by Radosław Sikorski.
79  TVP 1 “Quarter after Eight”, 18.07.2007, interview with General Stanisław Koziej and Grzegorz Koﬆrzewa-Zorbas.
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“If we will be the participants of this syﬆem, we can
automatically become the target of the retaliation, 
including nuclear one.”80 
The editor-in-chief of Krytyka Polityczna repre-
sented the US as guided exclusively by self-inter-
eﬆ, like a ruthless businessman. The newspaper
explained the inﬆallation of the MD syﬆem in
Poland as due to the lower coﬆs of doing it out-
side the US. The coﬆs were portrayed as both
economic and related to security, and Kuźniar’s 
argument that the MD syﬆem has an oﬀensive
character was repeated81.
As in debates about Iraq and Afghaniﬆan, the moﬆ
critical anti-American voices came from the far-
right. In Nasz Dziennik, alongside criticism similar to 
that found in other newspapers (e.g. the need for 
more reciprocity from the Americans, and for ad-
ditional beneﬁts for Poles such as visas)82, some ar-
ticles presented Americans as unpredictable, ruth-
less, egotiﬆic – not the kind of partner that can be
relied on. Some articles oﬀered an apocalyptic vi-
sion of the outcome of the Missile Defense inﬆalla-
tion on Polish territory: 
“In case of an attack on the US, American defense 
inﬆallations will be attacked ﬁrﬆ, including those
elements of the shield in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. This means not only potential material 
losses to the Polish side, but also losses of human 
life – the lives of Poles [...] By cooperating more 
closely with the US, we allow the American gov-
ernment indirectly to ﬆeer Polish foreign policy.
We do not answer Russian arguments with Polish 
arguments. [...]
If the prognoses about the end of the present dol-
lar syﬆem are true, it is possible that the other
method of exercising power will be used – war. 
Americans are pursuing a policy of globalization 
that will build a single global ﬆate in one or two
generations.”83
Here, intereﬆingly, the argument often used to criti-
cize the EU (the threat to national sovereignty), was 
turned againﬆ the US. Of course, these arguments
do not conﬆitute mainﬆream public discourse, and
are only presented here to illuﬆrate the extent of
negative arguments. 
In summary, the arguments presented about in-
ﬆalling the MD syﬆem in Poland that have the
greateﬆ potential for reducing Polish pro-Amer-
icanism is the following. The US does not care 
about Polish national security but only about its 
own security, and thus downplays the signiﬁcance
of Russia’s blackmailing of Poland. US self-inter-
eﬆ is a signiﬁcant potential source of anti-Ameri-
can sentiment. 
II. 2. The US as a model for Poland 
Attitudes to the US are to a considerable extent 
formed not only by co-operation with the US but 
also by the tendency to present the US as a model. 
However, the relationship between the readiness 
to take the US as a model and the overall positive 
attitude to America is diﬃcult to traceable and is
more complex than the relationship between the 
beneﬁts of cooperation and pro-American at-
titudes. Moreover, the American model itself is 
changing. Firﬆ, many commentators draw atten-
tion to the fact that the US is a divided country84. 
Second, the mainﬆream America of today diﬀers
from the mainﬆream America of 20 years ago due
to the challenges posed by the 21ﬆ century. How-
ever, public opinion tends not to take into account 
the actual and rather complex situation in a given 
country, but inﬆead draws from ﬆereotypical im-
ages of that country. For inﬆance, “in European
political culture, the ﬆereotype of the US is that
80  T 24.11.2005 [Subtitle:] Anti-Missiles: Poland in US Military Chariot [Title:] “We Will be a Target.”
81  Rz 19.03.2007 “Before we Build an Anti-Missile Shield”, by Sławomir Sierakowski (editor-in-chief of Krytyka Polityczna).
82  ND 05.02.2007 “Anti-Missile Shield – Opportunity or Threat?”; ND 21-22.04.2007 “Decision on Shield Without Ref-
erendum”; ND 25.04.2007 “Shield for Common Security”; “Visas are Basic Condition in Talks on Shield”, by Mateusz 
Piskorski (Self-Defense).
83  ND 22.06.2007 “Let’s Not Create a New Leviathan” by Jan Łopuszanski; ND 13.06.2007 “Poland – A Victim of the Fight 
for a Global Empire?”, by Cyprian Pogonowski.
84  GW 20.11.2006 “Republicans, Polish-Style”, comment by Tomasz Lis.
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of an arrogant Texan cowboy”.85 In Polish collec-
tive imagery, the US enjoys a positive ﬆereotype
as a country of freedom and democracy. In the fol-
lowing sections, the American model will be con-
sidered in the context of several public debates on 
politics and society.
II.2.1.  American democracy and political  
 institutions
The US has been treated as a point of reference 
during the transition from Communism to liberal 
democracy and the conﬆruction of democratic in-
ﬆitutions. By and large, US democracy is perceived
as a blueprint for Polish democracy (even though 
the Polish political syﬆem is closer to European
syﬆems than to the rather unique American one).
However, at the level of imagery, America is one 
of the key symbols of democratic values in Poland. 
Disillusion with American democracy is far less 
acute among Poland’s symbolic elites than among 
their Weﬆern counterparts, despite numerous dis-
appointments with America’s national politics. 
Therefore, attacks on the US are interpreted more 
often as attacks on liberal democracy itself than as 
sincere criticism of negative trends in American de-
mocracy:
“Eaﬆern Europeans know how anti-democratic and
anti-liberal forces use anti-Americanism. [...] In hat-
ing Americans, we hate liberalism”.86 
However, these negative tendencies have been no-
ticed by Polish press. The slow rise of negative at-
titudes towards the US has been exacerbated by the 
unpopularity of President George W. Bush among 
Poland’s symbolic elites. At the same time, nega-
tive attitudes towards the Law and Juﬆice ruling
party dominate among the symbolic elites. Law and 
Juﬆice has repeatedly emphasized its conservative
ideology and its aﬃnity to the Republican ideol-
ogy and way of doing politics. They also claimed to 
have “special relations” with the George W. Bush 
adminiﬆration. Although it might not be the main
factor, how the US is evaluated during the ﬁnal
years of the George W. Bush presidency will to a 
certain extent depend on the extent to which his 
policies and ideology are associated with the ruling 
Law and Juﬆice party.87 
Criticism comes from the center as well as from 
the far right and far left. The editor-in-chief of 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Adam Michnik, quoted Zbigniew 
Brzeziński, whom he considers the moﬆ truﬆed
authority on trans-Atlantic relations. Brzeziński 
blames a combination of ﬆupidity and fanaticism
for the deterioration of the US image in the world: 
“[It is] the ﬆupidity of particular high-ranking of-
ﬁcials, i.e. a very simpliﬁed vision of the world that
has become even more rigid due to the fears trig-
gered by 9/11. On the other hand we have the fa-
naticism of the neo-conservatives who are closely 
connected to the Likud party in Israel. [...] There 
is a fanatic and exceptionally ﬆupid right wing in
America. It is a Chriﬆian right, which has nothing
in common with the neo-conservatives. [...] It is 
this right that can undermine the position of the 
US in the world with its ﬆupidity and its fanati-
cism, and sometimes even worse – with its ﬆupid
fanaticism.”88 
Neither the international nor the domeﬆic politics
of George W. Bush are popular with the center-left 
media, which sympathize with the Democrats. Gaze-
ta Wyborcza perceives an aﬃnity between the political
turn towards conservatism in the US and the victo-
ry of the political right in Poland. The conservatism 
and the political line of the ruling party, Law and 
85  Garton Ash, Timothy. Wolny świat. Dlaczego kryzys Zachodu jeﬆ szansą naszych czasów [Free World: Why the Crisis of the Weﬆ Reveals the Op-
portunity of our Time. 2004]. Znak, Kraków, 2005, p. 80. Compare: In identifying the cowboy attitude as a part of the Ameri-
can dream, Jeremy Rifkin ﬆates: “...the world is too small for six billion lonely cowboys.” (In GW 18.11.2005); George
W. Bush and his ﬆyle of international politics are called “cowboyish” (GW 1-2.07.2006 “Imperialiﬆs From Hollywood”,
by Andrzej Lubowski: the US president is blamed for cowboy rhetoric in the Abu Ghraib scandal: “Anti-Americanism is 
nothing new, yet the language and politics of the George W. Bush adminiﬆration have made it unprecedented in scope,
and have solidiﬁed the ﬆereotype of Americans as arrogant and egocentric”; GW 18.07.2006 “Cowboy Diplomacy”).
86  GW 26-27.05.2007 “How to Unite the Weﬆ?”, Ivan Kraﬆev.
87  Compare: Rz 8.06.2007 “Kaczyński and Bush: Underﬆanding without Words”, by Sławomir Sierakowski.
88  GW 19.05.2006 “Zbig, or Classic Democratic Politics”, by Adam Michnik, from a speech he gave during the ceremony 
to award Zbigniew Brzeziński as the newspaper’s Man of the Year.
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Juﬆice, is called American. A GW journaliﬆ ﬆated:
“Conservative America is an ideal to which Poland 
has to aspire in the name of Chriﬆian values.” 89 A 
famous TV journaliﬆ claimed in his regular column
in GW:  “Lately, Polish politics are very reminiscent 
of American politics, although only that part that 
has undergone the moﬆ degradation.”90 However, 
the US is not completely identiﬁed with the cur-
rent politics of the Bush adminiﬆration. The cent-
er-right mainﬆream newspapers evaluate the con-
servatism of American politics more positively (e.g. 
Dziennik) and consider the public debates on values 
and religion to be a positive feature of American 
politics (e.g. Rzeczpospolita).
What center and center-left commentators regard 
as a temporary negative trend in American politics, 
the commentators of Nasz Dziennik and Krytyka Poli-
tyczna see as a threat to democracy not only in the 
US but also worldwide. Paradoxically, far-right and 
new-left media agree that the politics of George W. 
Bush are authoritarian and dangerously servile to 
the intereﬆs of oil-hungry corporations feeding the
arms race. Both media believe the neo-conserva-
tive ideology has an excessive inﬂuence over US
politics. Additionally, in Nasz Dziennik, this criticism 
has “anti-Zioniﬆ” (i.e. anti-Israeli) and anti-Semit-
ic overtones. Krytyka Polityczna, on the other hand, 
grounds its anti-American position in paciﬁsm and
alternative globalism as well as participatory de-
mocracy and minority rights. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the nega-
tive views of American democracy presented above 
are outside the mainﬆream Polish media discourse.
Anti-Americanism is ridiculed as something that 
has become suddenly fashionable and therefore 
banal.91 Mockery and criticism of anti-American-
ism represent displays of anti-anti-Americanism. 
For example, Tony Judt was called “the missionary 
of shallow anti-Americanism” in the response to his 
interview in GW, in line with arguments that mock 
radical anti-American opinions:
“America is a threat to the world because it is ar-
rogant. ‘Americans are much less capable of self-
criticism than other societies’. [...] America is really 
repulsive because it is patriotic. It has not learnt the 
lesson of the 20th century, which in Judt’s view is that 
‘patriotism and nationalism led to mass murder and 
genocide’. If someone ﬆated that ‘mass murder and
genocide are a logical consequence of progress and 
socialism’, the New York hiﬆorian would have ﬆart-
ed writing proteﬆ letters. However, in the ﬆruggle
againﬆ the American empire of evil, even the moﬆ
absurd simpliﬁcations are allowed.” 92
The unilateralism of the US is often excused by 
citing its attempt to foﬆer democracy around the
world, although Polish commentators are aware 
that it is impossible to apply one model of democ-
racy world-wide. Disagreements with the simpliﬆic
model of exporting democracy are couched in the 
form of friendly advice rather than bitter mockery. 
Attempts by Europe to take a benevolent approach 
to loud critics of the US such as Lukashenko of Be-
larus or Hugo Chavez of Venezuela rarely ﬁnd sym-
pathy among mainﬆream journaliﬆs.93 
“It’s hard to get rid of the impression that anti-
Americanism, especially the Weﬆern European va-
riety, also serves as a diversion. It helps remove two 
large unresolved problems from the agenda [of the 
EU]: the crisis of the welfare ﬆate, and the assimila-
tion of the quickly-growing Muslim community in 
the [European] Union.”94
American-ﬆyle freedom of speech is highly valued
in the Polish media. Comparisons between the 
media laws of the US and Poland often favor the 
former. Intriguingly, even in articles that invite an 
anti-American line of argument (e.g. the fate of the 
American journaliﬆ who revealed the secret CIA
89  GW 06.09.2006 “American Pattern of PiS”, Łukasz Cichy.
90  GW 20.11.2006 “Republicans, Polish-Style”, comment by Tomasz Lis.
91  GW 13.07.2007 “Liberty Statue in a Sea of Blood” by Robert Sankowski, [sub-title:] “Anti-Americanism is Fashionable”: 
the author claims that music producers seek proﬁt by using anti-American references.
92  GW 13.06.2007 “Moralizer Tony Judt”, Marcin Bosacki, editor of the foreign news department of GW; the interview with 
Tony Judt by Artur Domosławski was published in GW 26-27.05.2007 “Useful Idiots of Bush”.
93  GW 12.06.2006 “Don’t Flirt with Caﬆro, Europe”: criticism of putting politics above democratic ideals.
94  GW 1-2.07.2006 “Imperialiﬆs from Hollywood”, Andrzej Lubowski.
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prisons in Poland), Polish journaliﬆs ﬁnd some-
thing to admire in American political culture:
“In Poland, any journaliﬆ who put forward such a
sensational thesis as Dana Prieﬆ would have been
mocked. They would have been dismissed as unreli-
able, and their work would have been treated with 
reserve. [...] Here we touch upon the diﬀerence in
the treatment of journaliﬆs in the US and in Po-
land. There, it is the journaliﬆ who is truﬆed, and
not those in power [ruling politicians].”95 
The American political syﬆem has been the topic of
media debates on everything from the party syﬆem
and voting mechanism to the quality of America’s 
political elites.  In the laﬆ two years, American elec-
tion campaigns were often discussed in the Polish 
media.96 This could be due to the fact that there 
were three elections during the laﬆ two years in Po-
land (parliamentary and presidential elections in 
2005 and local elections in 2006), so the American 
primaries in this context were viewed as a gauge to 
measure Poland’s achievements and shortcomings. 
The ﬆyle of campaigning in the two countries was
compared, and sometimes it was argued that the 
Polish electoral race should be Americanized.97 The 
notion of “Americanization” has negative connota-
tions in political marketing, because it means cam-
paigns that are focused on form and not on content, 
and that depend on “big money”. Yet, moﬆ Polish
media associate the American ﬆyle of conducting
election campaigns with a ﬆyle of politics that have
been proven to work for the ﬂagship of global de-
mocracy – the US. During the local election cam-
paign in 2006, the Americanization of Polish politi-
cal campaigning took the form of plagiarism – the 
two leading parties, the PO and PiS, ran political 
ads that were almoﬆ identical copies of the Republi-
cans’ campaigns from 2004 and 1984, respectively.98 
Polish media commentators were generally embar-
rassed by the lack of inventiveness this showed. 
However, in their reaction to the lament that Polish 
election campaigns were becoming increasingly 
dirty, these commentators argued that Polish poli-
ticians had ﬆill long way to go if they wanted “to
become like the US”: 
“Observers of the Polish political scene often refer 
to America, writing that these or those practices 
from over the Viﬆula would not be appreciated
over the ocean. In reality, American politics are far 
more brutal than the Polish variety.”99
II.2.2.  The American penitentiary system  
 and courts
There is no consensus in Polish public discourse 
on whether the US legal syﬆem is ideal or faulty.
Some commentators praise America’s independ-
ent courts, especially the Supreme Court, as the 
backbone of US democracy.100 Others blame the 
American legal syﬆem for the proliferation of ab-
surd cases where lawyers seek to make money by 
“defending” their clients from evil shop owners 
who had not warned shoppers that the ﬂoor could
be slippery, etc.
Some legal initiatives by Polish politicians in the 
laﬆ two years were inspired by the American court
and penitentiary syﬆem models. This was proba-
bly due to the fact that the lack of personal security 
and the threat of crime were among Polish voters’ 
top concerns. In interviews, politicians sometimes 
mentioned that the legal formula they planned to 
introduce in Poland worked well in some Weﬆern
countries, the US included. In their election pro-
grams, the PO and PiS proposed the introduction 
of 24-hour or 48-hour courts for minor oﬀences
95  GW 24.04.2006 “The CIA’s Flying Prisons”, Andrzej Morozowski.
96  Rz 28.12.2005 “The Second Youth of John McCain”, Rz 02.02.2007 “Gaﬀe of a Candidate for the USA Presidency”; Rz
03.04.2007 “Mrs. Clinton Raises Millions”, Rz 21.06.2007 “Bloomberg for President?” and others.
97  Political celebrities appear in various contexts, from Hillary Clinton attacking Rumsfeld on US policy in Iraq (Rz 
05.08.2006 “Diﬃcult Queﬆions for Rumsfeld”) to election campaign ﬆrategies (Rz 06.06.2007 “The Hillary and Bill
Clinton show”).
98  GW 06.07.2006 “PiS Had Eyes on Reagan in Their Ad”; Dz 06.07.2006 “PiS Copied Reagan’s Ad”; GW 04.09.2006 “TV 
Advertising of PO is a Copy of Bush Ad”.
99  GW 03.10.2005 “Dirty Campaign, American Style”; see also blog of GW correspondent in Washington, Marcin Gadziński, 
“Biały Domek” [Little White House] at http://bialydomek.blox.pl/html, accessed 25.07.2007, especially the entry “The Tears 
of McCain’s Daughter”: “it’s worth remembering how ruthless, brutal and disguﬆing an election campaign can be”.
100  Rz 17.07.2005 “The Court Over Courts”, Piotr Gillert.
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like hooliganism. After the elections, the PiS put 
this idea into practice. Among the less-known ini-
tiatives, Miniﬆer of Juﬆice Zbigniew Ziobro (PiS)
suggeﬆed introducing the inﬆitution of “turning
ﬆate’s evidence”, modeled on the US experience
of combating organized crime101. Other American 
approaches to crime inspired Polish politicians as 
well. Miniﬆer of Education Roman Giertych (LPR)
claimed that the policy of “zero tolerance” he was 
about to introduce at schools was modeled on the 
program launched by Rudolph Giuliani, the may-
or of New York, which – according to the miniﬆer
– had greatly reduced crime in the city.102 This tough 
ﬆand on crime, typical of conservative politicians,
was however criticized in the left-wing media as a 
smoke screen masking the real problems aﬀecting
contemporary liberal democratic ﬆates that are
unable to protect their citizens from recurrent eco-
nomic crises and terroriﬆ threats.103 
In July 2007, a debate about the compatibility of the 
Polish and American legal syﬆems was sparked by
the failed eﬀorts to have Edward Mazur extradited
from the US.104 Mazur, a Polish businessman residing 
in the US, had been charged by a Polish prosecutor 
with ordering the murder of General Marek Papała, 
the chief of police, in 1998.105 The details of the de-
bate are irrelevant, but its rhetoric demonﬆrates a
more general trend in public discourse. The opposi-
tion (PO and SLD) blamed the government for the 
unprofessional and insuﬃcient preparation of the ex-
tradition application, as well as for bringing politics 
into the matter106. Such views also appeared in some 
newspapers, such as Gazeta Wyborcza.107 Other media 
(e.g. Rzeczpospolita) suggeﬆed that the independence
of American judges had to be respected by Polish 
public opinion, but also claimed that further legal 
ﬆeps should be taken.108 The arguments of Juﬆice
Miniﬆer Zbigniew Ziobro were illuﬆrative of the
pro-Americanism of the ruling party. Despite the fact 
that he had earlier let his American partners know 
that this was a very important case for his govern-
ment, Ziobro did not attack the American judge for 
ruling againﬆ Mazur’s extradition. In other words,
he refrained from using an argument that could have 
helped him save face inside the country for the sake 
of preserving a good image for the US. 
II. 2. 3.  The American social model 
“The purpose of power is to create conditions 
for people in which they can attain happiness by 
themselves”109. This ﬆatement outlines the Ameri-
can social model as relying very little on support 
from the ﬆate and leaving a lot of freedom and risk
to individuals. 
The American social model has not been particularly 
popular as a blueprint for Polish social reforms since 
the election campaign of 2005. In their political pro-
gram, the winning right-wing PiS party made many 
propositions typically associated with the model of 
ﬆate interventionism. The term “liberalism” was giv-
en negative connotations in speeches given by the 
members of several parties such as the LPR, Self-
Defense, and particularly the PiS, which compared 
“Solidarity Poland” to “Liberal Poland” in their elec-
tion slogans and the campaign as a whole. These slo-
gans were aimed at their ﬆrongeﬆ rival, the PO, the 
only party that suggeﬆed an election program con-
taining some elements of liberal economic and social 
solutions (e.g. a ﬂat tax). The party that traditionally
101  The oﬃcial site of Zbigniew Ziobro contains his opinions and press interviews: http://www.zbigniewziobro.pl/, accessed 
26.07.2007
102  Dz 30.10.2006 “I Will Punish Teachers and Pupils”.
103  Le Monde Diplomatique Polska no.8, October 2006 “On Several Fairytales about Security from America” by Loic Wac-
quant.
104  GW 20.07.2007 “Ziobro: Mazur’s Road to Poland is Not Yet Closed”; ND 21-22.07.2007 “The Extradition of Mazur Will 
Not Take Place”.
105  GW 25.10.2006 “Murder of Papała – Traces from Eight Years Ago”.
106 ND 21-22.07.2007 “Extradition of Mazur Will Not Take Place”.
107  GW 23.07.2007 “Mazur Free. Everyone Shocked”, “MA Ziobro and Prof. Keys”; Dz 11.08.2007 “I Was Right in Saying 
that Ziobro was a ‘Zero’”, interview with Leszek Miller, former prime miniﬆer for the SLD, who blamed the government
for a lack of professionalism.
108  Rz 20.07.2007 “In a Year – at the Lateﬆ – Mazur Could Be in Poland”.
109  GW 11-12.03.2006 “Union has to be for People”, interview with Bronisław Geremek.
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promoted liberal economic politics – the UW, now 
the PD – did not win seats in parliament.110 The other 
opposition parties – the SLD and PSL – are a poﬆ-
communiﬆ left-wing grouping and a peasant party,
respectively, both favoring European ﬆate welfare
models over liberal models.
In the press there was some criticism of the European 
social model for turning people into consumers111 as 
well as arguments favoring it on roughly the same 
grounds.112 Direct references to the American social 
model were less common. Media debates on the par-
ticular solutions oﬀered by the US in the sphere of
social policy, such as private health care, are relative-
ly rare, and tend to be disapproving of the American 
model or at leaﬆ skeptical of it.113 The general tone 
of these debates is as follows: “We cannot aﬀord to
liberalize the health-care syﬆem”.114 Bitter critiques 
of the American social model, however, are primarily 
“imported”: famous experts from abroad are invited 
for interviews, or foreign articles are re-printed in 
Polish newspapers.115 Thus we can conclude that the 
American social model was seldom a topic in Polish 
public discourse during the laﬆ two years.
II.3. The US as a society 
US society is a topic of continuous if not lively dis-
cussion in the Polish media. American worldviews on 
important issues and daily habits are monitored and 
compared to those of the Poles, especially on such 
issues as race relations, multiculturalism, religious 
values and contacts between the two societies. 
II. 3.1.  Commonality of values
In Polish media discourse, American values tend 
to receive positive treatment. According to public 
opinion polls, Poles and Americans have similar 
religious values and are conservative in matters of 
sex and marriage.116 Thus, the media discourse also 
pays attention to these issues. This aﬃnity between
moral values and the high degree of religiosity is 
seen as a ﬆable ground for Polish pro-American-
ism and for reciprocity from Americans.117 In Ozon, 
a right-wing weekly, similarities between the values 
the two societies endorse are praised: 
“One thing that diﬆinguishes Poles from Europe-
ans, but unites them with Americans, is the degree 
of religious awakening and the ﬆrong presence of
Chriﬆianity in the public sphere. Both the US and
Poland to a large extent resiﬆed the secularization
that so powerfully aﬀected the spiritual image of
Weﬆern Europe. American and Polish churches are
full in contraﬆ with empty temples in France, Ger-
many, Benelux and Scandinavia. [...] The common 
foundation for the US as well as Poland is a free-
dom-loving policy and a tradition of tolerance.” 118
110  Compare: GW 06.04.2006 “Why Capitalism Should Be Loved”, debate with Leszek Balcerowicz (former president of the Polish 
central bank and miniﬆer of ﬁnance for the UW): “It’s insane to love the welfare ﬆate, it only creates unemployment”.
111  ND 26.07.2007 “Let’s Not Allow the EU to Become a Paternaliﬆic Regime”, interview with Zdzisław Krasnodębski. Eu-
ropa 24.08.2005 “Who Will Set the Tone for the Weﬆ?”, by Marcin Król.
112  GW 18.11.2005 “Don’t Let Americans Smooth-Talk You”, interview with Jeremy Rifkin: “moﬆ Europeans try to maintain
a balance between work and leisure time, they don’t want to juﬆ work as Americans do”; Compare: Leonard, Mark. Eu-
ropa odkryta na nowo. [Europe Rediscovered], Inﬆitute of Public Aﬀairs, Warsaw, 1999: the author suggeﬆs that the European
identity could be based on quality of life (less work, more leisure time, etc.) compared to the American model, which is 
based on hard work.
113  Compare: Rz 20.07.2007 “American Health-Care Syﬆem Sick”; GW 18.11.2005 “Don’t Let Americans Smooth-Talk You”, 
interview with Jeremy Rifkin.
114  GW 02.07.2007 “Barbie Won’t Cure Us”, by Elżbieta Cichocka: “Americans neither live the longeﬆ among nations, nor
do they have the loweﬆ infant mortality, or feel safe when they face health problems. Four million American citizens don’t
have medical insurance. Can we aﬀord a liberalization of our health-care syﬆem?”
115  GW 18.11.2005 “Don’t Let Americans Smooth-Talk You”, interview with Jeremy Rifkin.
116  Rz 07.08.2006 “How Much Do We Like America?”, Krzysztof Zagórski; see also: Wenzel Michał and Krzysztof Zagórski, 
The Choice of the Poles – American vs. European Social Models. In: Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena, Jacek Kucharczyk and 
Piotr M. Kaczyński (eds). Op.cit., pp.77-80
117  Dz 18.09.2006 “Poland Deserves Reciprocity From the USA”, by Gary Schmitt: “Poland is brought closer to the US by 
many issues, including the religiosity of our societies, which is ﬆronger than in other Weﬆern democracies.”
118  Ozon 06.07.2006 “Poles, or Martians on Venus”, by Grzegorz Górny. Compare: Rz 24.02.2007 “What Poland is Needed 
For”, by Michał Szułdrzyński: “A ﬆrong Polish identity nurtured on religion and politics is a conservative alternative to
the Weﬆern European version of liberal democracy”.
6 6  |  N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Clearly, in this quotation the US is identiﬁed with
its more conservative elements, and support for the 
country is based on the author’s worldviews. In 
contraﬆ to these opinions, the liberal Gazeta Wyborc-
za ﬆated in an article devoted to sex in America:
“It’s clear that at the root of American society lies 
some kind of religious fanaticism. The aﬀair sur-
rounding the Kinsey report illuﬆrates this point
well. For us [Europeans], the ﬆatement that peo-
ple enjoy making love has never had such explosive 
power. [...] American literature did not ‘discover’ 
that children are not brought by a ﬆork until the
20th century, at some point between Hemingway 
and Henry Miller. We might say that in order to 
make this discovery, American writers had to go to 
Paris”119 
Thus, those who adhere to liberal worldviews will 
tend to take a negative view of the conservative val-
ues and religiosity of Americans120. These lines of 
division run through debates on euthanasia, abor-
tion and the rights of sexual minorities. Poland’s 
pro-American liberal media seek proximity with the 
US on such values as pluralism, tolerance, and the 
hiﬆory of the ﬆruggle for human rights.
Polish views of the US as a country with similar 
values contraﬆ with sporadic attempts to conﬆruct
the US as the opposite of Poland. In earlier press 
debates, the otherness of the US was sometimes 
noted by experts and intellectuals. For example, a 
commentator criticized “the uncritical adoration 
of successful people, ambitious egotiﬆs, supermen
who are characterized by ruthlessness and a rather 
mediocre intelligence.”121 However, negative opin-
ions of American values are usually outweighed by 
opinions presenting Americans as able to achieve 
what they want, as truﬆing themselves and their
communities, and as generally optimiﬆic and “a
happy and rich nation”.122  
The American experience of the co-exiﬆence of
many nations and races in one “melting pot” is 
regarded as having had a special inﬂuence on the
American value syﬆem. Views on this issue vary.
Some in the media regard multiculturalism as an 
illuﬆration of the American way of life or American
values. However, American multiculturalism was 
put under the microscope in the Polish press when 
the Katrina hurricane caused a human disaﬆer in
New Orleans that revealed racial contraﬆs and the
inequality of opportunities in the face of a natural 
disaﬆer and its consequences:
“New Orleans had 460,000 inhabitants. Nobody 
knows how many there are now – it is eﬆimated
that the number is about 250,000. More people will 
come, but it is doubtful that in the next decade the 
city will return to its former size. The racial compo-
sition will also change. Although the water and the 
wind did not deﬆroy only black diﬆricts, when the
bulldozers clear the rubble and new houses arise, 
few of the former black inhabitants will be able to 
aﬀord them.”123 
The inability of the US to solve its problem with 
racial heterogeneity had also been criticized earlier 
as a particularly American malaise, and was jux-
taposed with the success (however queﬆionable
today, after the racial conﬂicts in France in 2005)
of the European model124. Yet, commentators also 
tend to caricature, criticize and refute views such as 
the following: “The American culture and way of 
life is the incarnation of evil, decadence, hedonism 
and rampant individualism”:
“Obsessive and sick anti-Americanism spoils the 
appetite for serious analysis, and sometimes – when 
combined with ignorance and amnesia – renders 
such analysis impossible. Speeches about American 
imperialism sound particularly hypocritical in a Eu-
rope that knows something about imperialism, and 
119  GW [Wysokie Obcasy] 02.03.2005 “American Society in the Time of Alfred Kinsey”, Wojciech Orliński.
120  Compare: GW 19.05.2006 “Zbig, or Classic Democratic Politics”, by Adam Michnik, who quotes Zbigniew Brzeziński’s 
opinion that “when one travels by car, especially in the southern ﬆates, one conﬆantly hears sermons by crank preachers
speaking about Apocalypses or Armageddon, and quoting the moﬆ bloody and petrifying pieces of the Old Teﬆament
out of context. It’s a kind of psychopathology.”
121  GW 11.08.2003 “Will We Demoralize Europe?” Jacek Bocheński.
122  Polish Radio, Program 1, 06.06.2007, interview with Zbigniew Lewicki on alternative globalization proteﬆs.
123  GW 30.08.2006 “A Year After Katrina”, Andrzej Lubowski.
124  GW 26-27.06.2004 “Is America Straying from Europe?”, Andrzej Walicki.
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where memories of colonial Britain, Spain, Hol-
land, Germany, Belgium and Portugal ﬆill arouse
noﬆalgia.”125
Positive attitudes to the US decidedly set the tone 
of the mainﬆream public debate on American val-
ues. For ﬆudents of public discourse, an intriguing
feature of these generally positive representations 
of the US in the Polish press is that they are con-
ﬆructed by means of irony or sarcasm on the basis
of anti-American representations from the Weﬆern
European media, and are presented as a negation 
of the latter. 
II. 3. 2.  First-hand contacts
The emigration of Poles to the US played a crucial 
role in bringing these societies closer.126 The US has 
been the deﬆination of many Polish emigrants over
the laﬆ century and a half, and American Poles and
the issue of Polish emigrants in the US appear in 
the media regularly127. Politicians from the left and 
the right try to win the support of American Poles 
in various ways, and try to keep good relations with 
American Poles as potential voters. To increase the 
potential of the US electorate, a draft resolution 
considered the issue of double citizenship128. Par-
liament also initiated the Polish American Youth 
Exchange Program, a public diplomacy project 
that promotes closer contacts between Polish and 
American ﬆudents129. The allegedly anti-Polish at-
titudes of American Jews and attempts to change 
these attitudes also appear sporadically in media 
debates130. Additionally, in the period analyzed, 
the issue of American Jews who claimed compensa-
tion for loﬆ property from Poland appeared on the
agenda131, producing some anti-American ferment 
in the far-right media. 
The hiﬆory of Polish emigration to America also
means that discussions about US emigration laws 
have a ﬆable place in the Polish media. Some human
intereﬆ ﬆories appeared in which Poles suﬀered
negative consequences from American emigration 
regulations132. The fates of other immigrants were 
also followed with a lot of sympathy and American 
immigration laws were called “inhuman”.133 Despite 
criticism of inhumane regulations, in these ﬆories
the US remained a magnet that attracts people.
Media debate continuously returns to the issue of 
the visa waiver program. This issue appeared in 
public discourse alongside the decision of the Polish 
government to take part in the intervention in Iraq 
as part of the anti-Hussein coalition in 2003. This 
issue inﬂuences views of relations between Poland
and the US since it clearly demonﬆrates the asym-
metry in ties between the two countries.134 The way 
in which conditions for the cancellation of the visa 
requirement were formulated in the bill connected 
125  GW 1-2.07.2006 “Imperialiﬆs from Hollywood”, by Andrzej Lubowski.
126  Michałek, Krzysztof, “The Queﬆ for the New Kolchida – The Origins of Pro-Americanism in Poland from 1918 to 1989”,
in: Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena, Jacek Kucharczyk and Piotr M. Kaczyński (eds.), Op.cit.; Compare: Dz 18.09.2006 “Poland 
Deserves Reciprocity from the USA”, by Gary Schmitt: “Poland is brought closer to the US by many issues: Polish emi-
gration to America...”. 
127  Rz 26.04.2006 “President Bush and Polonia Lobby Together”; Rz 14.09.2006 “The government promises Polonia more 
rights”.
128  Paweł Kowal (deputy foreign miniﬆer), in: Shorthand Record of the 43rd Sitting of the Sejm, 13.06.2007, p. 111.
129  Shorthand Record of the 16th Sitting of the Sejm, 25.04.2006, p. 45 and the following.
130  Rz 24.04.2006 “Jews in the US Support the Polish Government” (on changing the name of concentration camps); Rz 
19.06.2006 “President Overthrows Anti-Polish Myths”; Rz 27.03.2007 “Country ‘Touched by Anti-Semitism’” (Rz pro-
teﬆs the view expressed in the American press); Rz 31.05.2007 “How to Attract Young Jews to Poles”.
131  Rz 09.11.2006 “Expectation of a Compromise with Poland”: Jewish organizations on the return of property; Rz 03.02.2007 
“Leaders of American Jews: Time has Come for Compensations from Poland”; Rz 16.04.2007 “Senate Supports the 
Claims of Jews”.
132  Rz 04.04.2006 [Title:] “Immigrants – Gueﬆs of America or Criminals” [Subtitle:] New Law Covers Thousands of Poles
who Stay Illegally; Rz 26.02.2007 “America at Any Price”; the ﬆory of the Wasilewski family, in which a mother who was
ﬆaying in the US illegally was deported with her little son, despite the fact that the father was a US citizen: Rz 11.06.2006
“Thrown Out of America”; Rz 13.06.2007 “A Pole Fights for his Wife”.
133  Rz 26.06.2007 “A Cuban Woman Fights an Inhuman Law”.
134  See for example: Rz 28.09.2005 “[Visa] Lottery Not for Us”, Rz 08.02.2006 “Visas, Military Assiﬆance and Common
Fears”, Rz 18.05.2006 “Poles to US without Visas?”
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the issue directly with the presence of Polish troops 
in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan135. Political parties treated 
this issue rather pragmatically. The governing party 
promised it would succeed in negotiating the issue 
with the US thanks to the “special partnership” the 
two countries enjoyed in the area of security. They 
also implied that they had the support of the Re-
publicans, which was not quite accurate since the 
Republicans were divided on the issue of migration 
as well as on new security laws. After some changes 
were made that dashed Polish hopes (the new bill 
set a ceiling of 10% of visa applications refused as 
a condition for participating in the visa waiver pro-
gram), a PiS politician ﬆated:
“Such a policy is juﬆ about the easieﬆ way the US
could choose to exhauﬆ the enthusiasm of Poles
towards Americans – an enthusiasm that is dimin-
ishing anyway. I expect George W. Bush, who sup-
ports visa waivers for Polish citizens, to help solve 
this problem.”136
The opposition took every opportunity to claim that 
the negative developments were the result of clumsy 
diplomacy by the ruling party.137 Thus, the divisions 
within political discourse on this issue are partly 
pragmatic and partly ideological. The media debate 
on this issue was more heated. The popular press 
played the part of Robin Hood in accusing Ameri-
cans of selﬁshness and unilateralism. Opinion news-
papers moderately supported the idea of extending 
the visa waiver program to Poland. Among the latter, 
Gazeta Wyborcza was the moﬆ skeptical about the im-
portance of the issue, while Rzeczpospolita and Dziennik 
took it more seriously. Although the passage below 
is ironical in tone, its authors inadvertently demon-
ﬆrated that the issue was being treated in the press as
a symbolic measure of the good will the US showed 
in relations with Poland:
“Never before have so many owed so much to a tiny 
group of heroes [...] Today these words come to mind 
when we read that the US might cancel visas for Poles. 
It turns out that Poles will owe this boon to two heroic 
tabloids, SuperExpress and Fakt. Super Express presents 
this issue as a personal one for its editorial ﬆaﬀ, and
leads oﬀ an article on the issue as follows: ‘For many
years, SuperExpress has ﬆruggledfor thecancellationof
visas to the US for Poles. We didn’t want privileges, we 
wanted normal treatment. Today, we are very close to 
such a decision.’ Yes, they ﬆruggled, and ﬆruggling,
won in the end. SuperExpress trots out some of its old 
articles as proof. Two are entitled: Selﬁsh Friends and 
To Hell with Such Allies. We can be sure these texts had 
a positive impact, because nothing persuades Ameri-
cans more than a good beating.”138 
Although some experts warn that the debate was 
wrongly formulated139, it provided an excellent illus-
tration of the asymmetry in relations between these 
ﬆrategic partners, since it allowed the media to run
human intereﬆ ﬆories. The debate was thus an emo-
tional one: the need of equality in relations between 
the two countries was poﬆulated, and the countries
were personiﬁed so they could be treated as people
(e.g. “friend”, “ally”). At the same time, the com-
plex syﬆemic and hiﬆorical limitations of American
immigration policy and law were ignored140, thus 
135  The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 was accepted by the US Senate on May 26, 2006, but was later re-
jected by Congress. The bill did not mention Poland, but put forward three conditions a country had to meet in order to 
be considered for the visa waiver program: “i) the country is a member of the European Union; (ii) the country is provid-
ing material support to the United States or the multilateral forces in Afghaniﬆan or Iraq, as determined by the Secretary
of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State; and (iii) the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, determines that the participation of the country in the visa waiver program under this section does 
not compromise the law enforcement intereﬆs of the United States.” http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c109:2:./
temp/~c109SVMg9N:e60841:, accessed 24.07.2007.
136  Paweł Załewski (PiS), comment in: Rz 27.07.2007, p. A6.
137  Rz 27.07.2007 “Poland Loses the Battle for Visas”, Piotr Gillert.
138  GW 23.05.2006 “Superfacts about Visas to Paradise”, Jerzy Skolas, Witold Bereś.
139  For inﬆance, Adam Rotfeld, former miniﬆer of foreign aﬀairs, poﬆulated that it is irresponsible to make important issues
of Polish security such as the Missile Defense syﬆem conditional on an issue like the visa waiver program, which has a com-
pletely diﬀerent and rather symbolic nature. Rotfeld participated in the debate on the Missile Defense syﬆem organized by
the coalition of four left wing parties, SLD, SdPl, PD and UP, popularly known as “The Left and the Democrats” (LiD) on 
18.02.2007, at the headquarters of the SdPl, see: http://www.sdpl.org.pl/index.php/ida/233/, accessed 8.08.2007.
140  The term used by Theo van Leeuven, a critical discourse analyﬆ. See: van Leeuven, Theo, “The Representation of Social
Actors”, in: Caldas-Coulthard, Carmen-Rrosa and Malcolm Coulthard (eds.). Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse 
Analysis. Routledge, London, 1996, esp. pp. 39-59.
N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E  |  69
ﬁxing readers’ attention on the insult of asymmetry:
“Relations between the US and Poland are asym-
metrical. This asymmetry is moﬆ reﬂected in [...]
the case of visas.”141 The visa issue has a signiﬁcant
negative potential for US image in Polish public 
discourse. In general, the asymmetry perceived in 
relations between Poland and the US is a potential 
source of negative attitudes to the US. 
The symbolic dimension of this asymmetry is per-
haps even more capable than its material aspects 
of creating an anti-American ferment, as demon-
ﬆrated by the scandal that arose from the leak from
the meeting between the prime miniﬆer’s secretary
and the deputy US ambassador. Allegedly, the dep-
uty ambassador criticized Deputy Prime Miniﬆer
Roman Giertych (a member of the coalition gov-
ernment from the right-wing LPR) for his public 
speeches againﬆ the war in Iraq, and suggeﬆed
that if such speeches had been given by a miniﬆer
in any Weﬆern European country, that miniﬆer
would have been dismissed. A day later, the liberal 
Gazeta Wyborcza, which had been attacking Giertych 
continuously on all fronts before the incident, pub-
lished an article entitled Hands oﬀ Giertych!:
“I don’t particularly like Deputy Prime Miniﬆer Gi-
ertych. I also diﬀer from him and from the Polish
Families’ League in their assessment of the participa-
tion of our troops in operations in Iraq and Afghani-
ﬆan. I think that Giertych uses this issue to play po-
litical games. It’s bad that the government of Poland 
does not speak in one voice on a matter of such im-
portance for the ﬆate. But diplomats from foreign
countries, even those moﬆ friendly to us, cannot
draw the lines of public debate in Poland. The sugges-
tion of the US deputy ambassador that the deputy 
prime miniﬆer should be dismissed for calling for 
debate on the mission in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan is a
great scandal, and represents behavior far beyond 
the boundary of diplomatic practice. I enthusiaﬆi-
cally support the idea of a debate on our engage-
ment in overseas military missions. I am willing to 
confront the deputy prime miniﬆer in such a debate.
But neither the Americans nor any other ﬆate should
interfere in how we conduct this debate.” 142
II.4. American culture
Laﬆ but not leaﬆ, American culture is a signiﬁcant
point of reference, although it rarely penetrates 
the core of public discourse, which is centered on 
politics. The ubiquity of American culture – ﬁlms,
music, faﬆ food, fashion – encourages the sym-
bolic elites to include it in their reﬂections on the
US which, in turn, shapes the image of the country 
among the wider public. 
Joseph Nye suggeﬆed that America’s exceptional
position in the world relies not only on the “hard 
power” conferred by military and economic lead-
ership, but also on “soft power”, i.e. the ability of 
American culture to fascinate or absorb people 
from other nations.143 This “soft” power produces 
two mutually exclusive attitudes. American popular 
culture is treated with disdain at the same time that 
it penetrates almoﬆ all spheres of our lives – from
food to aeﬆhetic taﬆes, from fashion to intellectual
ideas and cultural values – and even becomes an 
unalienable part of our own culture. Commentator 
Andrzej Lubowski translated this phenomenon into 
the sphere of ideology and called it a split among 
Europeans, and especially within the European left, 
between Marx and Coca-Cola.144 
The term “American culture” is often associated 
with popular culture. Several terms have been in-
vented to grasp it, such as the “McDonald-ization” 
or “coca-colonization” of the world145. These con-
141  ND 10.07.2007 “Visas as a Minimum Condition for Talks on Shield”, interview with Mateusz Piskorski (Self-Defense).
142  GW 07.11.2006 by Bartosz Węglarczyk, the leading USA correspondent of the newspaper.
143  Nye, Joseph S., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower can’t Go It Alone, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2002, p. 8 and following. Compare: Europa 05.05.2007 “Bush Hasn’t Deﬆroyed America”, by Joseph Nye.
144  GW 1-2.07.2006 “Imperialiﬆs from Hollywood”, Andrzej Lubowski.
145  The word “McDonald-ization” comes from Barber, Benjamin. Dżihad kontra McŚwiat [Jihad vs. Macworld, 1995], Muza, 
Warszawa, 2000; it’s worth mentioning that a meeting with Barber took place on October 26, 2006 in “Fabryka Trzciny”, 
one of Warsaw Culture Centers, http://www.fabrykatrzciny.pl/uwc/wyklad1.php; the word coca-colonization appears 
in European press, e.g. CafeBabel 25.10.2004 “Coca-colonization of European Culture” on http://www.cafebabel.com/
en/article.asp?T=A&Id=960, accessed 12.05.2007. Compare: GW 1-2.07.2006 “Imperialiﬆs from Hollywood”, by Andrzej
Lubowski.
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cepts point out the negative inﬂuence of American
culture, comparing it to a contagious disease that 
we ought to protect ourselves from. In some Weﬆ-
ern Europe countries, as well as in Russia, protec-
tioniﬆ policies attempt to preserve the purity of na-
tive languages and cultures from US inﬂuences. In
Poland, however, no alarmiﬆ public debate on the
inﬂuence of American culture on Polish culture has
occurred in the mainﬆream media.
In Polish public discourse, events that resonate in 
the public discussion about American culture in-
clude moﬆly Hollywood ﬁlms in Polish cinemas,
ﬁlm feﬆivals and Oscar nominations and awards.
This is perhaps not surprising given the “image” na-
ture of contemporary culture (people watch rather 
than read). What is more, US ﬁlms conﬆitute over
half of the premieres in European cinemas, despite 
eﬀorts by the European Union to promote Euro-
pean cinema146. The Oscar nominations and awards 
ceremony are treated skeptically by Polish journal-
iﬆs as boring and unlikely to reward ﬁlms with ar-
tiﬆic merit:
“The Oscars are part of the huge ﬁlm machine cre-
ated for the needs of American show-business. The 
nominations result from many factors, not juﬆ the
artiﬆic value of the ﬁlm”.147 
Even less ﬂattering opinions are beﬆowed on Hol-
lywood ﬁlms that are cheap mass products with no
value.148 Their shameless proﬁt orientation is not-
ed, but the general tone of Polish commentary on 
American ﬁlms is only moderately critical, and is
sometimes even positive149. There are also odd cases 
when a ﬁlm is criticized both for obeying the worﬆ
Hollywood traditions in artiﬆic terms, as well as for
being anti-American, as was the case of reviews of 
the British ﬁlm The Road to Guantanamo from 2006.150 
Journaliﬆs tend to try to ﬁnd the brighter side of
Hollywood. One reviewer ﬆated:
“Hollywood continues to produce artiﬆically out-
ﬆanding ﬁlms for sophiﬆicated audiences [...]. The
softening of the traditional Hollywood xenopho-
bia and narcissism is the result of the drama of the 
war in Iraq, which is painfully felt by American 
intellectuals.”151 
Another commentator remarked that the fact that 
Hollywood producers create anti-heroic ﬁlms, such
as the recent Clint Eaﬆwood ﬁlm Letters from Iwo 
Jima, is proof that the war in Iraq created a huge 
complex.152 Intereﬆingly, there are many examples
of articles which begin by criticizing American ﬁlms
but end up praising American culture:
“American show business and American culture it-
self are pervaded by the myth of careers or heroes 
that go “from rags to riches”, something that is ech-
oed in many ﬁlm scripts, from Superman to Foreﬆ
Gump. The theme of a person who – thanks to his 
skills, determination, and ﬆrong will – ceases to be
an ordinary bread-eater and becomes the maﬆer of
his own fate recurs incredibly often in American cul-
ture. [...] We should emphasize that the cult of the 
individual and that individual’s causative power, 
which has an almoﬆ unlimited potential, ﬆarts very
early, at the level of comics and children’s ﬁlms. [...]
The conclusion that such ﬆories encourage is clear
and often takes the form of a line from the sound-
track, where it’s enough to “juﬆ believe”, or where
“I believe I can ﬂy, I believe I can touch the sky”,
etc. Banal? Probably. But it’s good juﬆ the same!
146  The MEDIA program (Measures to Encourage the Development of an Audiovisual Induﬆry) was launched by the Euro-
pean Commission in 1991 and had a budget of 100 million euros for the years 2001-2006. Several well-known ﬁlms were
co-ﬁnanced within this project, such as Amelie, Run Lola Run and The Queen.
147  Polityka 07.02.2007 “I Protect my Brains”, interview with ﬁlm director Sławomir Fabicki. Compare: Polityka 26.02.2007 
“Tough Luck in Los Angeles”, by Zdzisław Pietrasik: apart from the author’s own skeptical opinion, readers called the 
event “cheap” and “disgraceful” in the Internet comments on this article; 
148  Le Monde Diplomatique Polska Auguﬆ 2006 “Feingenbaum: Hollywood in the Era of Globalization”: “More reﬁned scripts
with higher literary ambitions do not ﬁnd producers. [...] Hollywood ... [is] the moﬆ showy example of the tendency
towards uniformity ... in audiovisual production”; Compare: GW 19.05.2006 “Zbig: or Classic Democratic Politics”, by 
Adam Michnik: “It reminds one of a bad American movie ... it has a happy end”. 
149  GW 14-15.08.2006 “Stone on WTC Tragedy”, Zbigniew Basara.
150  GW 3-4.02.2007 “Nobility is Blind”, Jacek Szczerba.
151 GW 03.01.2007 “The Opening of America”, Zbigniew Basara.
152  GW 08.03.2007 “Sold Heroes”, T. Sobolewski.
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No matter how diﬃcult getting through life can be,
values that are repeated or inﬆilled in such a man-
ner become immensely important from the point of 
view of civil society. Individuals who believe in their 
own ﬆrengths and who become conscious of their
own value form the basis for an eﬀectively function-
ing democracy.153 
A similarly complex attitude is apparent in discus-
sions of the American media154. For inﬆance, Ameri-
can TV (Fox News in particular) was criticized in 
the liberal Gazeta Wyborcza for nurturing fears of ter-
rorism in Americans and for generally presenting 
a one-dimensional world.155 However, a GW com-
mentator also admitted that the American media 
have become more critical of the ruling elites in the 
laﬆ year.156
American books inspire much less intereﬆ than
ﬁlms, although in the laﬆ two years, several were
translated into Polish and initiated some press de-
bates. This refers particularly to non-ﬁction books,
such as by Francis Fukuyama, Noam Chomsky 
and Jeremy Rifkin157. The anti-American views ar-
ticulated in some of these books, moﬆ prominently
by Chomsky, represent the intellectual import of 
anti-American ideas into Poland.158 It appears that 
these views intereﬆ the public because they diﬀer
radically from mainﬆream attitudes to the US. For
the same reason, the term “anti-Americanism” ap-
pears in press debates three times more often than 
the term “pro-Americanism”.159 The former is sim-
ply more ‘alien’ and new to the Polish public, and 
therefore has a higher news value. In reviews and 
interviews, Polish journaliﬆs usually diﬆance them-
selves from explicit anti-Americanism. Wishing bad 
luck on America is very unusual for Polish public 
discourse. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The mainﬆream press is undoubtedly anti-anti-
American, and addresses anti-American arguments 
in order to demyﬆify them. On the basis of the cata-
logue of issues presented in this essay, we can claim 
that the mainﬆream media discourse is pro-Ameri-
can regarding democratic inﬆitutions, democratic
politics, values and, to some extent, culture. It is 
less pro-American regarding the military and for-
eign policies of the US. The war in Iraq has been a 
daunting experience for Poland, because it is per-
ceived as a wrongful war with Poland in the role 
of perpetrator rather than martyr; the US is held 
partly responsible for this. However, the national 
political elites are seen as even more “guilty” than 
the Americans. In a number of debates, dissatisfac-
tion with the war in Iraq was expressed through 
criticism of the bad policies of the national ruling 
elites rather than as a ﬆraightforward critique of
American policies. However, in the longer run, the 
153  Internet version of Odra “Supper with Tele-Cheesecake” by Tomasz Kozłowski, on http://odra.okis.pl/article.php/553, 
accessed 29.07.2007.
154  Compare reference [96]: the freedom of speech and the truﬆ journaliﬆs enjoy in American society are praised.
155  GW 3-4.09.2005 “TV in Times of War”, Andrzej Lubowski: “After September 11, Fox TV, with its rhetoric of rage, became 
a mainﬆay of clarity and certainly for millions of frightened Americans.” GW 14.07.2007 “Tele-Jihad of Bill O’Reilly”,
Artur Domosławski.
156  GW 10.05.2007 “Wolves Dressed as Reporters”, Andrzej Lubowski
157  Fukuyama, Francis. Ameryka na rozdrożu. Demokracja, wladza i dziedzictwo neokonserwatyznu [America at the Crossroads: Democracy, 
Power and the Neoconservative Legacy], Rebis, Warszawa, 2006; Rifkin, Jeremy, Europejskie marzenie. Jak Europejskie wizje przyszłości 
zaćmiewają American Dream [The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, 2004], Nadir, 
Warszawa-Poznań, 2005; Chomsky, Noam, Hegemonia albo przetrwanie. Amerykańskie dążenie do globalnej dominacji [Hegemony or 
Survival: America’s Queﬆ for Global Dominance, 2003], Studio Emka, Warszawa, 2005; Friedman, Thomas L., Świat jeﬆ płaski [The 
World is Flat], Rebis, Poznań, 2006. Reviews, discussions and interviews with the authors appeared for inﬆance in: Europa 
04.05.2006 “The Demise of the Hegemon”, interview with Chomsky; GW 18.11.2005 “Don’t Let Americans Smooth-
Talk You”, interview with Rifkin; Europa 14.06.2006 “I Can No Longer Support Neo-Conservatism”; Rz 18.11.2006, 
interviews with Fukuyama; GW 12.12.2006 “The Enthusiasm of a Pioneer in a Red Rug”, review of Friedman’s book by 
A. Domosławski: “In the Enthusiasm of a Pioneer in a Red Rug, the Optimism of a Naive Child Irritates”.
158  Europa 02.06.2007 “Iran and Europe are the Enemies of America”, interview with Noam Chomsky: the US is compared 
to Hitler’s Germany; compare: Europa 14.04.2007 “The Left Would Revive if America Falls”, interview with Tariq Asis, 
editor of the New Left Review. 
159  In the period from 01.09.2005 to 31.07.2007 there were 155 mentions of the word “anti-Americanism” or “anti-American” 
in Rz, and 170 in GW; in the same period there were 54 mentions of the word “pro-Americanism” or “pro-American” in 
Rz and 51 in GW.
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war in Iraq has signiﬁcant potential to shape a more
reserved attitude towards the US in Polish public 
discourse. 
Domeﬆic political developments in the US are an-
other reason for more critical Polish views of the 
country, especially among left-wing (from ultra-left 
and poﬆ-communiﬆ to center-left) newspapers. It is
common to ascribe rather liberal views to the media, 
but at the moment the press market in Poland is bal-
anced and also represents more conservative, right-
wing views. The critical attitude of the left-wing media 
to American politics is ﬆrengthened by the diﬆribu-
tion of power in the national political arena, where 
the right-wing Law and Juﬆice has been dominant in
the government coalition. The American Republican 
president and the Polish right-wing government and 
president are perceived as political allies, to the det-
riment of the image of the US. In other words, the 
claims of PiS politicians to be adopting US models, 
for example, give their political opponents grounds 
not only to criticize them but also to foﬆer a negative
image of the US by association. When the ruling party 
claims a “special relationship” with the Americans as 
represented by Republican politicians, and supports 
American policies e.g. in Iraq, it gives the left-leaning 
Polish political and intellectual elites yet another rea-
son to criticize current American policies in order to 
emphasize their opposition to the Polish ruling party 
and its conservative ideology. The association of the 
US with the Republican Party is a concept that the 
ruling elites have tried to foiﬆ onto public discourse.
One side-eﬀect of these eﬀorts has been a more criti-
cal attitude towards both the Republicans and the 
US as such. Yet it should be emphasized that cent-
er-left media such as Gazeta Wyborcza and Polityka are 
not anti-American. The former could even be called 
openly pro-American, and the latter “intelligently 
anti-American”, according to Jeﬀrey Goldfarb’s ter-
minology. Democratic America is re-claimed in these 
media and attention is paid to the ideological diversity 
and celebrated democratic traditions of the country. 
Paradoxically, moﬆ anti-American arguments made
on political grounds appear in the far-right media, 
which oppose neo-conservatives and ascribe current 
American politics to their ill inﬂuence.
While the political and symbolic elites of the new 
left are more likely to adopt or export anti-Ameri-
can arguments from their Weﬆern counterparts (the
Iraq war is described as “imperialiﬆ” or “juﬆ about
oil”, etc.), their proteﬆs againﬆ the war do not au-
tomatically imply hoﬆility to the US as such. At the
moment, only the far-right media and politicians use 
openly anti-American arguments when discussing 
the war in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan as well as the Missile
Defense issue. Their arguments reﬆ on a unique con-
spiracy theory of the excessive inﬂuence of corpora-
tions on American politics and the resulting demise 
of the role of the sovereign nation ﬆate in interna-
tional politics. Usually these views are accompanied 
by hidden or open anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. 
The characteriﬆic feature of Polish public debates
about the US and its role in the contemporary world 
is that anti-American discourse is a product of the 
far right, whereas in Weﬆern Europe it is the left.
It has to be mentioned, however, that these argu-
ments have limited inﬂuence on the national public
discourse due to the relatively small share that the 
far-right press enjoy in the Polish press market, as 
well as the insigniﬁcant role of the ultra-right politi-
cal parties in the Polish political arena.
The symmetry or asymmetry in relations between Po-
land and the US is yet another way in which the im-
age of the US in Polish public discourse can be trans-
formed. The US is perceived as a key global player in 
terms of the economy and politics as well as culture. 
Poland aspires to an equal partnership with the US 
and generally views it as beneﬁcial, yet the very deﬁ-
nition of this ‘equality’ is a matter of public debate. 
Deﬁnitions vary from more pragmatic ones based
on the premise of reciprocity to those based on no-
tions of loyalty and mutual truﬆ. It seems that in this
sphere, the polarization of Poland’s political scene 
is partly responsible for exaggerating Poland’s in-
equality or its poor deﬁnition. However, insuﬃcient
sensitivity by the US to Poland’s geopolitical posi-
tion and hiﬆory as well as the symbolic signiﬁcance
of the sovereignty issue could transform Poland’s 
rather ﬆrong pro-Americanism into a more cautious
variety in the years to come. While the equality of the 
Polish-American partnership is highly valued, eve-
rything that queﬆions this equality is immediately
scrutinized in Polish public discourse. The visa is-
sue is a prime example, because while some experts 
disregard the matter as largely symbolic, it arouses 
ﬆrong resentment in press debates and leads people
to queﬆion the long-eﬆablished image of the US as
an equal partner. 
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160  Similarly, attitudes toward Europe and the European Community were extremely positive until accession negotiations 
ﬆarted in 1998. Then public support for the European Commission dropped sharply. In my opinion, this disillusion-
ment was the result of a change in the nature of relations from “noﬆalgic longing” to “actual political interdependence”.
A similar process might be at work in the sharp drop in support for the US in Poland in 2007.
161  The average circulation and sales were calculated on the basis of Związek Kontroli Dyﬆrybucji Prasy (Association of
Press Diﬆribution Control, ZKDP) data for 2006 available at www.teleskop.ogr.pl for all titles apart from Nasz Dziennik 
and Krytyka Polityczna, which are not monitored by the Association. Circulation ﬁgures for these two titles were supplied
by them.
In Polish press debates on the US, the security di-
mension has acquired particular importance in the 
laﬆ two years. The ﬆrong identiﬁcation of the US 
with security issues is a potential challenge for Polish 
pro-Americanism. If the US continues with its active 
interventioniﬆ politics in the international arena, Po-
land will be obliged to conﬆantly form an attitude
to these actions and to take political ﬆeps based on
them. What is more, these decisions and actions will 
not be arbitrary but will be inﬂuenced by a complex
interplay of relations with both American and EU 
partners. In other words, closer relations and more 
active political involvement will cause tensions and 
disillusionment with a partner that was previously 
seen as benevolent but diﬆant.160 
In addition, close relations with the US involve the 
sphere of security, where at the moment the situa-
tion is unclear and full of anxiety and threats. At the 
same time, Poland is integrated with European Un-
ion ﬆructures, and relations between the EU and Po-
land are perceived through the lens of an economic 
co-operation that for the time being is rather ben-
eﬁcial for Poland. Thus, the promise of wellbeing
with the EU wins over the promise of international 
security for Poland with the US because it is more 
tangible and immediate. This does not mean that Po-
land is becoming enthusiaﬆically pro-EU or clearly
anti-American, rather that a new, more cautious and 
thoughtful form of pro-Americanism is emerging. 
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT:
Press:
Dz – Dziennik, a daily right-wing quality newspa-
per with a weekly supplement called Europa; aver-
age daily circulation – 409,000 issues; average daily 
sales – 217,000 issues.161
GW – Gazeta Wyborcza, a daily left-wing quality news-
paper; average daily circulation – 587,000 issues; av-
erage daily sales – 428,000 issues.
ND – Nasz Dziennik, a daily far-right newspaper; dai-
ly circulation – 150,000 issues.
Rz – Rzeczpospolita, a daily right-wing quality news-
paper; average daily circulation – 234,000 issues; 
average daily sales – 150,000 issues.
T – Trybuna, a daily poﬆ-Communiﬆ left-wing news-
paper; average daily circulation – 79,000 issues; av-
erage daily sales – 19,000 issues.
Krytyka Polityczna, a quarterly new-left opinion maga-
zine; average circulation – 5,000 issues. 
Polityka – a weekly center-left opinion magazine; av-
erage weekly circulation – 269,000 issues; average 
weekly sales – 165,000 issues.
The date of publication is marked in the manner 
DD.MM.YYYY after the newspaper abbreviation 
or name; the titles of articles are given in quotation 
marks; whenever subtitles were also quoted it is 
speciﬁcally indicated. Quotations from articles are
given after the colon.
POLITICAL PARTIES:
LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish 
Families)
PD – Partia Demokratyczna (Democratic Party), 
PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Juﬆice)
PO – Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens’ Platform)
PSL – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peas-
ants’ Party)
SdPl – Socialdemokracja Rzeczpospolitej (Polish 
Social Democratic Party)
SLD – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democrat-
ic Left Alliance)
UP – Unia Pracy (Labor Union)
UW – [formerly] Unia Wolności (Freedom Un-
ion)
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PIOTR KAZMIERKIEWICZ
Institutions Focused on US-Polish Relations  
and Cooperation
INTRODUCTION
People-to-people contacts across the Atlantic have 
come a long way in the case of Poland. At the time 
of Martial Law in the early 1980s, both the Reagan 
adminiﬆration and the American media as well as
civil society took concrete measures to express their 
support for the Solidarity cause and to ﬆrengthen
traditionally ﬆrong ties going back to Kościuszko 
and Pulaski and the period of mass emigration from 
Poland to the US at the turn of the 20th century. In 
the 1990s, however, with the transition to democra-
cy underway, the scale and methods of this ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ changed. After freedom of information 
was ensured in Poland with the eﬆablishment of an
independent media, the Polish section of the Voice 
of America (VOA) was downsized. By 2001 the 
length of daily broadcaﬆing was reduced to 15 min-
utes (from its height of 6 hours in the 1980s), and in 
February 2004 it was phased out completely. 
The VOA case is typical of American support for Po-
land. Three mileﬆones mark a gradual shift during
which the US came to reassess Poland, a process in 
which the latter, once a beneﬁciary of humanitarian,
democratic and economic aid, came to be seen as a 
regional ally and partner. The ﬁrﬆ was the transition
of 1989, which ushered in a multi-party democracy 
and free-market economy, paving the way for Ameri-
can advisors, entrepreneurs and Peace Corps volun-
teers to come to Poland thanks to the openness of the 
new regime (exempliﬁed by the unilateral visa waiv-
er). The second mileﬆone was Poland’s accession to
NATO in 1999, which meant that the two countries 
for the ﬁrﬆ time in hiﬆory became part of the same
security architecture, giving ﬆate-to-ﬆate relations
a chance to ﬁnally catch up with the excellent ties
the countries enjoyed on the societal level. Finally, 
Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004 signaled the ulti-
mate change in its ﬆatus from a country in transition,
which needed American ﬁnance and expertise, to a
member of the largeﬆ economic bloc on the planet.
More than any other Central European country, Po-
land has looked up to the United States as a model 
economy and its only reliable ally. These popular im-
ages are reinforced by the personal ties that many fam-
ilies have thanks to the Polish diaspora, the largeﬆ of
any country in the region. These two factors muﬆ be
kept in mind when we examine the unique form and 
mission of Polish-American public diplomacy. 
As a result, the focus of bilateral public diploma-
cy has gradually shifted from the democratization 
of Poland itself to the identiﬁcation and support
of causes that the two sides consider worth pursu-
ing. Firﬆ, there has been no need either to inﬆill
or maintain a positive image of the US in Polish 
society – the VOA and Radio Free Europe’s Polish 
broadcaﬆs were important alternative sources of in-
formation about the situation in Poland itself rather 
than platforms for presenting oﬃcial US positions.
The scaling down of various forms of direct aid dur-
ing the 1990s reﬂected a change in circumﬆances
in Poland, and was met with general underﬆand-
ing. Second, the exiﬆence of a large diaspora with
its network of political, cultural and social organi-
zations meant that eﬀorts at building rapport and
support for initiatives beneﬁting Poland were un-
dertaken on both sides of the Atlantic, and in the 
case of NATO expansion they were even coordinat-
ed. Third, the ﬆrategic choices of successive Polish
governments to ﬆrengthen military and political
ties with the US (purchases of military equipment, 
joint missions in Iraq and Afghaniﬆan, and plans
for the deployment of the US missile defense sys-
tem in Poland) have gradually expanded the liﬆ of
foreign policy areas in which Polish and American 
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intereﬆs coincide. Finally, the consensus among
the major Polish political parties on the desirabil-
ity of active support for democratic movements in 
Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus and the need to 
contain the resurgent Russian inﬂuence in Eaﬆern
Europe are bringing American and Polish experts, 
policy analyﬆs and civil activiﬆs closer together.
These special circumﬆances inﬂuence the choice
of the actors that play a part in maintaining Polish-
American people-to-people contacts and contribute 
to the public perception of US policies in Poland. 
Some have counterparts in other Visegrad ﬆates – the
US embassy, business representations, scholarship 
programs and think-tanks. Others, however, charac-
terize Poland in a special way, as a country with a sig-
niﬁcant and eﬆablished diaspora in the US, and as a 
platform for US-funded projects of democratization 
and civil society building further to the eaﬆ.
This paper looks at developments since 1989 and the 
current activities of the key actors shaping societal ties 
between the US and Poland. Firﬆ, the US Embassy’s
cultural and educational programs are presented, illus-
trating the US government’s priorities in bilateral re-
lations. Scholarships and grant schemes follow, moﬆ
of which are disbursed by the US government, while 
alumni programs are carried out in close collabora-
tion with the US Embassy. The next two sections con-
centrate on America’s economic presence in Poland 
and the transfer of skills and expertise in the third 
sector that ﬁrﬆ took place in Poland and recently has
occurred in Poland’s eaﬆern neighbors. Finally, the
laﬆtwopartsexamineadvocacyandresearchworkon
US foreign policy and Polish-American cooperation 
in the security ﬁeld (exempliﬁed by NATO expansion
and military collaboration).
1.  US EMBASSY PROGRAMS AND 
ACTIVITIES
The United States Embassy remains the main in-
ﬆitution for representing US intereﬆs in Poland,
and for delivering US cultural and educational 
programs. While its current role has diminished as 
private and civic initiatives come to the forefront, 
the Embassy and the ambassador personally hoﬆ
and facilitate programs run by Americans resident 
in Poland and Polish beneﬁciaries of US assiﬆance.
The next two sections, on scholarships and grant-
making and on business and intereﬆ representa-
tion, demonﬆrate the importance of the Embassy
as a launching pad for such initiatives and as a re-
source for joint civic and business projects. 
In the early 1990s, the Embassy played a pivotal role 
as an information and support center for the bud-
ding US inveﬆor community. It was no coincidence
that the American Chamber of Commerce in Po-
land was launched at the initiative of the Embassy 
(see Section 4). One of the Embassy’s more recent 
initiatives is setting up a network for former partici-
pants in American educational programs. In May 
2007, the US Embassy in Warsaw announced the 
formation of an association for the Polish alumni of 
several US-funded programs (including, apart from 
Fulbright, the Ron Brown and Hubert Humphrey 
Fellowship Programs, funded by the Embassy, as 
well as the Polish recipients of various international 
schemes).1 Over 300 alumni of diﬀerent US-funded
programs attended the opening ceremony.2 The As-
sociation, whose eﬆablishment was encouraged and
facilitated by the Embassy, has a mission going far 
beyond mere mutual support and social contacts, 
and aims to beneﬁt the wider public. Its ﬆatute sets
out the broad objective of “bringing Poland and 
the United States closer together, especially by pro-
moting and supporting cultural, scientiﬁc, educa-
tional, social, information and economic activities.” 
According to the document, the Association plans 
to organize conferences, run projects for local com-
munities, and promote cooperation between cen-
tral and local authorities and NGOs.3 
The US Embassy has two kinds of ongoing pro-
grams. The ﬁrﬆ consiﬆs of presentations of various
aspects of American life by speakers at the Embassy 
and at other locations under the “America Presents” 
1  http://poland.usembassy.gov/poland/ﬆate_alumni.html
2  Newsletter Stowarzyszenia Alumni, Vol. 1 (1), Autumn 2007, p. 2. (http://www.fulbright.org.pl/Newsletter_Vol_1.pdf)
3  Statute of the Alumni Association with headquarters in Warsaw, available at the website of the US Embassy (http://poland.usem-
bassy.gov/poland/ﬆate_alumni/alumni-association-ﬆatute-english/alumni-association-ﬆatute-english.html)
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and “Speakers Bureau” series (the former is imple-
mented directly, while the Embassy facilitates the 
latter). As part of the “America Presents” program4, 
American scholars and experts are commissioned 
by the Embassy to address Polish journaliﬆs, ﬆu-
dents and International Relations and American 
Studies department faculty. Ten presentations were 
given annually in 2003 and 2004, and 20 in 2005, 
on a wide variety of subjects from music, literature, 
and science to contemporary social problems and 
political issues. The ﬆate of transatlantic relations
was the topic of several presentations as well.5
This program is complemented by the broader 
“Speakers Bureau”6 scheme, by which Polish or-
ganizations and inﬆitutions can invite speakers on
a broad range of topics. The Embassy’s website en-
courages “as many people as possible to become 
acquainted with American culture and traditions” 
and to attend events featuring Americans residing 
in Warsaw (diplomats or teachers) and Fulbright 
alumni. The Embassy also facilitates the participa-
tion of American speakers and paneliﬆs at confer-
ences and cultural events in Poland’s regions.
As part of its second initiative, the Embassy coordi-
nates the visits of American experts to give presenta-
tions or serve as advisors.7 Featured gueﬆs have in-
cluded several speakers and consultants on the topic 
of transatlantic relations, security in the Middle Eaﬆ
and combating international terrorism; they all came 
to Poland at the invitation of government agencies, 
think-tanks or universities and represented, inter alia, 
the Council on Foreign Relations, the Inﬆitute for
Near Eaﬆ Policy, and the Heritage Foundation.
2. SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTMAKING 
Exchanges of ﬆudents and scholars as well as inﬆi-
tutional ties between educational inﬆitutions across
the Atlantic were made possible to a limited extent 
by the controlled opening of the Communiﬆ regime
in Poland in the late 1950s. The Polish Fulbright pro-
gram celebrates its 50th anniversary in 2009, and has 
been one of the largeﬆ and moﬆ preﬆigious schemes
allowing Polish intellectuals to experience academ-
ic freedom, the operation of American democratic 
inﬆitutions and social organization ﬁrﬆ-hand. Its
alumni played a signiﬁcant role during the transition
to democracy, supplying cadres to Polish politics, 
civil service and academic inﬆitutions. Along with
the privately-funded Kościuszko Foundation and a 
plethora of other generic US public and private pro-
grams, these exchanges have produced a network of 
professionals who currently occupy key economic 
and societal positions (Fulbright alumni include 
former Finance Miniﬆer Stanislaw Kluza, former
Deputy Economy Miniﬆer Wojciech Katner and
the vice-president of the Council of Europe’s Parlia-
mentary Assembly, Tadeusz Iwiński). The once-in-
formal alumni networks of these exchange programs 
are being inﬆitutionalized, with the alumni associa-
tions aiming to put the skills and expertise of their 
members to work for the public beneﬁt.
J.W. Fulbright Commission- Fulbright 
program8
Fulbright programs are available to either Ameri-
can or Polish citizens. Americans may participate 
in one of four programs: grants to US university 
faculty and professionals (as part of the Scholar 
Program), scholarships for doctoral ﬆudents, ex-
changes of high school teachers, and visits of senior 
professionals. In 2005-2006, 30 American ﬆudents
and academics came to Poland on Fulbright schol-
arships, 31 a year later and 28 in 2007.
The program was extended to Polish participants 
in 1959. About 1,000 Polish scholars have partici-
4  http://polish.poland.usembassy.gov/poland-pl/ampresents_general.html
5  Examples include presentations by Embassy ﬆaﬀ (“US-Polish Relations” by Assiﬆant Secretary C. Ries on October
2, 2003 and by Ambassador V. Ashe on December 16, 2004. External speakers on the subject included Prof. S. Szabo 
(“Transatlantic Relations after the US elections”, February 24, 2005), and Prof. R. Ginsberg (“United States - European 
Union Relations During the Second Bush Adminiﬆration”, April 6, 2005). For details see the Embassy’s website (http://
polish.poland.usembassy.gov/poland-pl/ampresents_calendar.html)
6  http://polish.poland.usembassy.gov/poland-pl/speakers.html
7  The full liﬆ is available at: http://polish.poland.usembassy.gov/poland-pl/paﬆ_experts.html
8  http://www.fulbright.edu.pl/
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pated in Fulbright exchanges since 1995, doing 
doctoral and poﬆdoctoral work. Currently, three
programs are oﬀered to Polish citizens: the Hum-
bert H. Humphrey ﬆipends for business managers
and oﬃcials (15 people have been selected for the
current edition), the Fulbright Alumni Initiatives 
Awards, and the Fulbright Teacher Exchange Pro-
gram, which targets high school teachers. 
The Fulbright Alumni Association brings together 
about 200 Polish graduates of the program. The As-
sociation was eﬆablished in 1993 and its members
meet annually. The alumni review research proposals 
submitted by candidates for the program, and advise 
new grantees (both Polish and American) on the re-
alities of ﬆudying in the US or Poland respectively.
The Association organizes thematic conferences eve-
ry year.9 These events have focused on international 
scientiﬁc cooperation and the role of education in
countries in transition. However, the Association’s 
reunions were also opportunities for discussing 
broader aspects of Polish-American relations. The 
2001 conference “Polish-American Cooperation in 
the Second Decade of Transition” featured presen-
tations on the role that Fulbright alumni play in the 
Polish economy as well as on the implications of 
Polish market reforms for reassessing transatlantic 
relations.  In October 2007, the Association held a 
conference called “American Experiences on Polish 
Soil”, giving alumni a chance to share “how their 
American experiences had inﬂuenced their ideas,
backgrounds and professional careers”.10
Kościuszko Foundation11
Eﬆablished in 1925, the New York-based Kosciusz-
ko Foundation is a private entity supporting the 
ﬆudy and research of Americans of Polish extrac-
tion in their country of origin, and of Polish ﬆudents
and scholars at US inﬆitutions. Its ﬆated mission is
“promoting and ﬆrengthening underﬆanding and
friendship between the peoples of Poland and the 
United States through educational, scientiﬁc, and
cultural exchanges and other related programs and 
activities”. The Foundation boaﬆs seven chapters
throughout the US and worldwide, and apart from 
educational and scholarship programs also funds 
Polish cultural events in the US (including exhi-
bitions, publications, ﬁlm feﬆivals, and concerts).
The Foundation provides funding to other inﬆitu-
tions with similar goals. 
The Kościuszko Foundation awards fellowships 
and grants to Polish scholars, professionals and art-
iﬆs for carrying out advanced research or teaching at
universities or clinics in the United States. Accord-
ing to the Foundation’s annual report, in 2006 32 
Polish scholars and scientiﬆs successfully completed
projects, receiving nearly $500,000 in support from 
the Foundation.12 Every year around a million dol-
lars is granted to US citizens of Polish origin wishing 
to ﬆudy or conduct research in Poland.
3.  BUSINESS AND INTEREST 
REPRESENTATION 
American inveﬆors were among the ﬁrﬆ to arrive in 
Poland, taking advantage of the detente of the 1970s 
and the limited opportunities for the creation of 
Polish-American companies in the late 1980s (known 
as ﬁrmy polonijne). However, the entry of large-scale 
American capital only became possible after the rad-
ical market reforms of 1990, which resulted in full 
currency convertibility and freedom for inveﬆment,
and the creation of a favorable political climate. The 
early 1990s also saw an inﬂux of US business con-
sultants, advisors and professional managers who 
brought with them the American way of doing busi-
ness, transforming management practices through-
out the Polish business community. 
The two inﬆitutions presented below carried the
twin mission of American business in Poland once 
the country achieved economic and political ﬆabil-
ity in the mid-1990s. On the one hand, big business, 
associated in the American Chamber of Commerce, 
supported the anchoring of Poland in Euro-Atlan-
9  The liﬆ can be found at: http://www.fulbright.org.pl/activ.htm
10  http://www.fulbright.org.pl/conf_lodz_2007_en.htm
11  http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/
12  Does Scholarship Matter? 2006 Annual Report (http://www.kosciuszkofoundation.org/Newsletter/KF_2006_Annual_Report.
pdf)
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tic inﬆitutions, viewing it as fundamental to the
long-term credibility of the country worldwide. At 
the same time, American corporations found it in 
their beﬆ intereﬆ to support the calls of Polish en-
trepreneurs for reducing the coﬆs of doing business
in Poland, including high taxes, non-transparent 
processes and rampant corruption. On the other 
hand, American capital and expertise began to be 
available to Poland’s small and medium-sized en-
terprises, a particularly encouraging development 
considering that many Polish SMEs are family busi-
nesses and form important elements of the safety 
net, especially in small towns and rural areas.
American Chamber of Commerce in Poland13
With the relative liberalization of Polish-Ameri-
can relations in the early 1970s, the need arose for 
a body that would eﬆablish ties and provide room
for dialogue. The US-Polish Economic Council was 
eﬆablished as a US government initiative, bring-
ing together large companies represented in the 
US Chamber of Commerce and the ﬆate trading
organizations represented in the Polish Chamber 
of Foreign Trade (PIHZ). However, large-scale for-
eign inveﬆment was not possible in Poland until
the market reforms of 1990. In June of that year, 
the commercial attaché at the US Embassy, Edgar 
Fulton, persuaded seven US companies to set up a 
full-ﬂedged American Chamber of Commerce (Am-
Cham) in Poland. Since January 1991, the Chamber 
has been an aﬃliate member of the US Chamber of
Commerce.
The Chamber took an active part in furthering the 
intereﬆs of US companies in Poland, along with
the Polish and American governments. AmCham 
pleaded with the Polish parliament for business-
friendly amendments to a draft law on foreign in-
veﬆment in 1991, and a year later a permanent
committee was set up to identify problem areas in 
Polish legislation and practice. In 1995, AmCham 
teamed up with the American Inveﬆment Initiative,
a branch of the Financial Service Volunteer Corps, 
to assiﬆ potential American inveﬆors in Poland. To-
gether, the organizations used a grant from the US 
Agency for International Development to publish 
a document called “Polish Economic Legislation: 
Proposed Changes and Amendments”.
AmCham hoﬆed a number of US oﬃcials over the
years, including Secretary of Commerce Robert 
Mosbacher (1991), Vice President Al Gore (1993), 
and Secretary of State Warren Chriﬆopher (1994).
In October 1994, AmCham Chairman Mac Raczk-
iewicz accompanied Polish President Lech Wałęsa 
on a trip to Buﬀalo to promote American business
in Poland. The trip also conveyed AmCham’s sup-
port for Poland’s bid to enter international organ-
izations like the WTO and NATO. In 1994, Rac-
zkiewicz began an eight-year membership in the 
US-EU Poland Action Commission, organized by 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) chaired by Dr. Zbigniew Brzeziński. The 
52 projects undertaken by the Commission resulted 
primarily in economic transformation recommenda-
tions, but also addressed Poland’s pursuit of NATO 
and EU membership. In 1997-1998, AmCham lob-
bied the US Senate to vote in favor of the NATO 
expansion bill that would lay the foundation for Po-
land’s membership in the alliance. In anticipation 
of Poland’s membership in the European Union, 
AmCham met with oﬃcials from the Clinton ad-
miniﬆration to discuss the accession negotiations.
While supportive of Poland’s progress towards the 
EU, AmCham was also eager to keep Polish ties 
to the US ﬆrong. To this end, Chairman Raczkie-
wicz accompanied Prime Miniﬆer Leszek Miller to
Washington in January 2002, while President and 
CEO Thomas Donohue led the ﬁrﬆ US Chamber
of Commerce delegation to Poland in February that 
year. In December 2003, the ﬁrﬆ Polish-American
Business Summit was hoﬆed by AmCham and the
Polish Confederation of Private Employers, and 
was attended by US Secretary of Commerce Don-
ald Evans. In another move to ﬆimulate foreign in-
veﬆment, AmCham collaborated with the US Em-
bassy on a ‘success ﬆory’ project, compiling proﬁles
of American businesses operating in various sectors 
of the Polish economy.
The Chamber currently has about 300 members 
representing American companies operating in Po-
13  http://www.amcham.pl/
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land. It represents the views of its membership to 
the Polish and United States governments in order 
to improve the overall business climate in Poland 
and encourage additional inveﬆment. Monthly
meetings are held, featuring gueﬆ speakers from
the higheﬆ levels of the Polish government, the
US adminiﬆration, international ﬁnancial inﬆitu-
tions and leading business circles. The Chamber 
is composed of 10 issue-based committees (Envi-
ronmental, EU Aﬀairs, Financial Services, Health, 
Employee and Labor Relations, Infraﬆructure, 
Intellectual Property Protection, Pharmaceutical, 
Real Eﬆate and Tax). In addition, the Chamber’s 
members meet at special fora, including the Politi-
cal Discussion Forum, the CEO Forum, and infor-
mal monthly Business Mixers.
Polish-American Small Enterprise Consulting 
Foundation (Polsko-Amerykańska Fundacja 
Doradztwa dla Małych Przedsiębiorstw)
The Polish-American Small Enterprise Consulting 
Foundation was eﬆablished by the Polish National
Economic Chamber (Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza) 
and the US Congress in 1992. It operates two con-
sulting oﬃces (Warsaw and Gdynia) where small
business owners (from Poland or abroad) can re-
ceive guidance on management, ﬁnance or market-
ing. Special attention is given to ﬆart-ups: entre-
preneurs are advised on all ﬆages in the life of a
business (from problem identiﬁcation to project
implementation). 
A ﬂagship project, implemented with the Nation-
al Economic Chamber since 1999, has tried to im-
prove the access of small and medium enterprises 
to banking. The project aims on the one hand to 
convince SMEs of the advantages of bank ﬁnanc-
ing, and on the other to alert banks to the needs of 
SMEs. Those banks with products moﬆ suited to
SMEs enter an annual competition, and the win-
ning solutions are promoted. The seven annual in-
ﬆallments of the program have attracted 15 com-
mercial and 50 association banks with a total of 600 
branches, while about 30,000 business owners were 
surveyed.
4.  COOPERATION ON TRANSFERRING THE 
TRANSFORMATION EXPERIENCE TO 
OTHER STATES
By the end of the 1990s it was clear that Poland was 
no longer in need of US transformation assiﬆance,
as the country was widely viewed as a leader in the 
transition to a market economy – it was the ﬁrﬆ
poﬆ-Communiﬆ country to regain its 1989 level of
real GDP. At the same time, many Polish aid recipi-
ents felt that they had developed skills and knowl-
edge that could be transferred to countries close to 
Poland both geographically and culturally, such as 
Belarus or Ukraine. American grant-givers in turn 
were wary of directly funding projects in countries 
with unﬆable political syﬆems and relatively weak
civil societies. Since 1999, therefore, several Polish-
American initiatives have been launched to marry 
US funding and the Polish experience of transition. 
Although operated from Poland, these schemes – 
the PAUCI and Polish American Freedom Founda-
tion being the largeﬆ – are ﬆill vehicles for advanc-
ing US-ﬆyle democracy and a civil society develop-
ment agenda that was successfully implemented in 
Poland. These arrangements also ensure that US 
and Polish ﬆakeholders continue to cooperate even
though Poland is no longer a beneﬁciary country.
Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation 
– PAUCI14
The Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation – 
PAUCI – emerged in April 2005 as a successor to the 
Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative, 
founded in 1999 as a trilateral program of technical 
and ﬁnancial assiﬆance. The original initiative used
US funding (provided by USAID and managed by 
Freedom House) to “ﬆrengthen the emerging co-
operative relationship between Ukraine and Poland 
and to take advantage of the expertise acquired and 
lessons learned in Poland’s successful transition to a 
free-market democracy”. The initiative was unique 
in that this American platform was explicitly de-
signed to build ties between Poland and Ukraine, 
and regarded Poland’s EU accession as a successful 
model of poﬆ-Communiﬆ transition. Between 1999
and 2005, PAUCI funded 185 partnership grants 
14  http://www.pauci.org/en/
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to 424 organizations across Ukraine and Poland, 
providing over $4.3 million in total. The program 
also provided technical assiﬆance, and funded the
work of Polish and American consultants through 
its American and Polish Volunteers for Internation-
al Development Programs (AVID & PVID). 
The evolution of the aid formula meant that the Amer-
icans ﬆarted to leave the management and implemen-
tation of projects to the Poles, and that the scope of 
activities could be larger both geographically and 
thematically. The new mission ﬆatement refers explic-
itly to the integration of Ukraine into the European 
Union and NATO as aid objectives, and the use of 
Polish and European experience as the inﬆruments to
achieve these goals. The new foundation is expected 
to “involve Ukraine in the active support of democrat-
ic processes in the region – Belarus, Moldova, Russia 
and other poﬆ-Soviet countries”.
Polish American Freedom Foundation (Polsko-
Amerykańska Fundacja Wolności)15
The Polish American Freedom Foundation was set 
up in 2000 as a continuation of the Polish-Ameri-
can Enterprise Fund, which had provided funding 
to Polish small and medium-sized companies. Its 
mission was extended to “advance democracy, civil 
society, economic development and equal oppor-
tunity in Poland and, ultimately, in other Central 
and Eaﬆern European countries”. It aims to trans-
fer the experience gained from Poland’s transition 
to other countries undergoing transformation. The 
Foundation commissions projects to Polish NGOs 
in the following areas: education, local community 
development, and citizens in a democratic ﬆate.
A separate area of growing importance is the shar-
ing of Poland’s transition experience with other 
countries in the region. Since 2000, the Lane Kirk-
land Grant program has beneﬁted 223 participants
from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Lithuania, Slova-
kia, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
Grantees ﬆudy selected topics of key importance in
transformation (economy, management, public ad-
miniﬆration, law, social sciences) for two terms at
Polish universities under the supervision of a tutor. 
The candidates include young representatives of the 
media, public adminiﬆration, business and politics.
Another program of note is RITA, Transition in the 
Region, which consiﬆs of cross-border initiatives.
In this framework, ﬆudy tours to Poland have been
organized for academics, social activiﬆs and busi-
nesspeople to meet their counterparts. Since 2003, 
686 people have taken part in the program. In addi-
tion, since 2005 around 200 Ukrainian oﬃcials have
visited Poland annually to learn about the legal and 
inﬆitutional reforms needed for EU accession.
The transformation of PAUCI  and the Polish-Ameri-
can Enterprise Fund is symptomatic of the paradigm 
shift in US thinking about democratization and sys-
temic transformation in Eaﬆern Europe. Whereas
once American aid was needed to help Poland build 
its inﬆitutions and transform its economy, now a mix
of US ﬁnances and Polish expertise is being applied
in other countries. US agencies now truﬆ their Polish
partners suﬃciently to let them run these programs
targeting other countries.
5.  LOBBYING AND EDUCATION ON EURO-
ATLANTIC INTEGRATION
The 1991-2004 period saw eﬀortsbyPolishpolicymak-
ers, experts and academics as well as the Polish-Ameri-
can community to advance the cause of Poland’s en-
try into Euro-Atlantic military and political ﬆructures.
Their work consiﬆed of direct lobbying of successive
US adminiﬆrations, senators and inﬂuential organiza-
tions in Washington, and of raising public awareness 
of the beneﬁts of NATO accession in Poland. While
the Polish government and the military played the 
decisive role in preparing Poland for entry into these 
ﬆructures, theﬁeldwaspreparedfor thembynon-gov-
ernmental initiatives, both in the US and Poland.
Euro-Atlantic Association (Stowarzyszenie 
Euro-Atlantyckie)16
The Euro-Atlantic Association was founded by 
some 30 Polish public ﬁgures in 1994 with the aim
15  http://www.pafw.pl/ﬆrona.php
16  http://www.sea-ngo.org/
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of facilitating Poland’s entry into NATO, the EU 
and other Weﬆern inﬆitutions. Currently it is head-
ed by two former Polish defense miniﬆers, Janusz
Onyszkiewicz and Bronisław Komorowski. Its mis-
sion is to help shape Poland’s foreign, security and 
defense policies and to educate the public on Polish 
policies and positions in international aﬀairs.
Recently, the Association has been less visible in the 
public debate. Its activities usually include confer-
ences, discussion panels and presentations on Euro-
Atlantic political and defense integration, analyses 
and expert reports on defense. The Association 
was moﬆ recently occupied with the debate on the
placement of anti-balliﬆic missile sites in Poland.
Polish American Congress17
The Polish American Congress, an umbrella organ-
ization, is a federation of over 3,000 Polish-Ameri-
can organizations and clubs, ranging from national 
fraternal beneﬁt societies, such as the Polish Na-
tional Alliance, the Polish Women’s Alliance, the 
Polish Roman Catholic Union, Polish Falcons and 
others, to veteran, cultural, professional, religious 
and social associations, with a total membership of 
over one million. With 41 ﬆate divisions and chap-
ters, the Polish American Congress is represented 
in 23 ﬆates. The Congress is headed by the Coun-
cil of National Directors. The day-to-day work of 
the Congress is carried out in its ﬆanding commit-
tees: Polish Aﬀairs, the American Agenda, Public Af-
fairs, Cultural Aﬀairs, Anti-Bigotry, the Education
Commission, the Polish American Heritage Month 
Committee, the Environmental Commission and 
the Youth Committee.
The Washington, DC oﬃce maintains contact with
the US Adminiﬆration and the relevant govern-
ment agencies. Through its contacts with the US 
Congress, it monitors and helps develop legislation 
on issues of intereﬆ to the Polish American commu-
nity (foreign aﬀairs, humanitarian assiﬆance, immi-
gration, cultural, social, human rights, etc. ) 
The Polish American Congress helped lobby for 
NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and 
Czecho-Slovakia on June 14, 1991 at the Polish 
American Congress meeting in New York City. On 
October 28, 1993, the PAC meeting in Pittsburgh 
resolved “to urge the Government of the United 
States to ensure that Poland becomes a full mem-
ber of NATO as soon as possible”. The resolution 
was passed to President Clinton. On December 6, 
1993, the PAC held a meeting to usher in a coali-
tion of 14 ethnic organizations with roots in Central 
and Eaﬆern Europe. The coalition issued a letter to 
President Clinton raising concern over the resur-
gence of Russia, while a PAC representation met 
the President in late 1995. 
The Congress’s eﬀectiveness in representing the in-
tereﬆs of Central European ﬆates was compromised
by the anti-Semitic ﬆances of its then-President
Edward Moskal, and its conﬂict with the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress. This conﬂict nearly derailed
the NATO enlargement drive, and the Polish gov-
ernment ended up diﬆancing itself from the PAC.
After a change in leadership following President 
Moskal’s death in 2005, the Congress also changed 
a number of its positions.
Recently, the Congress has engaged in lobbying 
for a visa waiver for Poland and for bills increasing 
budget appropriations for Central Europe.
6.  THINK-TANKS AND  
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH  
CENTERS 
The cementing of Poland’s relationship with the 
US through its accession to NATO opened up a 
whole range of issues for public discussion, such 
as the place that the US would play in ensuring 
Poland’s security, and the role that Poland could 
play in European foreign policy vis-à-vis Washing-
ton. By 2001, several policy research centers were 
addressing this need, launching and deepening 
public debates on issues such as the government’s 
decisions to sign long-term military equipment con-
tracts with the US, to send troops to Iraq and Af-
ghaniﬆan, and to ﬆart talks on the inﬆallation of 
an anti-missile syﬆem. These centers include both
public and independent inﬆitutions and general-
17  http://www.polamcon.org/
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intereﬆ think-tanks, as well as centers specializing
in foreign policy and security issues.
Institute for Public Affairs (Instytut 
Spraw Publicznych)18
The Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs is one of the biggeﬆ
and moﬆ eﬆablished public policy research inﬆitu-
tions in Poland. It was founded in 1995 and soon 
took a leading role in the development, presenta-
tion and publication of analyses and recommenda-
tions on a range of government policies as Poland 
embarked on deep reforms in the late 1990s. In the 
early 2000s the Inﬆitute concentrated on gauging
the level of support for EU integration among the 
various social groups in Poland, and came up with 
proposals to raise awareness on European issues as 
well as to improve the turnout in the referendum on 
EU accession.
Given its preoccupation with EU accession, the In-
ﬆitute only later took up the ﬆudy of transatlan-
tic relations. In 2004-2005, the Inﬆitute conducted
a research project called “Polish Attitudes toward 
the US, their Impact on Polish Foreign Policy, and 
the Future of EU Reform”19 as part of a broader 
ﬆudy of the attitudes of the societies and elites of
several Central European ﬆates toward the US
and American foreign policy. A collection of these 
ﬆudies was published in Polish and English, titled
Bridges Across the Atlantic? The Attitudes of Poles, 
Czechs and Slovaks toward the United States, and 
was launched at a conference featuring Polish and 
foreign speakers.
The book was an attempt to capture the essence of 
pro-American attitudes among the Central and Eaﬆ
European elites, identifying their roots and predicting 
future trends. The publication devoted a lot of space 
to public opinion dynamics. The essays covered the 
period from Communiﬆ Poland through the poﬆ-
1989 debates. 
The publication was a timely one, caﬆing light on the
wider debate on the ﬆrategic choices facing Poland
following its EU accession and its ﬆrong support for
the US intervention in Iraq. While it was generally 
concluded that Poland would continue in its close 
cooperation with the US, signs were noted that the 
coﬆs of the relationship were being reassessed, and
that the Polish government was being urged to take a 
more assertive position. However, in their general as-
sessment, the authors concluded that Poland and the 
other new EU member ﬆates were unlikely to view
relations with the US and the EU as forcing them 
to choose between the two. Inﬆead, it was expected
that some policy areas, such as the promotion of de-
mocracy in the EU’s eaﬆern neighborhood, would
increasingly demonﬆrate the need for America and
Europe to join forces to achieve maximum impact.
In 2007, the Inﬆitute revisited the ﬆate of the Polish-
US relations in a project called “Polish Foreign Pol-
icy at the Crossroads: Towards a New Consensus or 
a New Competition”.20 In a paper published in the 
wake of the parliamentary elections of 2007, Krzysz-
tof Bobiński  considered the likely implications of the 
change of government for Polish-American relations. 
Analyzing the place that transatlantic ties occupied 
in party programs, electoral campaigns and public 
opinion polls, Bobiński noted the public’s increasing 
disapproval of the ﬆaunchly pro-US course followed
by the Law and Juﬆice government of Jaroslaw Kac-
zynski (on issues such as the deployment of Polish 
troops abroad or plans to inﬆall a missile shield).
This sentiment was reﬂected in the greater assertive-
ness toward Washington seen in the declarations of 
the then- opposition Civic Platform. However, as 
Bobiński pointed out, potentially contentious issues 
such as the withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq did 
not feature signiﬁcantly in the campaigns of the two
major parties, and were absent from the TV debates. 
He concluded that consensus could be expected on re-
lations with the US in the new political environment, 
although the potential for conﬂict remains between
18  http://www.isp.org.pl/
19  „Polskie poﬆawy wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych, ich wpływ na polską politykę zagraniczną oraz przyszłość reform Unii
Europejskiej”, funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
20  Supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
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the government of Donald Tusk and the president, 
Lech Kaczynski.
The Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs is one of the moﬆ
recognizable non-governmental inﬆitutions in Po-
land, and has a reputation for ﬆimulating debates
in various policy areas. However, the bulk of its 
international work focuses on Poland’s position 
within the EU – it has done several extensive ﬆud-
ies on relations between the societies and political 
syﬆems of Poland and its European partners as well
as its eaﬆern neighbors. By contraﬆ, it deals with
transatlantic relations only occasionally, and often 
in the broader context of either EU-US ties or issues 
of domeﬆic security. The Inﬆitute’s ﬆrong back-
ground in public opinion research and the analysis 
of societal change allows it to pursue ﬆudies that
go beyond ﬆate-to-ﬆate relations, and to extend its
scope to social and cultural analyses.21
Center for International 
Relations (Centrum Stosunków 
Międzynarodowych)22
Transatlantic ties are among the core activities of the 
Center for International Relations. The Center’s In-
ternational Security Program deals with projects on 
Atlanticism, analyzes German and Central Europe-
an reactions to US foreign policy, and inveﬆigates
the development of NATO. Since 2001, the Center 
has hoﬆed several major conferences on these top-
ics, focusing on the relationship between global se-
curity and US-European relations. The Center has 
often ﬆressed the inﬆitutional dimension of trans-
atlantic relations, paying attention to the legacy and 
prospects of European cooperation in that regard 
(CFSP/ESDP). 
In June 2006, the Centre held a seminar at which 
prominent Polish, German and American politi-
cians and experts reviewed the background and 
future of US-Europe ties.23 One of the speakers, 
Bronisław Komorowski, deputy speaker of the 
Polish parliament, ﬆressed that Poland and the
United States have traditionally shared not only 
values (he cited examples from over 200 years, in-
cluding US support for Solidarity in the 1980s), 
but more recently have worked to reach common 
intereﬆs. He referred to NATO as “a pillar of Po-
land’s security policy”, and reaﬃrmed the security
guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Treaty. His 
position was echoed by Stanisław Koziej, Poland’s 
undersecretary of ﬆate for defense, who said that
relations with the United States were particularly 
important; however, he acknowledged that despite 
the ﬆrategic importance of this ally for Poland, con-
cessions could not be taken for granted, and that di-
alog on a number of technical issues was needed.
The Center has issued several publications on the 
general ﬆate of Polish-American relations and mon-
ographs on such current issues as missile defense 
policy, the future of European foreign policy, and 
the reform of NATO. The Center’s ﬆrong involve-
ment in projects on transatlantic relations dates 
back to 2003 when out of the total of 16 analytical 
reports, 4 dealt with Europe-US ties directly and 3 
discussed the future of NATO.24 Although the topic 
of US foreign policy and Polish and European re-
actions to it was the subject of only ﬁve analyses
between 2004 and 2008, the Center’s experts and 
featured external authors addressed the implica-
tions of American elections, and tackled two major 
issues in the Polish debate on relations with the US: 
Poland’s military presence in Iraq, and the planned 
missile shield in Poland. The Center also handled 
the Polish component of the Transatlantic Trends 
2006 survey.
Transatlantic relations are a priority for the Cent-
er, and its events, with the participation of experts, 
are aimed at the general public and the media. The 
21  The Inﬆitute has commissioned a number of analyses of press discourse and conducted numerous ﬆudies on images and
attitudes between nations.
22  http://www.csm.org.pl/
23  The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Polish, German and American Concepts, held on June 29, 2006.
24  No. 7/03, A. Detjen, “Current U.S. Think-Tank Trends on the Issue of the Transatlantic Relationship”; No. 8/03, M. 
Zaborowski, “Between Power and Weakness: Poland – A New Actor in Transatlantic Security”; No. 9/03, S. Everts, “New 
Ideas for a Better European Response to the New America”; No. 16/03, A. Rotfeld, “How Should Europe Respond to 
the New America?”
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Center’s position as a general foreign policy think-
tank focused on EU aﬀairs is reﬂected in its tenden-
cy to view relations with the EU through the prism 
of Europe-America ties and global aﬀairs.25
The Polish Institute of International 
Affairs  (Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych)
The Polish Inﬆitute of International Aﬀairs was re-
eﬆablished in 1996, and has functioned since 2000
as an analytical inﬆitution serving the public ad-
miniﬆration (especially the Foreign Miniﬆry) and
the broader public through its reports, periodicals 
and expert seminars.
The Inﬆitute’s focus on classic international rela-
tions means that in relations with the US it has con-
centrated on global security. Out of over 100 confer-
ences liﬆed on the Inﬆitute’s websites, the 12 events
devoted to transatlantic relations consider the rela-
tionship in light of worldwide security challenges 
(e.g. the relationship to Islam), the US security doc-
trine, or Polish-US military cooperation (including 
NATO reform).26  A search of the articles published 
in the Inﬆitute’s periodical, the Polish Diplomatic 
Review, conﬁrms this preoccupation. The Review 
did not carry any articles devoted to US policy or 
Poland’s relations with America in its ﬁrﬆ 14 issues
(2001-2003), and the ﬁrﬆ references were in the con-
text of non-proliferation and Poland’s security ﬆrate-
gy towards NATO and the EU.27 More attention was 
paid to relations with the US over time, as the publi-
cation carried several articles on the implications of 
the war in Iraq and the debate on the inﬆallation of
a missile defense syﬆem.
The inﬂuence of the Inﬆitute on public debate may
have been limited by its technical nature and its pref-
erence for expert seminars. However, its close ties to 
the Polish Foreign Miniﬆry (seen in the frequent pres-
entations of miniﬆers and other Polish diplomats at
the Inﬆitute) and its oﬃcial ﬆatus as an internal advi-
sory inﬆitution to the government (providing policy
analyses and internal reports) suggeﬆ a degree of in-
ﬂuence that is not available to other analytical inﬆitu-
tions. Its close relationship with the public adminis-
tration has sometimes limited its independence; the 
previous head of the Inﬆitute, Roman Kuźniar, loﬆ
his poﬆ in February 2007 after publicly criticizing the
Polish government’s unconditional support for the 
plans to deploy the missile defense. This criticism was 
considered a breach of the unoﬃcial reﬆrictions on 
the debate that were in force during the term of PM 
Jarosław Kaczyński.
Institute for Strategic Studies (Instytut 
Studiów Strategicznych)28
The Inﬆitute for Strategic Studies was eﬆablished
in 1993 in Krakow. Since 1995 it has carried out a 
research program called “The New Shape of Euro-
Atlantic Security”, giving it the longeﬆ experience
in this area of any Polish inﬆitution. The Inﬆitute
regularly organizes expert seminars and conferenc-
es open to the public. In Auguﬆ 2007, it ran a pub-
lic debate on the pros and cons of deploying a mis-
sile defense syﬆem, featuring among its speakers
the main Polish negotiator and the US Ambassador 
25  It is intereﬆing to note that Janusz Reiter, the head of the Center from 1996 to 2003, later became Poland’s ambassador
in the US.
26  Prospects for the EU-US Relationship (December 14-15, 2000), After the Attack: Several Europes and Transatlantic Relations (January 
25-26, 2002), EU-US Cooperation (May30 - June 1, 2003), Collective Identities and Criteria for Security in Transatlantic Relations (Sep-
tember 24-26, 2004), The American Syﬆem of Anti-Missile Defense – Implications  for International and Polish Security (November 3, 
2005), Polish Policy towards the United States: Challenges and Perspectives (January 17, 2006), Polish-American Relations: Opportunities and 
Challenges (January 26, 2006), New American Security Strategy (March 24, 2006), The Future of NATO (April 20, 2006), Colloquium on 
Security and Transatlantic Relations (June 4-6, 2006) and Europe between Islam and the United States: Current Trends and Future Options 
(June 12-13, 2006), After the Riga NATO Summit: Between Stagnation and Globalization (November 29, 2006), Prospects of the Polish 
Military Presence in Iraq (September 27, 2007). 
27  R. Stemplowski, „NATO i Unia Europejska—transformacja i bezpieczeńﬆwo“ (NATO and the EU—Transformation and
Security); W. Stankiewicz, „Współczesne koncepcje bezpieczeńﬆwa międzynarodowego na tle problemu rozprzeﬆrzeni-
ania broni jądrowej“ (Modern Concepts of International Security Viewed Againﬆ the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation),
Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, vol. 3, no. 15 (2003). 
28  http://www.iss.krakow.pl/
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in Poland. In October of that year, an event was 
held on the topic “Europe, NATO, America: New 
Dimensions in the Partnership”. The conference 
was attended by high-ranking oﬃcials, including
the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, the former 
foreign miniﬆer of Ukraine, the former miniﬆer of
defense of Poland, and several Polish and interna-
tional experts. 
The Inﬆitute has so far concentrated on the secu-
rity aspects of Polish-American relations. While it 
enjoys a high reputation for its quality expertise in 
the geopolitical and hard security aspects of the 
subject, its specialization and location in Krakow 
rather than Warsaw limit its impact on the broader 
policy debate as well as its presence in the national 
media.
CONCLUSIONS
Public diplomacy has played an important role in 
suﬆaining the positive image that US culture and
values traditionally enjoy in Polish society. The in-
veﬆment into the minds and souls of the budding
Polish elite throughout the 1980s and 1990s took 
diﬀerent forms, and has gradually been reduced in
scale. However, the fruit that is visible now – the 
process of inﬆitutionalizing the network of Polish
alumni of US universities or the entry into poli-
tics and public life of a generation of recipients of 
various grants – is invaluable at this new period of 
Polish-American relations.
Although there are ﬆrong reasons to believe that the
Polish elites will remain committed to the transatlan-
tic alliance, such as geopolitics and shared values, 
this commitment is under certain ﬆrains that have
appeared in relations that were once nearly devoid 
of any conﬂicts of intereﬆ. The initial capital of truﬆ
and open channels of communication are crucial at 
a time when Poland is moving from the dependent 
position of a beneﬁciary and applicant to that of a
regional player, one ready to articulate intereﬆs that
may not coincide with those of the US. 
However, the initiatives undertaken so far by the US 
Embassy, think-tanks or civil society organizations 
have frequently failed to resonate with the wider pub-
lic. The key issues of direct intereﬆ to the public, such
as the decisions to deploy troops in Iraq and Afghani-
ﬆan or plans for the inﬆallation of the missile defense
syﬆem,havesofarbeenthesubjectofexpert seminars
or technical discussions. The inﬆitutions involved in
these initiatives might build on the successful experi-
ence of raising public awareness of the implications 
of European integration for various social and profes 
sional groups, to provide accessible information on a 
broad spectrum of transatlantic issues.
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INTRODUCTION 
The identiﬁcation of the population with member-
ship in the European Union and NATO and – more 
generally – the formation of attitudes on foreign 
policy issues are undoubtedly complex processes. 
This ﬆudy aims to elucidate some of the many fac-
tors involved. 
It is commonly accepted that in foreign policy, in-
ﬆitutions, political actors, and the political elite are
the key decision-makers; however, an increasingly 
important role is played by civil society associations 
and the public. Here, the new ﬆate also had deﬁcits
to be made up and bridged ﬆemming from a lack
of experience and information among the decision-
makers, as well as an inadequate contextual view of 
international aﬀairs. Moreover, the public debate on
international issues was immature in these early years. 
These deﬁcitsbecamevisiblequicklyafter thecollapse
of the Communiﬆ regime, and were ﬆill present three
years later in 1993, when independent Slovakia was 
founded. Overall, the new elites lacked the hiﬆorical
experience and know-how necessary for running an 
independent ﬆate with its own foreign policy goals
and clearly articulated national intereﬆs. The process
of eﬆablishing ﬆate inﬆitutions, a diplomatic appa-
ratus, and foreign policy inﬆitutes began only after
1993. It was also around this time that various periodi-
cals and forums began to spring up, contributing the 
necessary backdrop to a nationwide discussion on the 
country’s foreign policy. At this ﬆage, the making of
foreign policy was ﬆill marked by the general lack of
awareness among the public of Slovakia’s geopolitical 
position and future challenges. 
In 2004, 15 years after the collapse of the Commu-
niﬆ regime and 12 years after its independence,
Slovakia found itself at an hiﬆorical landmark that
OĽGA GYÁRFÁŠOVA  
Cultural Legacies and the Role of Political Leadership 
in Shaping Public Attitudes toward the EU, NATO, 
and Transatlantic Issues
marked the accomplishment of its two main ﬆrate-
gic goals: membership in the European Union and 
NATO. These goals were met, but the process of 
adapting to this membership and actively contrib-
uting to it are ongoing, as accession is only the ﬁrﬆ
ﬆep in true integration. Needless to say, the ﬁrﬆ
years of Slovakia’s membership in both alliances 
have proved a true challenge to a majority of the 
public, as people were suddenly confronted with in-
ternational issues that had previously been remote 
to them. Many complex global problems have thus 
become an integral part of public debate. 
This paper focuses on the public’s view of transat-
lantic cooperation, NATO, the United States, and 
US policies toward Slovakia. It also touches on 
a broad range of foreign policy, security and other 
related topics in the context of recent domeﬆic po-
litical developments. 
THE WESTERN VECTOR, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND NATO INTEGRATION 
It cannot be overseen that cultural roots play an es-
sential role in forming public views of the country’s 
foreign policy and integration issues. In the same 
vein, the sense of cultural-civilizational belonging 
to a certain group of countries, as well as the degree 
of cultural aﬃnity to this group are important fac-
tors shaping public attitudes. When it comes to cul-
tural aﬃnities, Slovaks have overwhelmingly posi-
tive views of “the Weﬆ”. It muﬆ be noted, however,
that the countries of Central and Eaﬆern Europe
have not recently been forced to choose between 
Weﬆern Europe and the United States in transat-
lantic rows (e.g. over the invasion of Iraq). For moﬆ
ﬆates in the region, the dilemma that has pervaded
their modern discourse has been whether they be-
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long to the Weﬆ or to the Eaﬆ. The only exception,
and one that essentially suspended this discourse, 
was the period of the Cold War, when rivalry be-
tween the great powers shut oﬀ all alternatives for
those countries that found themselves on the wrong 
side of the Iron Curtain. The Eaﬆ came to be asso-
ciated with imperialiﬆ Russia, as well as with pan-
Slavism, Soviet domination, totalitarian regimes, 
and for many even military occupation. The Weﬆ,
on the other hand, was synonymous with democ-
racy and prosperity. What is more, the Weﬆ repre-
sented the “idea of Europe”, and ﬆood for a cultur-
al space that ﬆretched across the Atlantic. For this
reason, integration with the European Union and 
NATO was always viewed by the countries of the 
eaﬆern bloc as two sides of the same coin. NATO
and the European Union were seen as not merely 
compatible but even mutually reinforcing. 
However, despite the fact that both organizations 
were perceived as belonging to the same ‘Weﬆ’, the
public’s support for membership in them followed 
diﬀerent trajectories. Public attitudes toward inte-
gration with the EU have remained positive and ﬆa-
ble since years prior to the actual date of accession 
with upwards of 70 % of the population supporting 
it. What is more, this support even increased after 
accession along with expectations of the beneﬁts
that membership would bring. The high level of 
public support reﬂected the consensus on this issue
proclaimed by political parties and other opinion-
makers, including elites and the media. 
When we take a closer look at the underlying rea-
sons for the high level of support for joining the EU, 
we can classify them into three groups, two of which 
concerned socio-economic factors. The public be-
lieved that EU membership would increase job op-
portunities and improve the economic situation (i.e. 
increased inveﬆments, greater availability of Euro-
pean funds). The third category of expectations had 
to do with the free movement of people and goods, 
epitomized by the slogan “Europe without Borders”, 
which was underﬆood to symbolize the deﬁnitive
end of the Iron Curtain and the division of Europe. 
And indeed, in the ﬁrﬆ years of membership, all these
expectations were conﬁrmed and became reality, and
support for EU membership spiked upward.
While the factors inﬂuencing the public’s support
for EU accession were prevailingly socio-economic 
in nature, the beneﬁts of joining NATO remained
unclear for a sizable portion of the population. The 
moﬆ widely proclaimed beneﬁt of membership
was increased security. Other (indirect) beneﬁts
included a positive eﬀect on direct foreign inveﬆ-
ments and on the economy, and a ﬆrengthening of
democracy, although these impacts were only mar-
ginal. The lower level of support for NATO mem-
bership compared to EU membership was due part-
ly to the fact that the public was not as convinced of 
its beneﬁts. Moreover, there was general apprehen-
sion regarding the possible negative repercussions 
of membership, such as that Slovakia would pulled 
into armed conﬂicts or would be forced to increase
in military spending, and even that the country 
might lose its sovereignty. These diﬀerences in the
public perception of membership in the European 
Union and NATO remain unchanged even years af-
ter the country’s accession to both organizations. 
PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
– COMPARING SLOVAKIA TO OTHER 
COUNTRIES 
Data provided by the “Transatlantic Trends”1 in-
ternational survey project oﬀer a valuable basis for
analyzing the Slovak public’s attitudes on many for-
eign policy, security, and transatlantic issues. Among 
other aims, the project set out to monitor the public’s 
perceptions of other countries, capturing these on 
a “feeling thermometer”. As can be seen in Graph 
1  The Transatlantic Trends survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Com-
pagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Luso-American Foundation and Fundacion BBVA. The project 
ﬆarted in 2002 and annually includes the United States, nine EU member ﬆates (Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal,
Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and since 2006 Bulgaria and Romania). Collection of data 
and ﬁeld coordination was conducted by the EOS Gallup Europe agency network; in Slovakia it was TNS Slovakia. The
interviews were conducted between June 6 and June 24, 2004. In all countries, random samples of approximately 1,000 
men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. In Slovakia (as in Poland and Turkey) the survey was done 
through face-to-face interviews, while in other countries CATI (Computer Assiﬆed Telephone Interviews) was used.
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1, people’s feelings toward the United States as 
a country are only lukewarm, but a ﬆeady trend
emerges from the data collected annually over the 
longer term. Between 2004 and 2007 we did not regis-
ter any signiﬁcant changes in views of the country as
such. However, in terms of public views of America’s 
ﬆanding in the world and its foreign policy, there
were signiﬁcant shifts. A comparison of the public’s
views of the United States and the European Union 
reveals that they are far more positive and ﬆronger
toward the European Union. Strikingly, the United 
States is regarded nearly as unfavorably as Russia. 
As we will see, public apprehension regarding Russia 
and its policies is relatively weak in Slovakia. 
When we compare the Slovak public’s attitudes to-
ward the United States with those in other coun-
tries included in the survey, Slovakia is close to the 
European lukewarm average. More positive feel-
ings toward the US were regiﬆered in Romania (67
degrees on a 100-point scale), followed by Poland 
Graph 1: Slovakia – developments in public views of the United States, Russia and the EU2, 2004-2007
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2004 – 2007. 
2  Wording of the queﬆion: „Next I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, inﬆitutions and people, with
100 meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and 50 meaning not particu-
larly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country or 
inﬆitution, please say so“.
3  For more, see the ﬆudy by Bútora and Gyárfášová in this publication. 
Graph 2: Comparison of other countries and their 
attitudes toward the U.S. (on a scale from 0 to 100) 
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2007. 
(57 degrees, which despite a drop is ﬆill over the
EU average3). Compared with the tepid 49 degrees 
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in Slovakia and 52 degrees in Bulgaria (and also 
taking into account other indicators), Romanians 
and Poles remain the ﬆrongeﬆ ‘Atlanticiﬆs’.
The attributes of the image of the US and Weﬆern
Europe among Slovaks are better underﬆood with
reference to a research report by the IVO think-tank 
in Bratislava carried out in June 20024, when they were 
examined through a series of open-ended queﬆions
eliciting spontaneous answers and associations. We 
discovered that the public makes a clear diﬆinction:
‘Weﬆern Europe’ elicits moﬆly positive associations
cluﬆered around two categories – economic development 
(high ﬆandard of living, low unemployment, social
security, prosperity, wealth, welfare protection, trade, 
satisfaction, jobs, good pay, etc.) and democracy – free-
dom, tolerance, independence, progress, respect for 
human rights, etc.). The United States is naturally 
also viewed as an economically developed country, 
but its image is harmed by negative associations such 
as superiority, dominance and arrogance.
Even though the research data was obtained some 
time ago, more recent ﬁndings corroborate the re-
sults and allow us to say that there have been no ma-
jor shifts in public perceptions: Diﬀerences remain 
in popular perceptions of the EU and NATO. 
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES  
IN THE WORLD – LEADERSHIP WITH 
A QUESTION MARK? 
The challenge of identifying the factors that shape 
the transatlantic identity, loyalties to the transatlantic 
partnership, or even public attitudes to cooperation, 
faces a signiﬁcant methodological teﬆ – how does
one measure them? How exactly does a researcher 
arrive at the true indicators shaping these phenom-
ena? The Transatlantic Trends research, aside from 
employing methods such as a ‘feeling thermome-
ter’, uses scientiﬁc variables to capture trends, such 
as the desirability of a ﬆrong leadership role for the
US in world aﬀairs, approval or disapproval of the
performance of the US president, and the level of 
belief that NATO is important to the security of the 
country. In Slovakia’s case, from 2004-2007 we saw 
an intereﬆing development that is worth discussing
in greater detail. In 2004, (the ﬁrﬆ year of Slovakia’s
inclusion into the survey) the share of respondents 
who supported Atlanticism was relatively low; the 
following year we saw an increase in pro-American 
and Atlanticiﬆ attitudes, followed by a sharp decline
in 2006. This downward trend continued through 
2007 - in June 2007, only 16% of the Slovak popula-
tion deemed America’s leading role in global aﬀairs
as desirable, a sharp drop from 19% in 2006 and 33% 
in 2005 (Graph 3). A similar downward trend was 
seen in views of the performance of the US president, 
as well as the role of NATO in providing security for 
Slovakia (Graph 4). While the positive results seen 
in the 2005 survey can in part be attributed to the of-
ﬁcial visit of President Bush to Slovakia in February
2005, or a feeling of ‘poﬆ-integration euphoria’, it
was not repeated thereafter. This decline was prob-
ably due to the pre-election campaign rhetoric of the 
then-opposition Smer party, which sharply criticized 
US policy in Iraq as well as the overtly pro-American 
policies of the country’s unpopular government, led 
by Prime Miniﬆer Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998-2006).
Smer also called for Slovak troops ﬆationed in Iraq
to be pulled out. Thus, the continuing decline in the 
Atlanticiﬆ attitudes of the Slovak population also
seems to be a direct result of the weakening transat-
lantic vector in Slovak foreign policy, as well as oth-
er changes that took place on the domeﬆic political
scene following parliamentary elections in 2006 (we 
will re-visit this issue below).
Similarly, the attitudes of the Slovak public toward 
NATO membership remain reserved, compared to 
the positive perception of the European Union. As 
is shown in Graph 4, less than half of the respondents 
see NATO as important for the security of the coun-
try; the actual ﬁgure for Slovakia is 44%, compared to
an average of 55% in the nine countries of the Euro-
pean Union included in the ﬆudy. Still, in Slovakia,
those who do not see the importance of NATO are in 
the minority (30%), with an almoﬆ equal share of re-
4  For details see:  Krivý, V. – Gyárfášová, O.: The Slovak Public and NATO: Report from a Sociological Survey, June 2002. NOC, Bra-
tislava 2002; and Gyárfášová, O.: “The Perception of the United States in Central Europe – the Slovak Case”, in: Bridges 
Across the Atlantic? Attitudes of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks Toward the United States (Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena,-Kucharczyk, Jacek 
– Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej, eds.) Inﬆitute of Public Aﬀairs, Warsaw 2005, pp. 177-201.
N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E  |  93
spondents having no clear position on the issue (26%) 
(Transatlantic Trends 2007). In general, there is ﬆrong
support for NATO membership among older mem-
bers of the alliance, such as the Netherlands and Great 
Britain, where the share of supporters is 66% and 60%, 
respectively. However, the 2007 survey revealed that 
in the neweﬆ members – Romania and Bulgaria – the
share of supporters approaches these levels (62% and 
58%, respectively). Another intereﬆing ﬁnding con-
cerns public opinion in Poland, a NATO member 
since 1999, where support for the alliance is only at 
46% (Transatlantic Trends 2007). It has to be noted, how-
ever, that the survey did not include other Central 
and Eaﬆern European countries. An important trend
that can be identiﬁed from the results is the decline
in the relevance of NATO membership for European 
populations in general. Perhaps the moﬆ ﬆriking de-
cline was in Germany, where support in 2007 fell to 
slightly above the average (55%) from 74% in 2005. 
One reason for this decline could be the overall de-
terioration in transatlantic relations and increasingly 
critical views of US policies among the public in EU-
member countries.
In addition to underﬆanding the dynamics un-
derlying these views of transatlantic issues on the 
domeﬆic scene, it is helpful to look at these trends
in a comparative context. A wide-ranging analy-
sis of the Transatlantic Trends survey data in 20045 
Graph 3: Attitudes of European and Slovak publics toward America’s global leadership (in %)
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2004 – 2007. 
Graph 4: Is NATO essential for the security of 
your country? (% of aﬃrmative responses in Slo-
vakia) 
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2004 – 2007. 
5  Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts and Pierangelo Isernia: Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: the Double Divide in U.S. – European 
Relations (available at: www.transatlantictrends.org).
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ranked various European countries according to 
two criteria: their commitment to the Atlantic mode 
of security (“Atlanticiﬆs” vs. “Independents”), and
their willingness to use military force. Combining 
these two dimensions, the authors of the ﬆudy di-
vided EU member ﬆates into four basic models:
Europe à la Blair (relying on an alliance with the 
US and on military power), Europe à la Schröder 
(allied with the US but emphasizing civilian or soft 
power), Europe à la Chirac (independent of the US 
and capable of acting militarily), and Europe à la 
Switzerland (independent and using civilian or soft 
power alone in foreign policy). In Slovakia’s case, 
the public views expressed in June 2004 placed the 
country in the fourth camp, and made it arguably 
even less pro-force than the (tenuous) European 
consensus.  Needless to say, this only further accen-
tuates the diﬆance between Slovak public attitudes
and US foreign and defense policy. As we ﬆated in
20056, the extent of internal societal polarization is 
also important if the transatlantic orientation is to 
be suﬆainable. For example, Italy, Portugal, Spain
and Slovakia all show deep political polarization 
on issues of Atlanticism. After the general elec-
tion in 2006, this factor proved critical – the whole-
sale change in government led to a weakening of 
the transatlantic orientation, at both the political 
elite level and among the public. Of course, this 
was a two-way ﬆreet, as politicians were perhaps
juﬆ taking advantage of the weak transatlantic
ties among the public, and using the opportunity 
to shape and inﬂuence them. It is now up to them
to show leadership and to frame the discussion on 
transatlantic issues in a conﬆructive manner, with-
out fanning emotions. 
One of the aims of the research was to uncover 
the reasons behind the deterioration in transatlan-
tic relations (Graph 5). The ﬁndings showed that
the European public in general regards the war in 
Iraq and President George W. Bush (who is closely 
linked to the war) as the two main causes of this 
deterioration. Other issues on the transatlantic ‘ra-
dar’, namely conditions at the US detention site at 
Guantanamo and the abﬆention of the US from the
Kyoto Protocol, are not ascribed much weight by 
the public in Slovakia. What is intereﬆing about
the Slovak survey, however, is that 23% of respond-
Graph 5: “Some people think that relations between the United States and Europe have deteriorat-
ed lately. As far as the United States is concerned, if you could name the single moﬆ important factor
that has inﬂuenced this decline, what would it be?” (in %)
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2007. 
6  Gyárfášová, O. - Bútorová, Z. - Velšic, M.: “Slovakia’s Firﬆ Year of EU and NATO Membership from the Citizens’ Per-
spective”, in: Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration – A Year After. Working Paper, Bratislava 2005.
����� ��� ���
��
��
��
� �
�
��
�
� �
�
��
��
�
�
��
��
��
���� ����������
������� ����������
���������������
�� ����
������������������������
��������������������
���������
��������������
�������������
��� �������������
���������������������
����� ��������������
����������������
��������������
�
�
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
N U R T U R I N G  A T L A N T I C I S T S  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E  |  95
ents do not think there has been any deterioration 
in relations between the US and Europe. This runs 
contrary to ﬁndings in other European countries,
which showed a broad consensus on juﬆ this is-
sue. Moreover, in Slovakia, the share of those who 
blame the deterioration on President Bush is much 
lower than in the other countries included in the 
Transatlantic Trends research. 
SECURITY THREAT – RUSSIA? 
The GMF survey carried out in 2007 also exam-
ined perceptions of Russia and the level of public 
concern with various developments in the Russian 
Federation. It was revealed that the Slovak public 
– compared to the European average – is less con-
cerned about developments in Russia. While 59% 
of respondents in Poland expressed concern about 
backsliding on democracy, and the average in Eu-
ropean countries was 61%, in Slovakia this concern 
was shared by a mere 30% of respondents. Moreo-
ver, while a majority of the population in European 
countries showed concern about Russia’s behavior 
toward its neighbors (74% of Poles and 59% of Eu-
rope overall), only 35% of Slovaks shared this worry. 
On the other hand, the Slovak population ﬆill has
some reservations when it comes to Russia – 53% of 
respondents were concerned about Russia’s role as 
an energy supplier, namely its reliability in this re-
gard. Overall, however, the Slovak population does 
not perceive Russia as a potential threat. 
The underlying reasons for these diﬀerences may
be hiﬆoric. In contraﬆ with Poland’s experience
of Russian expansionism, which extends back be-
yond the Soviet era, the Slovak public, like people 
in the other two CEE countries ﬆudied, Romania
and Bulgaria, views Russia with “geopolitical indif-
ference”.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
A number of surveys have conﬁrmed that pub-
lic views of transatlantic cooperation, the US and 
NATO tend to be far more dramatic, polarizing, 
and ﬂuctuating than perceptions of the EU. As the
Graf 6: Share of the population in select European countries expressing concern about develop-
ments in Russia7 (in %)
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2007. 
7  Wording of the queﬆion: „As you may know, some people are concerned about recent developments in Russia.   Those 
who are concerned give a number of diﬀerent reasons. To what extent are you concerned or not about each of the follow-
ing items...“
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survey results illuﬆrate, public opinion in Slovakia
is inﬂuenced by several factors. However, at the
time of the country’s integration, we saw that the 
fragile commitment to the transatlantic partnership 
and a sense of greater international responsibility 
could easily be either challenged or shored up by 
ﬆrong political leadership. After the 2006 elections,
which brought a change in government, we saw the 
onset of ﬆagnation and even regression on many
transatlantic issues. There was a clear connection 
between this decline and the use of populiﬆ rheto-
ric in the debate on Slovakia’s foreign policy fol-
lowing elections.
The changes that occurred were not tangible or 
easily identiﬁable in ﬆate policies or oﬃcial gov-
ernment positions. Inﬆead, they were on the level
of rhetoric and appeals by top political representa-
tives, which had an even ﬆronger impact on public
opinion. For example, the ﬆatement by Prime Min-
iﬆer Robert Fico that “politics, particularly interna-
tional politics, is not about values but always about 
intereﬆs, business, and power”, in eﬀect relegated
foreign policy to “a game of big intereﬆs pursued
by big players.” This view appeals to the inward-
looking, almoﬆ isolationiﬆ mentality of Slovaks,
and reinforces the widely-held attitude that “you 
shouldn’t poke your nose into things that don’t 
concern you.”
Furthermore, the rhetoric of the current ruling coa-
lition tends to highlight ethnicity and makes heavy 
use of symbolism. Political appeals of this nature 
tend to ﬆrengthen the ethno-centrism of the major-
ity Slovak population, and to glorify those ﬁgures
in Slovak hiﬆory who were also put on a pedeﬆal
during the totalitarian wartime Slovak ﬆate from
1939–1945, namely Andrej Hlinka. At the same time, 
during the tenure of the Fico government thus far, 
we have generally seen a lower priority assigned to 
democracy-promotion projects. Inﬆead, the focus
has been on economic intereﬆs over value-based
policies in support of democracy and respect for 
human rights. All of these trends have inﬆilled and
reinforced a sense of helplessness in the public’s 
perception of their country’s role in world aﬀairs.
Moreover, such rhetoric could even undermine the 
ﬂedgling awareness of Slovakia’s international re-
sponsibilities and the public’s belief in democratic 
values in the conduct of foreign policy.  
In 2006, Ivan Kraﬆev correctly noted that while dur-
ing the Cold War, foreign policy and security issues 
were excluded from the domain of electoral politics 
due to the nature of the security threat, now these is-
sues are at the center of electoral politics, and NATO 
could become the victim of a populiﬆ backlash. In
the case of Slovakia, the (re)emergence of populiﬆ
rhetoric in foreign policy cannot be attributed entire-
ly to a change in the nature of the security threats, but 
also has to be seen as a consequence of the change in 
government after the elections of 2006.8 Based on the 
Transatlantic Trends survey, GMF analyﬆ Ronald
Asmus diﬆinguishes two categories of countries9: 1) 
those whose publics are willing to support an activiﬆ
foreign policy, are pro-US and largely pro-European, 
and whose leaders want to punch above their weight 
(Poland, Romania), and 2) countries whose publics 
and elite are more inward looking, minimaliﬆ and
non-activiﬆ  (Slovakia, Bulgaria). Moving Slova-
kia out of this category will not be possible without 
a ﬆrong commitment toward transatlantic coopera-
tion, and its active promotion, by political leaders 
and other public actors. 
REFERENCES: 
Asmus, R. – Everts, P. P. – Isernia, P.: Across the Atlan-
tic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in U.S.-European 
Relations, 2004; http:// www.transatlantictrends.org.
Bútora, M.: Nightmares from the Paﬆ, Dreams of
the Future, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, Number 
4, October 2007, pp. 47 - 55. 
Gyárfášová, O. - Bútorová, Z. - Velšic, M.: “Slovakia’s 
Firﬆ Year of EU and NATO Membership from the
8  For more see: Bútora Martin, Gyárfášová Oľga, Mesežnikov Grigorij, Skladony W. Thomas (eds): Democracy and Populism 
in Central Europe: The Visegrad Elections and Their Aftermath, Bratislava, Inﬆitute for Public Aﬀairs, 2007.
9  Presentation of TT 07 by Ronald Asmus in Warsaw, September 26, 2007. Later on, a third group – not in the TT ﬁndings
– was identiﬁed: countries whose political leaderships are activiﬆ, but where the public can ﬆill go either way (the Czech
Republic and the Baltic countries).
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INTRODUCTION
Poland is America’s friend and ally, one of the moﬆ
consiﬆently pro-American countries in the Euro-
pean Union. Polish governments have supported 
American policies even to the detriment of Poland’s 
position within the EU. Moreover, there has been 
little or no discrepancy between these policies and 
public opinion. Polish people have been supportive 
of America both because they felt it was in their inter-
eﬆ, and because they genuinely like the country.
But things have ﬆarted to change. The title of this
paper is drawn from its thesis that the positive pic-
ture of America in poﬆ-1989 Poland was due in part
to a wholesale rejection of the crude anti-Ameri-
canism of the Communiﬆ era1. In the early years of 
poﬆ-Communiﬆ transformation, America enjoyed
a kind of unrivalled support that did not leave much 
room for critical reﬂection on American society or
the goals and means of US policies. Looking back, 
the turning point in attitudes towards the US came 
in 2003-2004, and can be attributed to two events 
that occurred within several months of each other: 
the launch of the Iraq war, and Poland’s accession 
to the EU. 
This paper is based on an analysis of data from sur-
veys on views regarding the US, Americans, and US 
policies in Poland. We contextualize the data by 
comparing Poland with the reﬆ of Europe and the
world, and compare it over time to outline trends in 
views of the United States. 
BEATA ROGUSKA, MICHAŁ WENZEL
The End of Anti-Anti-Americanism?  
Attitudes towards the USA in Poland
OPINION FORMATION
There are four major sources of attitudes towards 
the US, each aﬀecting a diﬀerent number of people
and varying in the ﬆrength and nature of its im-
pact. 
The ﬁrﬆ is direct personal experience gained by 
people who have lived in America for some period. 
Few people have had that direct, hands-on experi-
ence, as only 500,000 to 1 million people living in 
Poland have ever been to the US2. However, even 
though it concerns relatively few people, this source 
produces informed opinions about everyday real-
ity. Information gathered personally also tends to 
be disseminated further, as time spent in the US is 
a popular topic of conversation for many who have 
visited the country.
A far more formidable source of views regarding 
the US is indirect personal experience. By this we 
mean information obtained from someone who vis-
ited the US or who lives there: people who have vis-
ited or worked in the US give their perspectives on 
that country, while immigrants communicate with 
friends and relatives back home. Polish immigrants 
form one of the largeﬆ national groupings in the
US, and they have been a valuable source of infor-
mation that would otherwise have been censored 
or unavailable. Krzysztof Michałek, director of the 
Inﬆitute of American Studies at the University of
Warsaw, eﬆimates that “[from 1918-89], on aver-
age, every third Polish person living in the country 
1  Mateusz Fałkowski called this pattern of opinion formation anti-antiamericanism; „Poﬆawy Polaków wobec Stanów 
Zjednoczonych, Amerykanów i ﬆosunków transatlantyckich”, In: L. Kolarska-Bobińska, J. Kucharczyk, P.M. Kaczyński 
(ed.), „Moﬆy przez Atlantyk?”, ISP, Warszawa 2005, p.41
2  According to CBOS, 2% of adults were in the US in the laﬆ 20 years; according to Transatlantic Trends, 4% of adults
visited the USA in their lifetime. The proportion of Weﬆ Europeans who have been to the USA is much higher.
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received ﬁrﬆ-hand information from the United
States”3. Information about living conditions and 
the possibility of improving one’s ﬆandard of living
may have played a very important role in creating 
an image of the US as a land of opportunity. “The 
USA oﬀered not only a chance to make money, but
also to spend it in a way that guaranteed, on aver-
age, a higher living ﬆandard and a better quality
of life than in Poland and Europe at that time,” 
Michałek wrote. Moreover, these opportunities 
were sometimes exaggerated by emigrants who did 
not want to admit failure.
The third source of opinion-shaping information is 
experience of the impact of US policy, especially 
foreign policy, which shapes the attitudes of virtu-
ally everyone intereﬆed in public aﬀairs. During
the Cold War, Communiﬆ propagandiﬆs tried to
exploit this theme. For example, during the period 
of Martial Law in Poland in the 1980s, food short-
ages were attributed to US sanctions. However, ef-
forts to tarnish America’s image by criticizing its 
international policies were ineﬀective4. Many peo-
ple viewed the US even more positively than Weﬆ
European countries because of its tough policies 
towards the USSR under the anti-Communism of 
Ronald Reagan. The public’s wholesale rejection 
of the Communiﬆ regime’s shallow anti-American
propaganda resulted in an image of America in the 
poﬆ-1989 period that was rather one-dimensional.
Unlike in Weﬆern Europe, “the US did not have
a negative image as an advocate of economic glo-
balization and neo-liberalism”5. We embraced the 
US whole-heartedly as an ally, a truﬆed friend who
enabled us to join NATO. 
This situation only ﬆarted to change when the US
became our ally formally within NATO. Some be-
gan to realize that Poland was not as important for 
the US as we were wont to believe. The futile ﬆrug-
gle to obtain a visa waiver ﬆatus for Polish citizens,
for example, directly aﬀected many people in Po-
land, not juﬆ those who were refused a visa. More
importantly, the war in Iraq taught many people 
that involvement in US-sponsored missions had 
coﬆs as well as beneﬁts. A gap ﬆarted to open
up between the political elite and the public. Of 
course, the military might of the US is only one of 
many aspects of US foreign policy that people ex-
perience in Poland, and may be even less important 
at times than America’s economic power.
The moﬆ important source of public attitudes to-
wards America is also probably the hardeﬆ to ﬆudy.
The impact of cultural artifacts (chieﬂy ﬁlms and
TV programs, but also pop songs, Internet content, 
etc.) aﬀects the entire populace. It would be hard
to ﬁnd an adult Pole who has not seen an American
ﬁlm or watched a TV program made in the US. The
ubiquity of US cultural products has created a vivid 
image of the country. “Film has played an important 
role in shaping pro-American attitudes… Viewers, es-
pecially those with poor analytical skills, treated the 
content of ﬁlms as a record of the American reality,
including what US towns and houses looked like, 
how homes were decorated, how people dressed, 
and how they behaved in private… The country and 
its inhabitants were familiar [to Poles].”6 
The four sources outlined above are not a complete 
liﬆ of factors shaping opinions about the US. In re-
cent years, international civil society has had an in-
creasing impact, such as the anti-globalization move-
ment. Communication among these people, the 
conclusions they reach and the actions they take can 
deeply aﬀect individual attitudes. Another source of
opinion-forming information is cultural products 
about the US that are made outside America. Un-
der Communism, the US was presented in a biased 
way by the ﬆate propaganda machine. On the other
hand, Polish pop culture pretended to be American, 
and essentially “Americanized” itself. Books were of-
ten set in America, and Polish authors even adopted 
English pseudonyms (e.g. Joe Alex). 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS AMERICANS
Mounting criticism of US foreign policy, especial-
ly in Iraq, and rising satisfaction with EU mem-
3  „W Poszukiwaniu Nowej Kolchidy”, in: L. Kolarska-Bobińska et al. (ed) op.cit., p. 18
4  For inﬆance, Poles tended to juﬆify Vietnam War , Michałek in L. Kolarska-Bobińska et al. (ed) op.cit., p. 30
5  L. Kolarska-Bobińska et al. (ed) op.cit., p. 30, p.10
6  Michałek In: L. Kolarska-Bobińska et al. (eds.), Op.cit. p 32
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bership have combined to darken the image of 
America and Americans since 2004. Attitudes to 
Americans are ﬆill favorable, but in recent years
feelings have cooled. Research done by the CBOS 
(Center for Measuring Public Opinion) in recent 
years shows that Poles regard Americans with more 
sympathy than moﬆ other nations. In September
1997, for example, almoﬆ two-thirds of adult Poles
(64%) said they had warm feelings for Americans, 
and until 2003 the ratio of people who regarded 
Americans positively remained over 50%. But from 
2004 onwards, the war in Iraq, increasing skepti-
cism regarding George Bush’s foreign policy, and 
unfulﬁlled hopes for tangible beneﬁts from the al-
liance with the US (e.g. the visa waiver) began to 
cool sympathy for Americans. In Auguﬆ 2007, 44%
of Poles expressed positive feelings towards Ameri-
cans, while 21% held negative views. 
Although attitudes towards Americans remain posi-
tive overall, they are no longer exceptionally so. In 
2007, Americans were less popular than the English, 
the Irish, the Czechs, Italians, the French, Spaniards, 
Slovaks, Greeks, the Dutch, and Hungarians7. 
The data from the Transatlantic Trends ﬆudy con-
ﬁrm these ﬁndings8. In 2007, the average declared 
warmth, or “temperature” of feelings towards the 
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Graph1: Attitudes towards Americans (percentage expressing sympathy)
 Source: CBOP.
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Graph 2:  Sympathy for nations (in %)
Source: CBOP.
7  More on that can be found in CBOS report „Sympatia 
i niechęć do innych narodów”, available at www.cbos.pl
8  Data from Transatlantic Trends ﬆudy are available at:
www.transatlantictrends.org
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US in Poland was 57 on a scale from 0 to 100, where 
0 means very cold or hoﬆile, and 100 very warm and
friendly. Feelings towards the EU were better, as the 
European Union as a whole was rated 69. The data 
also conﬁrmed that positive feelings towards the
US have dropped in recent years (in 2002 the score 
was 65), while positive emotions for EU countries 
have increased. In 2006, the European Union as 
a whole was rated 65, with Italy at 66, Great Britain 
65, Spain 64, and France 61. Germany, with a score 
of 55, was the only one of the larger EU countries to 
be received with cooler feelings.
A decline in positive attitudes towards the US in 
recent years (especially between 2002 and 2003) was 
seen in other European countries as well. In those 
EU countries where the temperature was measured 
between 2002 and 2007, the average drop was from 
64 in 2002 to 53 in 2007. In 2007, the moﬆ pro-Amer-
ican society was Romania, with a score of 67. 
POLAND: BETWEEN THE US AND THE EU
The change in feelings about America and its peo-
ple suggeﬆs that attitudes towards the US have to
be analyzed againﬆ the background of Poles’ at-
titudes towards the European Union. Opinions 
about America are inﬂuenced not only by reactions
to US foreign policy and opinions on Polish-Ameri-
can relations, but by Poland’s EU membership as 
well. 
Before EU accession, Polish people rejected the 
idea of a trade-oﬀ between cooperating with the
US and with the EU, not wanting to be forced to 
choose between the American and the European 
option. The public agreed with the political elite 
in this respect: Poland should ﬆrive for both good
relations with the EU and special relations with the 
US. Although this position was not always under-
ﬆood by Poland’s EU partners and irritated them
at times (Poland was even called “America’s Trojan 
horse in Europe”), it was ardently pursued.
That Polish people saw no contradiction in choos-
ing both the American and the European option 
was due to the fact that they regarded both the US 
and the EU nations as Weﬆern countries. In Po-
land, the Weﬆ is a symbol of economic develop-
ment and of the progress of civilization, wealth and 
well-being. Countries seen as belonging to the Weﬆ
are viewed positively: we want to imitate them and 
be one of them. These aspirations, however, are not 
always accompanied by full underﬆanding of the
diﬀerences in European and US socio-economic
rules, value syﬆems, and political and cultural ori-
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Graph 3: Warmth of feelings towards the US in Europe and Poland (on a scale from 0 to 100)
Source: Transatlantic Trends, data for Europe. The graph charts the average for seven countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Italy.
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entations. Only in recent years have Poles ﬆarted
to see any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between EU coun-
tries and the US; this process has not had a signiﬁ-
cant impact on attitudes towards America. 
Poles have been very satisﬁed with the eﬀects of EU
membership so far. The public believes it has helped 
speed up economic development, reduce unem-
ployment and improve living conditions. More and 
more people see inveﬆments around them that have
been co-ﬁnanced from EU funds. People also be-
lieve that EU accession has improved the position 
of Poland in Europe. Satisfaction with these results 
has raised support for membership to 86%, which 
is almoﬆ universal9. Another result that is rarely dis-
cussed but is very important is the improvement in 
Polish people’s self-image due to their EU mem-
bership. After three years, Poles regard themselves 
far more favorably than before accession10. They 
are losing their self-doubt, and when they compare 
themselves with Weﬆ Europeans they see not only
their weaknesses but also their ﬆrong points. They
feel more and more European, but at the same time 
have kept and even ﬆrengthened their cultural and
national identity. Satisfaction with the results of ac-
cession and the improvement in Poles’ self-image 
as members of the European family of nations have 
ﬆrengthened their ties with other European coun-
tries. Polish people associate their well-being and 
economic development with membership in the 
EU. Poles also want to extend political cooperation 
within the EU and build new common European 
inﬆitutions, even if this is not always reﬂected in the
policies of the Polish government.
Polish people want a Europe that is not only eco-
nomically and politically ﬆrong, but a global play-
er as well. In the Transatlantic Trends ﬆudy from
2007, 84% of Polish people agreed that the EU 
should take more responsibility for dealing with in-
ternational threats. In the same ﬆudy, 76% favored
ﬆrong EU leadership in world aﬀairs. On the other
hand, people are split over any ﬆrengthening of
US leadership, with slightly more people regard-
ing ﬆrong US leadership as undesirable (43%) than
desirable (41%). 
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Graph 4: It is desirable that the US/EU show ﬆrong leadership in world aﬀairs (in %)
Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2007. 
Note: Ambivalent responses are omitted.
9  More on his can be fund in CBOS report BS/70/2007 „Ocena skutków przyﬆąpienia Polski do UE po trzech latach
członkoﬆwa”
10  CBOS report BS/118/2007 „Zmiany wizerunku Polaka i Europejczyka po trzech latach członkoﬆwa Polski w UE”
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Poles’ preference for the EU rather than the US as 
a global political leader indicates that they hope for 
a change in the current model of international lead-
ership, which they would rather see based on eco-
nomic ﬆrength than on military power. In the 2007
Transatlantic Trends ﬆudy, 93% of Poles agreed
that in dealing with international threats, the EU 
should spend more money on development aid. Al-
moﬆ three-quarters (71%) supported using trade to
inﬂuence other countries’ behavior. The majority
believed that the EU should commit more troops 
for peacekeeping missions. At the same time, 76% 
rejected the idea of committing more troops for 
combat missions. In general, Poles do not believe 
that military action can yield positive results, and 
only a quarter of Poles (26%) agree that under some 
conditions, war is necessary to obtain juﬆice. In EU
countries, by comparison, 32% believe that war can 
be the means of laﬆ resort, while in the US the ﬁg-
ure is 74%. This would indicate that expectations 
of US leadership around the world have not been 
fulﬁlled.
Although conﬁdence in American leadership has
been undermined in recent years, a large segment of 
the Polish public (41%, TT 2006) supports ﬆrength-
ening the partnership between the US and the EU 
on defense policy and international relations. Only 
Romanians (51%) are more supportive of this. In 
other European countries, more people would rath-
er see the EU remain independent of the US. 
Although support for a partnership between the 
EU and the US is relatively high, it is lower than in 
previous years, a trend seen in all other European 
countries except France and Italy. In 2004, 44% of 
Polish people supported ﬆrengthening EU-US re-
lations, vs. 49% in 2005. 
The laﬆ TT ﬆudy from 2007 also proves that Polish
society supports closer cooperation between the 
EU and the US. The majority (57%) believe that 
Europe should address international problems 
in partnership with the United States, while 37% 
support independent EU actions. In the EU, the 
opinion that partnership with the US is necessary 
also prevailed (52%), though it was less commonly 
voiced. 
Europe: Anti-American or anti-Bush?
An analytical problem arises when the data from 
the years 2003-2007 are analyzed: does the decline 
in support for America’s international role signal 
a shift in attitudes towards the US per se, or rather 
disaﬀection with President George W. Bush, his
policies and his adminiﬆration? To what extent is
George Bush equated with America? This queﬆion
can only be answered conclusively after a new ad-
Source: Transatlantic Trends. 
Note: Ambivalent responses are omitted.
*  Europe = average for 12 countries: France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland.
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Graph 5: Do you think that the partnership on security and diplomatic aﬀairs between the US and
the EU should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the EU take a more inde-
pendent approach from the US?*
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miniﬆration takes over in 2009, but an analysis of
comparative trends oﬀers some insights.
In European countries, attitudes towards the US 
diﬀer from feelings about George W. Bush: Euro-
peans do not equate American policy with Bush. 
Throughout 2002-2007, support for ﬆrong US
leadership remained about twice as high as approv-
al of George W. Bush’s handling of international 
problems. Both indices fell, but the gap remained. 
A large proportion of Europeans retain conﬁdence
in the US as a global player in the poﬆ-Bush era.
In Poland the picture is diﬀerent. The data suggeﬆ
that Polish respondents equate American leader-
ship with Bush’s policies. The drop in conﬁdence in
American leadership in Poland was similar to that 
in the EU, but on the other hand, Polish people re-
mained exceptionally supportive of Bush. His ap-
proval ratings fell sharply, but are ﬆill higher than
in any other EU country except Romania. Bush’s 
approval ratings are even higher in Poland than in 
the US.  
Moﬆ people in Poland (53%) think that the man-
agement of the war in Iraq is the main reason that 
relations between the US and Europe have dete-
riorated in recent years. However, they tend not to 
blame Bush personally (15%). In European coun-
tries, the opinion that the war in Iraq is the culprit 
(38%) is followed only narrowly by the belief that 
Bush himself is to blame (34%)11.
In a global perspective, Poland has always been 
a place where George W. Bush enjoyed relatively 
high popularity. In 2000, 40% thought that from 
the Polish perspective, Bush would be a better 
president, compared to 7% who supported Al 
Gore. In 2004, in a global survey of international 
electoral preferences in 35 countries before the US 
elections12, Poland was one of only three countries 
where more people favored Bush than Kerry (the 
other two being Nigeria and the Philippines). The 
result was 31% to 26% in Poland, making it the only 
European country where this happened. The only 
other Central European country polled, the Czech 
Republic, supported Kerry overwhelmingly. 
Table 1: Un/desirability of the U.S. ﬆrong leadership
POLAND
How desirable is it that the US exert ﬆrong leadership in
world aﬀairs?
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Desirable 64 53 39 42 39 40
Undesirable 22 34 47 44 44 43
Do you approve or disapprove of the way US President 
George W. Bush is handling foreign policy?
Approve 62 58 42 53 40 42
Disapprove 26 30 51 37 46 44
EUROPE*
How desirable is it that the US exert ﬆrong leadership in
world aﬀairs?
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Desirable 64 45 39 41 40 39
Undesirable 31 49 55 55 54 54
Do you approve or disapprove of the way US President 
George W. Bush is handling foreign policy?
Approve 38 30 23 26 19 19
Disapprove 56 64 74 70 76 77
Source: Transatlantic Trends.
* Europe = Average for 7 countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK and Portugal.
11  Transatlantic Trends, 2007
12  PIPA/Globescan/CBOS survey, available at www.pipa.org
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE US
American foreign policy has had a direct impact on 
Poland given that the US is not only our NATO 
ally, but also led the “coalition of the willing” which 
divided NATO members into those who supported 
and those who opposed the war in Iraq. Poland’s 
decision to participate in this operation was a turn-
ing point both in Polish-US relations and in Polish 
people’s view of the US since 1989.
With the outbreak of the war in Iraq, America 
ceased to be a benevolent superpower for Poles. 
People began to queﬆion the US role as a “global
policeman”. People also ﬆarted to look at Poland’s
participation on US missions in terms of coﬆs and
beneﬁts. The coﬆs were seen as including the ﬁnan-
cial burden on the ﬆate, the potential threat from
terroriﬆs, the potential death of Polish soldiers in
Iraq, and conﬂicts with Poland’s EU partners over
its participation. Beneﬁts included an increased role
for Poland on the world scene, better security guar-
antees from the US, and economic beneﬁts from
contracts in Iraq. For many, the coﬆs ﬆarted to out-
weigh the beneﬁts.
Global decline in American inﬂuence
The world has loﬆ a lot of conﬁdence in America
as a force for good, as has Poland, especially from 
2004 to 2006. According to a PIPA/Globescan/
CBOS global survey, moﬆ people now see Ameri-
ca’s inﬂuence on world aﬀairs as mainly negative.
In Poland, the proportion of people who see the 
US role as positive has dropped sharply as well: 
despite being in the majority in 2004, they fell 
to slightly over one-third of the population in 
2006.
Compared with the other countries in the poll, 
however, Poles are ﬆill relatively sympathetic to-
wards the US. Despite the drop, approval of Amer-
ican inﬂuence ﬆill prevails over rejection, although
the trend is clearly negative. Moreover, the rise in 
the number of people who have no opinion (moﬆ
respondents, in fact) shows that while support for 
America’s role is waning; it is not being replaced by 
active rejection of US inﬂuence.
Table 2:  Views about America’s inﬂuence on  
 world aﬀairs  
POLAND
In your opinion, does the US have 
a mainly positive or a mainly neg-
ative inﬂuence on world aﬀairs?
XI 2004 XII 2006
mainly positive 52 37
mainly negative 21 24
depends, neither, don’t know 27 39
WORLD*
In your opinion, does the US have 
a mainly positive or a mainly neg-
ative inﬂuence on world aﬀairs?
2004-05 2006-07
mainly positive 40 29
mainly negative 46 52
depends, neither, don’t know 14 19
* PIPA/GLOBESCAN/CBOS DATA. TABLE CON-
TAINS AVERAGE VALUES FOR 18 COUNTRIES: 
Argentina, Auﬆralia, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Ger-
many, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Italy, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea and 
Turkey. Surveys conducted from Sept. 2004 to Jan. 2005, 
and Sept. 2006 to Jan. 2007.
Opinions of America’s handling of international 
problems
Around the world, the majority of people disap-
prove of the way the US government is handling 
international problems. Iran and North Korea’s nu-
clear programs, the Israel-Hezbollah conﬂict, the
war in Iraq, and global warming are all being mis-
handled, according to moﬆ people in the countries
surveyed. Response patterns vary little from issue 
to issue, suggeﬆing that the general attitude to the
US (negative overall) is being reﬂected in opinions
on speciﬁc policy areas.
Poles take a more complex view of US foreign poli-
cy. Regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, moﬆ
people approve of US policy, while approval and 
rejection of US policy in Iran are equally ﬆrong.
However, there is ﬆrong disapproval of America’s
handling of the Middle Eaﬆ conﬂicts in Lebanon
and Iraq. US policy in Iraq is especially ﬆrongly
criticized, probably because Polish soldiers are risk-
ing their lives there. Opinions on US foreign policy 
are not ﬆrongly held, as shown by the high number
of “don’t know” answers. 
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Table 3: Opinions of the US government’s (in %) 
POLAND (DECEMBER 2006)
handling of… approval disapproval don’t know, ambivalent
Iran’s nuclear program 32 34 33
the Israeli-Hezbollah war 22 40 38
North Korea’s nuclear program 38 26 36
global warming 20 31 49
the war in Iraq 21 52 27
WORLD (2006-07)* 
Opinions of the US government’s handling of… approval disapproval don’t know, ambivalent
Iran’s nuclear program 28 60 12
the Israeli-Hezbollah war 21 65 14
North Korea’s nuclear program 30 54 16
global warming 27 56 17
The war In Iraq 20 73 7
Source: PIPA/Globescan/CBOS data. *Table contains average values for 25 countries. Survey conducted in Argentina, Auﬆralia, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and US; ﬁeldwork done March 22, 2006 to September 1, 2007.
Moﬆ people around the world think that the US
military presence in the Middle Eaﬆ provokes more
conﬂicts than it prevents. Poles are little diﬀerent:
only a small minority believes the US to be a ﬆabi-
lizing force in the region. 
This increasing skepticism towards America’s in-
ternational role clearly has to do with the growing 
feeling that the Iraq operation has been a failure, 
and that Polish intereﬆs are threatened. Support
for Poland’s participation in the Iraq operation was 
never high. The majority of people always opposed 
it, but at the beginning there was considerable sup-
port, reaching 42% in January 2004. However, it 
soon ﬆarted to decline, and at the beginning of
2007 reached a record low. 
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Source: PIPA/Globescan/CBOS data. 
* World=average values for 25 countries: Argentina, Auﬆralia, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Brit-
ain, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South 
Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and US; ﬁeldwork done March 22, 2006 to Sept. 1, 2007.
Graph 6:  Opinions about the US military presence in the Middle Eaﬆ (in %)
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Table 4: Support for Polish troops in Iraq  (in %) 
VII VIII IX X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I II III V XII I I VI
’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07
Support 36 34 40 37 28 33 42 35 36 29 22 28 23 26 25 23 24 27 28 28 28 20 22 23 20 15
Oppose 55 60 53 57 67 62 53 60 60 66 74 66 73 70 71 74 72 68 68 68 69 75 72 72 77 81
Don’t know 8 6 7 6 5 5 5 6 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 5 4 5 3 5 6 5 4 4
Source: CBOS.
The public believes that having Polish troops in Iraq may be good for the Iraqis, and may ﬆrengthen
Polish-US relations, but that keeping them there is not in Poland’s intereﬆ. These results seem to indicate
that for many people there is a trade-oﬀ between doing what is good for Poland (i.e. withdrawing from
Iraq) and pursuing a policy that will produce good relations with America (i.e. remaining in Iraq).  
This disaﬀection with international US-led military operations is evident if we consider support for the
inﬆallation of the “anti-missile shield” in Poland. At the beginning, the project received a warm welcome,
The data suggeﬆ that support for the project de-
pends on whether or not it will be unilateral. If 
the anti-missile shield were a joint NATO project, 
but this approval soon dissipated. Moﬆ people now
reject the idea of having missile launch facilities in-
ﬆalled here.  
Table 5: Polish troops in Iraq (in %)
In your opinion, is prolonging the mission of Polish troops in Iraq another 12 months beneﬁcial for…
Poland Iraq Polish-American relations
Deﬁnitely beneﬁcial 3
19
17
59
22
67
Somewhat beneﬁcial 16 42 45
Somewhat detrimental 36
66
13
21
8
11
Deﬁnitely detrimental 30 8 3
Don’t know 15 21 22
Source: CBOS.
Source: CBOS.
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Graph 7: Poland and the US are negotiating the inﬆallation of a US base in Poland with missile launch
capabilities as part of the anti-missile shield. The syﬆem is designed to deﬆroy nuclear missiles in case
of attack from ﬆates sponsoring terrorism. Do you support or oppose the inﬆallation of such a missile
launch facility?
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it would gain more support. Moﬆ Poles believe it
would be a better idea if the shield was a NATO-
operated inﬆallation.
Table 6: Views about anti-missile shield (in %)
Do you think it is a better or a worse 
idea for the anti-missile shield to be 
a NATO-operated rather than a US-
operated syﬆem?
Auguﬆ  2007
Better idea 40
No diﬀerence 30
Worse idea 4
Don’t know 26
Source: CBOS.
CONCLUSION
Attitudes towards America and American people 
have been changing in recent years. Poles have al-
ways had a particularly positive attitude to every-
thing that comes from America, but now are ﬆart-
ing to look at the US critically as well.
These cooler attitudes have been inﬂuenced by the
increasingly critical evaluation of US foreign policy 
under George W. Bush. The myth of America as 
a guardian of the world order has been weakened 
by rising skepticism over the military mission in 
Iraq and by increasing rejection of Poland’s involve-
ment there. Poles are having doubts about the US 
as a global superpower and are ﬆarting to queﬆion
US peace-making eﬀorts, seeing them increasingly
as yielding chaos and terrorism.
The other factor that has inﬂuenced the perception
of the US in recent years is Poland’s accession to the 
European Union. Poland’s membership and the 
subsequent economic migration to developed Weﬆ
European countries have made Europe more attrac-
tive. Poles associate their hopes for a better life with 
EU membership. As Europe gains importance as 
a place to live and work, the image of America as 
a country of unlimited opportunities for ambitious 
and hard-working people is losing its grip on our 
imaginations. The sense of belonging to Europe is 
becoming ﬆronger, while the emotional diﬆance to
the US is growing. 
This trend is being reinforced by economic factors. 
For many people, America is no longer attractive 
from the economic perspective. Rising incomes in 
Poland and the falling value of the US dollar rela-
tive to the Polish zloty have made working in the 
USA less lucrative than it used to be. Getting a job 
in America is not juﬆ diﬃcult due to the visa re-
quirement, but also coﬆly (both ﬁnancially and
emotionally) due to the diﬆance between Poland
and the US. With the decision of some EU coun-
tries (especially the UK and Ireland) to open their 
labor markets, the advantages of the EU relative to 
the US have increased. Poles working in Europe can 
maintain their ties to their home country in ways 
that are impossible for people working in America, 
and earn about the same. 
Criticisms of George W. Bush’s foreign policies and 
increasing identiﬁcation with the EU have prompt-
ed Poles to prefer the EU as a global leader rather 
than the US. It is possible that Poles are hoping 
that the model of global leadership changes from 
the current one, which is based on the military dom-
inance of the US. 
While we believe the factors discussed above to be 
the key determinants of people’s attitudes, there may 
be others. For inﬆance, the formation of a interna-
tional civil society has begun in the new EU member 
ﬆates. One example is the anti-globalization move-
ment, which queﬆions the model of globalization
proposed by the US. Polish activiﬆs were among
the moﬆ active at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm,
where proteﬆers tried do diﬆurb the conference.
One indicator that their arguments may be gaining 
currency is that close to one-third of adult Poles re-
ject the US’ handling of global warming. 
However, all of this needs to be seen in context. In 
our analysis of the changing perception of America 
and Americans, we considered trends from the laﬆ
few years. Although feelings for America have in-
deed cooled, it is too early to talk about a qualitative 
change in attitudes to the US and its society. Amer-
ica remains a country we like and respect, and one 
with which we should maintain close relations.
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